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A Process Theory of Torts
Jay Tidmarsh*

Torts is filled with wonderful contradictions. On the level of theory,
there are the well-known oppositions of justice to efficiency and of
formalism to realism and pragmatism.I On the level of metadoctnne, there
is the dyad of strict liability and negligence. 2 On the more mundane level
of doctrine, hosts of opposing solutions to common factual occurrences
exist.3 On the level of practice, the fact that two juries hearing the same
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Mark Grady and
Alan Gunn for their insights on an earlier version of this draft, the participants in the Friday
Faculty Forum for their comments on an earlier version of these ideas, and Victor Nieto for
technical assistance.
1. For fuller discussions of the impact of these theories on torts, see G. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW INAMERICA 63-113 (1980), and nfra part I.A. See also BAILEY KUKLIN
& JEFFREY W STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 131-92 (1994) (describing jurisprudential influences on law).
2. For descriptions of the tug-of-war between negligence and strict liability in AngloAmerican history, see OLIVER W HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 85-90, 102-19 (1881);
C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 154-83 (1949); MORTON J.
HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 85-99 (1977); S.F.C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 285-313 (2d ed. 1981); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV 641 (1989)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Early Tort Law]; Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Tort Law]. Other cultures have faced the same choice. See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF & DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 50-62 (Donald G. Gifford &
William M. Richman eds., 1991) (describing negligence and strict liability rules in 10
European and Pacific-rim countries); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 28, 32 (1987) (questioning negligence and strict liability rules in England, France,
Germany, and former Soviet Union). On the general choice between negligence and strict
liability, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 61-125 (5th ed. 1990);
MARK F GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1-95 (1994).
3. For example, think of 'the many solutions proposed for the problem of the plaintiff
who cannot identify the precise manufacturer of a generic product marketed by numerous
independent corporations. See Sindeltv. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.) (adopting "market
share" approach when substantial share of manufacturers in local market is joined), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Mulcahy v Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986)
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evidence might reach different conclusions is so widely accepted that it
passes without notice.4
I take as a starting point one of the deepest and most enduring
oppositions in tort law- the metatheoretical division between "conceptualism" and "anti-conceptualism." "Conceptualism"' holds that torts is (or
should be) governed by a single, true foundation from which specific doctrinal consequences-the "correct" state of tort rules-follow The opposing view, which we nught call "anti-conceptualism," demes the validity
of the conceptualist enterprise at every turn: Torts has no true foundation,
tort rules and outcomes are culturally and historically determined, and
grand conceptual theories about torts are intellectually bankrupt. Many
legal economists and corrective justice theorists have lined up on the
conceptual side of the debate,6 while most realists, 7 pragmatists, 8 critical
(rejecting market share approach); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.)
(allowing use of market share approach and imposing liability on basis of national rather than
local market shares), cert. dented, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Collins v Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d
37 (Wis.) (allowing plaintiff to sue any manufacturer of product, even if substantial share is
not joined), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
4. Cf. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 185 (1930) ("[W]e may have a process for
passing judgment in negligence cases, but practically no 'law of negligence' beyond the
process itself."). Many even suspect that juries occasionally ignore that stated legal
rule-whether it be negligence or strict liability. See Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("In leaving it to the jury to decide
whether the inference [of negligence] has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against
it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability "); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984) ("Imposing a negligence standard for design defect
litigation is only to define in a coherent fashion what our litigants in this case are in fact
arguing and what our jurors are in essence analyzing.").
5. The term "conceptualism" was coined by intellectual historian Edward White. See
WHITE, supra note 1, at 211-30 (discussing "neoconceptualists" who, like original
conceptualists of the late nineteenth century, have attempted to provide overarching theoretical
framework for tort law).
6. Id., see also infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (describing various positions
staked out by corrective justice and economic scholars).
7 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 4; THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
[
LIABILITY I, at xxv (1906) (noting that " n]o definition of tort at once logical and precise can
be given"); WHITE, supra note 1, at 63-1 13 (describing influence of realism on torts).
8. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 5-6 (6th ed. 1983); WHITE, supra note
1, at 232-36 (rejecting idea that single theory holds all of tort law together); cf.Richard Rorty,
The Banality of Pragmatismand the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv 1811, 1813 (1990)
("For myself, I find it hard to discern any interesting philosophical differences between
Unger, Dworkin, and Posner; their differences strike me as entirely political, as differences
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scholars, 9 and empiricists ° have lined up on the other.

At present, the anti-conceptualists hold the high ground. Disagreements by conceptualists on such basic matters as the proper foundational
principle and the correct methodology have resulted in a jarring
(and apparently irreconcilable) cacophony of claims about the true nature
of torts and its doctrines. Today, tort law is not entirely consistent
with the normative or descriptive vision of any conceptualist; indeed,
torts cannot even agree on such simple matters as the meaning of
"negligence" il or the proper liability principles to apply to discrete events
like ground damage from aircraft 2 and injuries from rampaging eleabout how much change and what sort of change American institutions need."). See generally
Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis" A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort
Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv 765 (1987); Catharine P Wells, Tort Law as CorrectiveJustice:
A PragmaticJustificationfor Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv 2348 (1990).
9. See generally Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV 785 (1990);
J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. Rlv 197 (1990); Leslie Bender, A
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3 (1988) [hereinafter
Bender, Pnmer]; Leslie Bender, An Overview ofFemmst Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L.
RaV 575 (1993) (reviewing feminist literature concermng torts).
10. See generallyKAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN TORT LITIGATION (1986); Michael J.Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behaviorof the Tort LitigationSystem-and Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REv 1147 (1992).
11. Tort law has never settled upon a universal description of "negligence." See, e.g.,
Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856) (Alderson, B.)
("[The defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to
do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking
reasonable precautions would not have done. A reasonable man would act with reference to
the average circumstances
in ordinary years."); Stone v. Bolton, 1 K.B. 201, 211 (1950)
(Jenkins, L.J.) ("[The hitting out of the ground of the ball which struck and injured the
plaintiff was a realization of a reasonably foreseeable risk, which because it reasonably could
be foreseen, the defendants were under a duty to prevent."); Bolton v. Stone, 1951 App. Cas.
850, 867 (Reid, L.J.) (appeal taken from C.A.) ("I think that it would be right to take into
account not only how remote is the chance that a person might be struck but also how serious
the consequences are likely to be if a person is struck; but I do not think that it would be right
to take into account the difficulty of remedial measures."); United States v Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("Mf the probability be called P; the injury, L, and
the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P- i.e., whether B < PL."); see also Schwartz, Early Tort Law, supra note 2,
at 680-85 (describing different terms used for "negligence" in pre-1860 America). And juries,
of course, are not confined even by the many legal definitions of negligence. More than one
jury has been reputed to find a defendant at fault because that defendant was wealthy or well
insured.
12. The rule regarding ground damage from aircraft has changed over time. Early in
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phants. " The historical and cultural relativity of torts seems manifest.
The problem with anti-conceptualism, however, is that torts does seem
to work out its concerns within certain structures and with certain
predictable patterns. For this reason, many scholars continue to engage in
conceptualist thought despite past disappointments. The promise of
conceptualism is deep understanding: understanding of tort law's recurring
theories, themes, doctrines, and practices and of its limitations as a

response to individual suffering or avarice. Anti-conceptualism cannot
explain, much less satisfy, our intuition that torts somehow does "hang
14
together" and is bounded in spite of its cultural and historical vagaries.
The purpose of this Article is to push beyond this jurisprudential
stalemate and to suggest an intellectual passage across the gulf separating

the conceptualist from the anti-conceptualist, while also traversing the
valleys that separate each of the conceptualist and anti-conceptualist camps
the history of aviation, the owner of the aircraft was strictly liable for the damage done to
property or persons on the ground. See Guille v Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y 1822) (damage
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 520, cmts. b, g (1938) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATE-

from balloon); RESTATEMENT

Simeon E. Baldwin, LiabilityforAccidents in Aerial Navigation, 9 MICH.L. REv 20
(1910). Today negligence is emerging as the basis of liability. See, e.g., Boyd v White, 276
P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954); see also I LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW
§ 6.01 (rev ed. 1994) (discussing present split between strict liability and negligence
jurisdictions).
13. The rule of liability for rampaging elephants differs among cultures. In colonial
Burma, responsibility for damages caused by an elephant not known to be dangerous was
adjudged under negligence principles. See Maung Kyaw Dun v Ma Kyin, 2 Upper Burma
Rulings Civ. 570, 571 (1900) ("In view of the manner in, and extent to, which elephants are
employed in this country [strict liability] would be manifestly unjust.") (copy on file with
author). In contemporary Britain, however, courts followed strict liability principles to
measure elephant damage. See generally Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25
Q.B.D. 258 (1890); Current Topics, 34 SOLIC. J. 596 (1890). The rule of strict liability for
damage caused by elephants still pertains today in both Great Britain and the United States.
See Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd., 2 Q.B. 1 (1957); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§§ 506-507 (imposing strict liability for injuries caused by wild animal, which is defined to
be "an animal which is not by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the
place in which it is kept"); id. cmt. b ("[A]n elephant in England and America is a wild animal
"); see also H. EButt Grocery Co. v Perez, 408 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. Civ App.
1966) (although declining to impose strict liability, finding that elephant is so dangerous by
nature that "allegations of the animal's nature and of its escape are sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of negligence").
14. Cf. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 428-29 (1992) (recognizing need to
"argue for boundaries on tort law, confines within which it must remain if it is to have
integrity and coherence"). It is that task which I attempt here.
MENT];
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from each other. My suggestion is that torts must be understood as a
system in perpetual process-forever indefinite and infinitely malleable in
its precise theoretical, doctrinal, and practical manifestations-yet
ultimately bounded in its possibilities. An eternal, indefinite struggle
occurs, but it occurs within defined limits. The limits are these: Torts
responds only to certain types of claims (claims of loss), it responds to loss
only in a certain fashion (an adjudicatory process to reallocate loss), and
its adjudicatory response to loss allocation can be invoked successfully
when a defendant's conduct has caused the loss (a "causal model" for loss
allocation), has breached community norms (a "community model" for loss
allocation), or has done both (a combined "causal-community model" for
loss allocation).
This process approach views torts as an outer, empty shell within
which an indeterminate struggle constantly regenerates the old face of tort
theory, doctrine, and practice into the new As a consequence, process
theory separates itself from both the conceptualist and the anti-conceptualist
traditions. Unlike conceptualism, the process view of torts denies that torts
possesses any single conceptual form; unlike anti-conceptualism, the
process view demonstrates that torts "hangs together" on a single thread-a
thread woven from the friction generated by the intersection of overlapping, yet often opposing, causal and community forms. A process theory
denies the existence of the static endstate so often implied in conceptualist
thought. Yet the clash of the two models creates repetitive patterns to
which all tort systems must respond, often in routine or predictable ways
that belie the relativistic orthodoxy of anti-conceptualism.
The process view of torts flows naturally from the process metaphysics of Scottish realist Alfred North Whitehead.' 5 Whitehead's metaphysics
suggests that every real object is in process-influenced in each moment of
self-creation by the past, yet not determined by that past. Whitehead's
15. After having achieved fame as a mathematical logician at Oxford, Whitehead turned
to his metaphysical enterprise rather late in his life, doing most of his work after he joined
Harvard's faculty at the age of sixty-three. His major works on metaphysics are ALFRED N.
WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS (1933) [hereinafter ADVENTURES OF IDEAS]; ALFRED
N. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY (1929) [hereinafter PROCESS AND REALITY]; and
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1926). An excellent short

summary of his main themes, stripped of most of his technical vocabulary, can be found in
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT (1938) [hereinafter MODES OF THOUGHT].
For a short treatment of his life and work, see Dorothy M. Emmet, Alfred North Whitehead,
in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 290, 290-96 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
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metaphysics have had an important effect in diverse fields such as
theology, 6 the natural sciences, 7 and, more recently, political theory; 8 but
thus far, they have had little direct influence in law 19 Using torts as a
testing ground, this Article demonstrates the ways in which a jurisprudential concept of law as process can overcome and justify many of the
apparently irreconcilable tensions in the theories, doctrines, and practices
of law
The Article proceeds in three stages. Part I describes the problems of
both conceptualism and anti-conceptualism, the need to get beyond the
terms of this debate, and the failed efforts of Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib
to do so. Part II develops in detail the understanding of torts as the
confederation of the causal and community models. Although it is
impossible to deduce precise doctrinal, theoretical, or procedural consequences from either model, Part II demonstrates that each model works
best in conjunction with certain optimal conditions that adumbrate those
consequences. Not surprisingly, the optimal conditions for the two models
are distinct and sometimes conflicting. Because the two models are not
mutually exclusive and thus can overlap as justifications for large portions
16. With such noted adherents as Charles Hartshorne, "process theology" became a
significant theological movement during the middle of this century. For brief introductions
to the theological dimensions of Whitehead's metaphysics and the subsequent developments
in process theology, see generally JOHN B. COBB, JR. & DAVID R. GRIFFIN, PROCESS
THEOLOGY (1976).
17 Whitehead's influence on physics and biochemistry-and in particular his influence
on Albert Einstein, Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine, and physicist David Bohm-is traced
in GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR., THE REHABILITATION OF WHITEHEAD 180-99 (1989).
18. See PROCESS PiLosoPHy AND SOCiAL THOUGHT 1-112 (John B. Cobb, Jr. & W
Widick Schroeder eds., 1981). See generally RANDALL C. MORRIS, PROCESS PHILOSOPHY
AND POLrIcAL IDEOLOGY (1991); ROBERT C. NEVLLE, THE COSMOLOGY OF FREEDOM
(1974); Douglas Sturm, ProcessThought and PoliticalTheory: Implications of a Principle
of InternalRelations, 41 REv POL. 375 (1979).
19. The legal scholar most associated with Whitehead was Yale's F.S.C. Northrop,
who had been Whitehead's student. But Northrop's own work focused more on the merits
of sociological jurisprudence rather than on the effort to translate Whitehead's metaphysics
into a theory of jurisprudence. See F.S.C. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND
ETHICAL EXPERIENCE

(1959). Richard Rorty, whose work has spearheaded the resurgent

interest among legal scholars in pragmatism, also briefly embraced Whitehead's process
philosophy, but ultimately rejected it as his own neopragrnatism evolved. Even now,
however, many of Rorty's positions are similar to those of Whitehead. See LUCAS, supra
note 17, at 137-41.
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of tort law and practice, a clash of optimal conditions arises. Out of the
inevitable struggle for supremacy grow the specific manifestations of tort
doctrine and practice in a particular place and time.
The final stage locates this specific understanding of torts within a
broader jurisprudential concept of law as process. Part III justifies the
descriptive theory of Part II by demonstrating its consistency with
Whitehead's process metaphysics. It then subjects the process theory of
torts to some of the major criticisms levelled against traditional conceptualist and anti-conceptualist positions and against process metaphysics.
Predictably, the theory does not run the gauntlet of criticism entirely
unscathed, but it does possess a satisfying normative vitality- Tort law is
what tort law should be.
L The Methodology
I begin with the assumption, which is noncontroversial to both the lay
person and the scientist, that any theoretical discussion of torts must
account for its "hard data"; in other words, any theory of torts that cannot
explain its doctrine, its fact-finding and law-giving processes, and its
rhetoric is irrelevant at best and dangerously misguided at worst. This
inductive methodology is, of course, controversial in law, and in tort law
particularly, for two opposing reasons. The first is the normative,
deductive quality that inhabits much of legal thought and analysis., The
second is the profound, pragmatic skepticism toward any grand theoretical
enterprise in law I Though they are locked in ideological conflict
otherwise, both the theoretician and the skeptic unite in their disbelief that

20. On the methodology of inductive reasoning, see JAMES D. CARNEY & RICHARD
K. SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC 330-34, 352-62 (2d ed. 1974); Karl Popper, The
Problemof Induction, in POPPER SELECTIONS 101 (David Miller ed., 1985).

21. See generally Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV 801
(1991).
22.

In talking about skepticism, I refer both to the intellectual critique of formal

analysis, see Symposium, Renaissance of Pragmatismin American Legal Thought, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv 1569 (1990) [hereinafter Symposium]; Roberto Unger, The CriticalLegal
Studies Movement, 96 HARv L. REv 561, 567-76 (1983), and to the anti-intellectual bias
prevalent among some law students and members of the practicing bar, see Robert W
Gordon, Bargaining with the Devil, 105 HARV L. REV 2041, 2047-48 & n. 16 (1992)
(reviewing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARvARD LAW

SCHOOL (1992)); Project, Law Review Usage and Suggestionsfor Improvement: A Survey
of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV 1467, 1469-72 (1992).
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the jumble of clashing verdicts, doctrines, and justificationsz can be reconciled in the world of actual legal fact.
Viewed from the perspective of result, this disbelief is justified. It is
impossible to reconcile the outcomes of all tort cases-if we mean by
"outcome" legal doctrine, the reasons used to justify that doctrine, and the
reality that a second jury hearing similar or identical evidence might return
a different verdict. Compounding the impossibility is the fact that any
truly inductive theory about torts must accommodate seemingly irreconcilable perspectives on the role of theory and process. An inductive theory
of torts must, therefore, find common ground and justificatory force in
places other than the principles, the rules, and the specific results of tort
law
The immediate response, of course, is, "But what else is there in tort
9
law " I come to that answer in Part II. Before I get there, however, I
must explain the reasons that an inductive theory is both necessary and
useful. The justification has two parts: first, a demonstration of the
deficiencies of the present conceptualist/anti-conceptualist discourse; and
second, a proof that an inductive theory can avoid those deficiencies in a
useful way
A. The Deficiencies of the PresentTort Discourse
Discussion about the nature and the future of tort law has tended to
divide into two camps: the "conceptualists" and the "anti-conceptualists."
Although the labels suggest a clear dichotomy rather than the spectrum of
views that actually exists, this division mcely captures the two general
approaches of the judicial and academic commentary about torts.
The conceptual approach begins with a set of "first principles" and
develops specific answers to doctrinal questions from those principles.
Conclusions are as varied as the source and nature of the first principles
themselves. For some, the source of first principles lies in notions of
23. It should be unnecessary to prove in any great detail my assertion that tort law is not
entirely consistent in its doctrine, its theory, or its judgments. Casebooks are filled with
examples of different approaches to doctrinal questions. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at
97-101 (discussing reception of Rylands v. Fletcher); id. at 476-97 (discussing various
approaches to duties owed by landowners); id. at 666-89 (discussing various interpretations
given to term "design defect"); d. at 231-46 (discussing different possible roles for judge and

jury). Inconsistency in theory is also evident. See infra part I.A.
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autonomy, 24 community,' utility, 26 individual rights,27 or corrective
obligations' fashioned for different purposes by philosophers as diverse as
Nozick, Rawls, Mill, Kant, and Aristotle. For others, the specifics of tort

law derive from the efficiency or wealth-maximizing principles of
economics. 29 For still others, the critical first principles are not grand

jurisprudential notions external to torts; rather, they are either the more
pedestrian goals of deterrence, compensation, convenience, and fairness
24. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof ProductsLiability Law: Toward
First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV 427, 438-53 (1993). See generally Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of StrictLiability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
25. See Owen, supra note 24, at 453-59. See generally John B. Attanasio, The Prnciple
ofAggregate Autonomy and the CalabresianApproach to ProductsLiability, 74 VA. L. REV
677 (1988).
26. See James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv L. REV 97, 110-13 (1908); Ernest
J. Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 280-87 (1980).
27 See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Mo. 1984) (en
bane) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (adopting "Rawls' principle of fairness" to solve products
liability issue); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-312 (1986); Ernest J. Wemrib,
CorrectiveJustice, 77 IoWA L. REv 403 (1992).
28. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 14; George P Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARv L. REv 537 (1972).
29. There is a distinction in law and economics theory between normative and positive
methodologies; normative analysis argues that policymakers should adopt an efficiency stance
in resolving tort questions, whereas positive analysis merely uses economic methods to
analyze, and in some cases explain, common-law rules. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.2 (4th ed. 1992); Mark Grady, A New Positive Economic
Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 799-800 (1983). I include within the "conceptualist"
category the normative branch, see, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
(1970); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, andLegal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103 (1979); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV 487 (1980) (attempting to hitch theory of
efficiency to concept of autonomy articulated by Robert Nozick rather than to utilitarianism),
as well as the rather large portion of the positive branch which uses economic methods to
discover the set of tort rules that would be efficient, see, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 2; John
P Brown, Toward an Economic Theory ofLiability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973). Although
the latter group does not necessarily contend that efficiency ought to be a relevant norm, that
implied premise is the basis for their work. Thus, like normative law and economics scholars,
many positive scholars use efficiency as the starting concept from which further analysis
descends.
Some scholars in the law and economics movement, however, purport merely to use
economic analysis to describe the actual state of tort doctrine. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 19-24 (1987); POSNER,
supra, at 17 For a discussion of that positive effort, which begins with the data of actual
cases rather than with a concept, see infra notes 71, 78-80 and accompanying text.
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that tort law sets as its own internal purposes 3 or the related instrumental
demands of public policy and expediency 31 Whatever the first principles,
however, the methodology is the same: identify the relevant principles and
choose the doctrinal rule dictated by those principles.
This conceptualist approach has fatal defects. The most obvious
deficiency results from the choice of relevant first principles. Even
assuming that all could agree about the meaning and content of concepts
like "autonomy," "individual rights," "efficiency," or "sound public
policy" (and in reality we cannot), no one can resolve as a normative
manner which principle(s) should be entitled to primacy Each of us may
have a preference, and each may be able to support the chosen preference
with reasons. However, equally rational counterarguments exist, so any
preference that we espouse must ultimately rest upon belief.32 Someday,
perhaps, we will come to universal knowledge and acceptance of the one
true principle and its consequences. In the meantime, the claims of any
ipse dixit quality that decimates the
first principle to primacy in torts has 3an
3
conceptualism.
of
force
prescriptive
30. See, e.g., 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 23-33 (1991)
[hereinafter ALI STUDY] (stating that goals of tort law are corrective justice, social grievance
redress, compensation, risk distribution, and injury prevention); W PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]; Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv 69, 73 (1975) (identifying goals of loss spreading, wealth
distribution, cQlective deterrence, and market deterrence). For critiques of the coherence of
tort law's purported goals and of tort law's ability to achieve them, see STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 3-72 (1989) (describing failings of
safety, compensation, and justice rationales); Stephen F Williams, Second Best: The Soft
Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV L. REV 932 (1993) (critiquing
deterrence rationale).
31. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 2, at 95-96; CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT
MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 7-9 (2d ed. 1980); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 53,
at 358 (noting that "'duty'
is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection"). Holmes did
not rely entirely on public policy for his conclusions about tort doctrine; he also adopted a
more inductive approach considered infra notes 70, 74-77 and accompanying text.
32. See F.S.C. NORTHROP, supra note 19, at 52, 62, 68-70, 165-72; Michel Rosenfeld,
Deconstructionand Legal Interpretation:Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptation of the
New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 186 (Drucilla
Cornell et al. eds., 1992); HENRY J.STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE
COURTS 34-35, 90-91, 138 (1987); Unger, supra note 22, at 578, 618-33; Wells, supra note
8, at 2373.
33. Some conceptualists have sought to avoid the problem by demonstrating that multiple
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Furthermore, the problem of indeterminacy lies in wait behind the
apparently unresolvable problems of content and primacy As Roberto
Unger has cogently argued, no general principle can determine all doctrinal
consequences.' Some of the problems may be informational; for instance,
many people now recognize that an economic approach to tort doctrine (if
efficiency is our first principle) cannot choose among tort liability rules
without considerable information about transaction costs, relative value of
competing activities, risk aversion, moral hazard, and strategic behavior. 5
More typically, however, the first principle will operate at such a level of
generality that at a certain point in the derivation of specific doctrinal
consequences, any of two or more doctrinal choices would be equally
consistent with the principle.36 Although the choice may be made by
principles support a particular doctrine or approach, thus obviating the need to denominate one
principle as "primary." See, e.g., Halphen v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110
(La. 1986) (using efficiency and fairness arguments to justify products liability standard);
CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 24-26, 291-308 (recognizing possible justice constraints on
maximization principle); Attanasio, supra note 25 (developing philosophical notion of
"aggregate autonomy" to buttress Calabresi's economic argument for strict products liability);
Robert Cooter, Torts as the Umon ofLiberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.KENT L. REv 523 (1987) (creating theory of liberty that supports economic efficiency);
Owen, supra note 24 (contending that negligence is required by blend of freedom and
community considerations); Wemrib, supra note 26 (arguing for easy duty to rescue on both
Kantian and utilitarian grounds); cf. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying
Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) (describing inevitable distributional concerns that
underlie economic analysis). As the disagreement between Attanasio and Owen demonstrates,
however, a blend of approaches does not guarantee agreement about rules or results. Cf.
Unger, supra note 22, at 569 (denying existence of "meta-principles that would settle, once
and for all" conflict between principles and counterprinciples that inhabit all bodies of law).
In any event, the problem of selecting a single primary principle is merely replaced by the
equally difficult task of selecting the (two or three or four) primary principles.
34. Unger, supra note 22, at 570-73; see also Richard A. Epstein, Causation-In
Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV 653, 664 (1987); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 514 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of
Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV 801, 874 (1991); Wells, supra note 8, at 2375-76. For an effort
to reconcile formalism with indeterminate outcomes, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:
On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1008-12 (1988).
35. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
11-25, 46-52, 72-74 (2d ed. 1989); SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 21-32, 73-85, 206-15, 262-70.
36. The obvious example is the economic approach, which holds that in the absence of
transaction costs and other variables discussed supra text accompanying note 35, any liability
rule is efficient. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 31-38; POLINSKY, supra
note 35, at 11-12. But a similar problem infects those who profess allegiance to the Kantian
categorical imperative or the Rawlsian "original position." How those principles would make
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resorting to a set of "second-tier" tie-breaking principles,37 those principles
are also likely to have the problems of content, primacy, and indeterminacy
that plague the first principle. Resort to second-tier principles also
highlights the inability of the first principle to capture adequately the true
nature and operation of the tort system. Assimilating the second-tier
principles into the first tier avoids this difficulty, but a third type of
indeterminacy haunts such "multi-principled" conceptualist thinking.38
Sooner or later, one or more of the principles will pull in one doctrinal
direction, and other principles will pull in another. Whether the resolution
the choice among pure comparative fault, "not as great as" comparative fault, or pure
contributory negligence is not at all clear. Compare Richard W Wright, AllocatingLiability
Among Multiple Responsible Causes:A PrincipledDefense of Joint and Several Liabilityfor
Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv 1141, 1179-93 (1988) (using one
version of corrective justice to derive proper form of joint and several liability) with Aaron
D. Twerski, The Joint TortfeasorLegislative Revolt: A RationalResponse to the Critics, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REv 1125 (1989) (arguing that joint and several liability is unfair).
37 See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-44 (1971) (discussing use of "lexical"
ordering of principles); George P Fletcher, Corrective Justicefor Moderns, 106 HARv L.
REV 1658, 1667 (1993) (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 14) (noting that "theorist of a
mixed system of justice and utility needs a meta-theory to determine the optimal combination").
38. "Multi-principled" analysis, which attempts to determine consequences by examining
the extent to which a particular rule or outcome advances each of a series of relevant
principles and then deciding whether on balance the weight of those principles favors the rule
or outcome, see Ernest J. Wemrib, UnderstandingTort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV 485, 48788 (1989), is perhaps the most common analytical approach in modem tort law. See ALI
STUDY, supra note 30, at 34 (suggesting that torts must seek to accomplish broad variety of
goals attributed to torts); WHITE, supra note 1, at 139-79 (discussing methodology of William
Prosser); cf. Schlag, supra note 34, at 819-28 (discussing methodology of "technical
doctrinalists"). Much of multi-principled analysis takes the form of asking whether a
particular doctrine fulfills the perceived multiple purposes of tort law, discussed supra note
30 and accompanying text, or the multiple purposes of a particular subset of tort doctrine.
See, e.g., Beshada v Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). But even
adherents of a particular conceptual approach sometimes check their results against other,
competing approaches to demonstrate the appeal of their position. See supra note 33.
Multi-principled analysis, which often travels under the rubric of public policy, is
difficult to distinguish from the pragmatic approach to law. The one difference is that a
conceptual approach treats principles such as risk spreading, deterrence, and compensation as
exogenerously given and untouchable and then tries to develop rules from those factors; a
pragmatist sees these factors merely as expressions of the good that the law can achieve and
constantly adds to or subtracts from those expressions in light of experience and context. See
generally Steven D. Smith, The Pursuitof Pragmatism,100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990) (discussing
pragmatic method); Symposium, supra note 22 (same). In any event, little in this Article
turns on this admittedly fine distinction.
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of the conflict relegates some of the principles to a second tier or simply
enforces a compromise faithful to none, the specific result cannot be
logically determined from the first principles themselves. 9
Another deficiency of conceptual analysis is its neglect of process and
people. Having devoted itself to the revelation of the correct doctrinal
solution, conceptualism pays scant attention to the effects of procedure and
adversarial ability on the outcomes of actual tort cases. For instance,
conceptualists rarely acknowledge the possibility that a jury might disagree
with or be unable to apply a particular standard; the rogue jury is dismissed
as a deviation from perfection or analyzed as a "transaction" or "error"
cost.4 Furthermore, the effects of "objectively correct" legal rules on the
lives of those for whom the rules work an injustice are sometimes
acknowledged, but are ultimately ignored;4 2 individual injustice must be
sacrificed to intellectual purity I Aside from the obvious ethical issues that
surround a normativity blinded to people and process, any theory (however
intellectually satisfying) that rejects the reality of a process that causes (and
perhaps assures) some slippage between rule and result can possess only
partial relevance to the subject that we call torts.'
More broadly, present normative theories of torts have difficulty
accounting for the wide and unruly smorgasbord of rules and processes
39. See ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at 34; Izhak Englard, The System Builders:A
CriticalAppraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 29-30 (1980);
Wemrib, supra note 38, at 495-503.
40. For a description of the normative adjudicatory model and the ways in which it
deviates from the contextual, pragmatic model that often informs actual decision-making, see
Catharine Wells, SituatedDecisionmaking,63 S. CAL. L. REV 1727, 1731-36 (1990).
41. POSNER, supra note 29, § 21.1, SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 79-85.

42. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 79 ("If, therefore, there is any common ground for
all liability in tort, we shall best find it by eliminating the event as it actually turns
out
"); Wells, supra note 8, at 2372-73.
43. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV 933, 954-58 (1991). Although a common-law process of
adjudication can mitigate the problem, no one can pretend that it eliminates all individual

instances of injustice. See, e.g., Enright v Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).

44. This was the fundamental and enduring insight of Leon Green. See, e.g., GREEN,
supra note 4, at 185; WHITE, supra note 1, at 77; Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate
Cause, 35 TEX. L. Ray 357 (1957); see also MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 31, at 1-9; Mark
Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in LiberalPoliticalTheory,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV 579 (1987); Schlag, supra note 34, at 834, 858-62.
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offered around the world and within our own country I Any "true"
solution derived from "correct" first principles must necessarily posit as
"false" (in methodology, conclusion, or both) all those solutions that
descend from "incorrect" first principles. Moreover, unless those first
principles can change,' conceptualism will inevitably create a single,
static, "true" state of affairs. Of course, the mconvement fact that torts is
not, and has never been, a consistent, frozen body of law does not bother
the conceptualist, who thinks in terms of "ought" rather than "is." I
suspect, however, that few conceptualists would wager that tort law will
ever reach an Elysian state in which all rules are umversally accepted and
forever immutable. If umversal and eternal uniformity is impossible, and
(many of us would say) even undesirable, what then is the point of the
conceptualist enterprise?
None of my critiques of conceptualism is unique; realists, pragmatists,
empiricists, and critical scholars have been making similar points for
seventy years. As different as their starting and ending points may be, all
of these scholars share the belief that torts cannot be "done" from the top
down; it must be done from within. Grand theory47 fails to capture the
45. Think, for example, of our country's numerous permutations on the meaning of
terms such as (1) "defect," see SCOTT BALDWIN ET AL., THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCT
LIABILITY CAsE §§ 2.2- 4 (2d ed. 1993); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A
ProposedRevision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV
1512, 1532-34 (1992), (2) "negligence," see supra note 11, and (3) "duty," compare, e.g.,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928) (using foreseeability approach) with
Tarasoff v. Regents of Umv. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (using seven-factor duty test)
and Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (rejecting duty analysis
in many cases).
46. For the most part, conceptualists do not acknowledge the impermanence of their
principles. The one possible exception would be those who contend that tort rules derive from
"public policy" factors. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. But even here "public
policy" conceptualists only contend that as the content of public policy changes, the rules
should also change. See, e.g., Palsgraf v Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting). They do not suggest that the first principle (public policy) from
which the rules are derived should change. Nor do they always make the changes that public
policy deems desirable. See, e.g., Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 673-74 (Iowa 1980)
(declining to adopt comparative fault principles judicially even though "the desirability for
change" was manifest).
47 On the meaning of "grand theory" and its conflation with formalism and
foundationalism, see Smith, supra note 38, at 424 n.73. See also Margaret J. Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCriticalLegal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV
1019, 1022-24 (1991) (discussing grand theory as paradigm of legal normativity).
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political and practical dimensions of torts. Torts is more than rules
divinely received; its rules and outcomes are also sensitive to, if not driven
by, the rhetoric of the lawyers, the social biases of the jury, and the
political predispositions of the judge. A need to recouple theory with
experience, a rejection of prescriptive conventions that operate without
concern for contexts, and an instrumental, forward-looking nature are the

common points of "anti-conceptualism."
In a certain sense, even a conceptualist (at least one who has been
around to see a few tort cases pushed through the system) knows that the
anti-conceptualist speaks the truth.4 s Nonetheless, in tort law, conceptualism has remained a living approach in tort scholarship and judicial
opinions 49-so much so that it is difficult to find good anti-conceptualist
discussions in torts today I For all its defects, conceptualism must fill
some void that anti-conceptualism cannot.
It is not difficult to see what that void is. Although the variance
among anti-conceptualists is at least as great as it is among conceptualists, 5'
all are ultimately better on the attack than on the defense. The realist, the
48. Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 312 ("There is a gap between the law in
the books and in action
"). Indeed, even Judge Posner, who might well be the
"frontrunner" for the office of leading legal formalist of our era, see Smith, supra note 38,
at 426, considers himself a pragmatist. See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatismto
Offer Law?,63 S. CAL. L. REv 1653, 1660 (1990).
49. See infra notes 161-63, 217-22 and accompanying text. If anything, the past 30
years has seen a renaissance of conceptualism in tort theory at the same time that pragmatism
has become a dominant theory elsewhere in law. Compare WHITE, supra note 1, at 211-30
(discussing use of "neo-conceptualism" in torts after 1960) with Symposium, supra note 22
(discussing rise of pragmatism) and Smith, supranote 38 (discussing pragmatic methodology).
Conceptualism is considerably less relevant in tort practice than in scholarship and opinions.
50. This may seem to be a surprising statement until we reflect on the number of
academic articles and judicial opinions that (1) do not attempt to propose some grand metatheory, (2) do not merely follow in a formal way the established doctrines and policies of prior
authorities, and (3) consciously admit that they are adopting a particular outcome only because
it is the best available approach considering all the circumstances (a pragmatic effort) or
because it empowers certain social interests (a realist or critical approach). In my view, such
articles and opinions are few and far between. Cf. Delgado, supra note 43, at 933 ("Today,
the normative orientation remains the unspoken dominant mode of legal analysis and
scholarship."). Regardless of their exact number, however, the fact is that a core of
conceptual thought remains in torts.
51. Remember that anti-conceptualists include realists, pragmatists, critical and feminist
scholars, and empiricists, whose common feature is a skepticism toward, or rejection of,
grand theory. Otherwise, the various anti-conceptionalists themselves can disagree markedly
about methodologies and conclusions.
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pragmatist, the feminist, and the critical scholar can attack the surface
neutrality of tort doctrine and grand theory by showing us that everthmg
in torts is power52 or practical judgment.53 Staking out and defending a
coherent, rational alternative to conceptualism, however, is another matter.
The anti-conceptualist can stand against universal, neutral principles, but
she cannot stand for them.' She is forced to concede that tort law is
whatever the political and social trends of the moment let it get away
55
with.
Such an irreverent attitude about a subject that "matters"56 is neither
morally appealing nor rationally satisfying. The anti-conceptualist
response is to deny the validity of morality or logic as a primary way of
thinking about torts, but that response inevitably has a normative component. The observation that torts is not moral, efficient, or logical is an
interesting fact, but no more interesting than the fact that the word "torts"
starts with a "t"-unless it is hitched to the premise that we should not (the
proper normative tense) heed theories that inaccurately describe their
subject matter.57
52. See, e.g., supra note 9; cf. IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 60-69
(1993) (critiquing Abel and Balkin).
53. See Smith, supranote 38, at 434-37; Wells, supra note 8.
54. See Smith, supra note 38, at 444; Weinrib, supra note 34, at 951-52; Cornel West,
The Limits of Neopragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV 1747 (1990).
55. I intend this statement to be as stark as it sounds. Anti-conceptualists may differ
about what tort law is, or should be, getting away with. For instance, the critical scholar
might claim that torts is getting away with a subsidy of industry, see HORWrrz, supra note 2,
at 63-108; on the other hand, the pragmatist might claim that torts should be getting away with
advancement of the public good or the community's interests, see Smith, supra note 38, at
420-22. Whatever the result of that debate, tort law's instrumental nature means that the only
constraints on its reach are the political and social limitations which prevent those who control
tort outcomes from fully achieving their personal objectives through tort law.
56. Why it matters is not at this point important. It is enough that, for some reason,
legal curricula and judges find "torts" a useful category.
57 A great deal of anti-conceptualist thought rests on other implicit normative premises
as well. Realism, for instance, debunked formalism by demonstrating the political, social, and
economic milieu of legal rules. That point gained relevance, however, only in conjunction
with the normative claim that rules and processes should be based explicitly on such political,
social, and economic considerations. See GREEN, supra note 4, at 76-77 Likewise, the
feminist observation that tort law's "reasonable man" focus excludes women's insights, see,
e.g., Bender, Primer,supra note 9, at 20-25, gains its power from the normative premise that
women's voices are entitled to an equal hearing in tort law. On the inherent normativity of
anti-normative thought, see Radin & Michelman, supra note 47
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Of course, catching anti-conceptualism in the act of trading with the
enemy is hardly strong proof of conceptualism's correctness,5 8 but, in a
sense, correctness is unimportant. Nearly all tort scholarship and reported

tort decisions invoke conceptualist methodologies at least to some extent.
Conceptualism is a part of torts, every bit as much as the political or
process-oriented perspectives of the anti-conceptualists. 59

To reject

conceptualism is also to reject a part of what tort law is. That the rejection
can be accomplished only by normative claims about the way torts "should

be" understood is a sweet irony, but the more important point is that the
appeal to an overreaching sense of morality or logic is an inveterate aspect
of the practice of torts. The gnawing sense of incompleteness and
irrelevance with which conceptualism left us' has not been removed; in
fact, anti-conceptualism's implicit premise that theories which inaccurately
describe reality are invalid makes its incompleteness a greater and less
forgivable sin.6"
Additional critiques of various branches of anti-conceptualism (such
as amorality, intellectual bankruptcy, relativism, and nihilism) have been
widely rehearsed in the literature62 and will become important later.63 For
now, it is enough to note that anti-conceptualism has been unable to

eradicate our desire to think about torts conceptually But the same is true
The normative statement in the text, however, is slightly different. It asserts only that
theory not reflective of reality is invalid. It does not ask what that reality is or how tort law
should respond to it. Nonetheless, even this more minimalist assumption creates difficulty for
anti-conceptualism. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
58. Pierre Schlag calls the inevitable normative dimension of anti-normative thought
"performative contradiction," but refuses to bend the anti-normative critique in the face of the
contradiction. See Schlag, supra note 34, at 805-07, 925. For a pragmatically oriented
attempt to help him out of the dilemma, see Radin & Michelman, supra note 47
59. Cf. NORTHROP, supra note 19, at 171 (noting that existence of natural law
jurisprudence in major world cultures "shows that the burden of proof rests upon anyone who
would affirm that [natural law] has no significance").
60. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
61. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 212 ("The significance of neoconceptualism in Torts
literature thus far lies in its reaffirmation of the value of abstract theorizing itself, not in the
semmality of any of the theories its proponents have advanced.").
62. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. REv 1071 (1991); Walter B.
Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the TranscendentalApproach, 5 FORDHAM L. REV 272
(1936); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV 1597, 1625
(1990); Schlag, supra note 34, at 828-52.
63. See infra notes 371-84 and accompanying text.
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of conceptualism: It has not yet offered a system of principles that confirms
our experience of the subject.
At this point, I doubt that this two-sided dialogue about torts can find
much more of interest to say Undoubtedly, a new first principle could be
found to replace "corrective justice" or "wealth maximization," and
conceptualists and anti-conceptualists alike could debate its intrinsic merits
and its fidelity to our experiences. New anti-conceptual movements will
become fashionable, as have realism, pragmatism, and critical legal studies
in their time; new discoveries and experiences in the physical and social
sciences will bring to light now-neglected experiential dimensions of tort
law; greater insight into process and more contexts for judgments will
accumulate as humanity proceeds through history Undoubtedly the next
200 years of tort law will see changes (some marginal, some radical) in
doctrines, processes, attitudes, and theories. However, the structure of the
debate will not change, and, barring a dramatic, universal revelation that
proves one side's validity, the outcome of the debate will be equally
indeterminate. Faulkner's words about Dilsey well describe the fate of the
opposing positions: "They endured. "I
B. Toward a Different Understandingof Torts
If torts cannot shed its aspiration to normativity or its grounding in
reality, then it is time, perhaps, to move beyond that debate and to
recognize that the tension between the conceptual and the anti-conceptual
is constitutive of torts.65 In spite of our efforts to force a choice of sides
upon it, torts has chosen both: It exists in a "no-persons' land" claimed by
both sides, but actually belonging to and understood by neither.
I can appreciate the immediate reaction to my claim of torts as a
"tertium quid"" How can something be both conceptual and pragmatic?
How can something profess allegiance both to the neutral rule of law and
to the political, contextual nature of outcomes? How can it ignore process
64. WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURY 22 (Modem Library 1946).
65. See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 1678 ("The life of the law is not simple logic, for all
too often there are multiple logics, multiple paradigms, at work in legal disputes."); George
P Fletcher, The Searchfor Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 LAw & PHIL. 63, 63 (1983) ("A pure
commitment to either positive or normative theory might be ideal, but the tension between the
two, particularly in legal theory, seems inescapable."); cf.ROGER A. SHINER, NORM AND
NATURE 323 (1992) (concluding that legal theory is "condemned eternally to the rivalry
between positivist and anti-positivist theories of law").
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and embrace process? How can it be just and efficient, yet neither?
The short, and perhaps sufficient, answer is: "Because it is." 66 As
Holmes said, torts "did not begin with a theory," and it "has never worked
one out."6I Ultimately torts must be understood as being in perpetual
process, a timeless battlefront scarred by previous skirmishes among
theories, doctrines, and practices, which fluidly adjusts to absorb new
-assaults that redirect the struggle. The conceptual and the pragmatic, the
neutral and the political, the efficient and the just are all locked in a tense
battle in which it is, quite simply, impossible to reject any dimension
because doing so denes an aspect of tort law's nature-demes, in other
words, a part of the heritage that has made torts what it is and that
therefore constitutes a formative element of what torts will be.6" Aspects
of the balance may fall from favor, and others may become dominant for
a time. But all influences unite in the present-i.e, the precise manifestation of tort law in California on June 1, 1994-and all remain subject to
recall as the interaction of ideas, experiences, and prior options pushes
torts, day-by-day and case-by-case, at glacial speed to the very different
pattern of rules and practices in California on June 1, 2094. As much as
we might wish to obliterate formalism or pragmatism or efficiency, as
much as we might wish to make torts prisoner to our pet conceptualist or
anti-conceptualist theories, we cannot; whatever piece of torts that we cage
is less than its total and will invariably die in captivity
What remains is to demonstrate that the description of torts as
perpetual struggle has both validity and value as a way of understanding
tort law Validity, of course, is the bedrock requirement: Unless this
description is an accurate one, the first justification for this view of torts
("Because that's what it is") necessarily collapses, and the "description"
becomes the type of normative clami that the descriptive method rejects.
In order to be relevant, a valid description must also have value. For
example, a valid description of tort law would describe (or merely
66. The longer answer-"Because that's what it should be"-is reserved for Part M.
67 HOLMES, supra note 2, at 77
68. Those already familiar with the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead may
particularly recognize his influence in this statement. But the statement also draws on the
more recent insights of chaos theory, which, at least as I understand it, largely validates
Whitehead's metaphysics. For short treatments of chaos theory, see generally Andrew W
Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REv 751 (1992); Glenn H.
Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REv 110 (1991); Robert E. Scott, Chaos
Theory and the Justice Paradox,35 WM. & MARY L. REV 329 (1993).
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reproduce) the complete record of every case, book, and article that has
ever sounded in tort. But that description would have no utility; a useful
description must help us understand the history of torts, its future, and its
potential boundaries.

9

In attempting a valid yet valuable description of torts, I follow in large
footsteps. Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib have each attempted a similar
enterprise: to search for the least common denominator in torts and then
to build from that essence the appropriate shape of the tort system. For
Holmes, the essence of tort was voluntary action; from that central feature,
Holmes argued that torts should be based on negligence.7" Posner's central
feature is efficiency, which, depending on the circumstances, can favor
either a negligence or a strict liability system of rules.7 Weinrib's
approach is less monolithic. He finds that tort law arises from the tension
between a pair of central, yet opposing, features: a defendant who has
acted and a plaintiff who has suffered loss.7 2 According to Weinrib,
accommodation of the tension between "doing and suffering" requires a
negligence system with the central doctrinal features that the system now
possesses.73
By asking first what torts is (i.e., attempting a valid description) and
then developing that description into a theory that assists our understanding
of torts (i.e., creating something of value), Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib
69. My claim that a description must have both validity and value is another way of
saying that any argument about torts must be both descriptively and prescriptively satisfying.
See DwoRKiN, supra note 27, at 285 ("A successful interpretation must not only fit but also
justify the practice it interprets."); POSNER, supra note 29, § 1.3. The failure of the existing
conceptual and anti-conceptual discourse to satisfy both (and in some cases, either) of these
prongs (allowing market share and imposing liability on the basis of national rather than local
market shares) formed the core of my prior critique of that discourse. See suprapart I.A.
70. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 90-95. Holmes was not content to rest on such an
inductive claim; he also supported a negligence system with instrumental, policy-oriented
arguments. Id. at 78, 95-96.
71. See LANDES &POSNER, supra note 29, at 54-122; POSNER, supra note 29, §§ 6.1,
6.5. For some of the economic factors that can determine the use of negligence or strict
liability in particular cases, see supra text accompanying note 35.
72. Wemrib, supra note 38, at 493-95. Wemrib, whose work has influenced me greatly,
has elaborated on other aspects of this theme in a wealth of recent articles. See, e.g., Ernest
J.Wemrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv 407 (1987) [hereinafter
Weinrib, Causation];Wemrib, supra note 27; Weinrib, supranote 34, at 969-71, Ernest J.
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983).
73. Weinrib, supranote 38, at 514-23.
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all engage in the only method that in my judgment can lead to a true
understanding of torts. But each of them ultimately fails, largely on the
issue of validity For Weinrib and Holmes, it is enough to note that at
least in limited circumstances, tort law imposes liability even when the
defendant fails to act,74 which thereby undermines their claim of the
essential nature of an act.75 Moreover, neither Holmes nor Weinrib can
explain the areas of strict liability that torts has long tolerated76 or the more

than occasional behind-closed-doors rejection of negligence liability by
juries77 Posner too has problems with validity Although many scholars
have criticized his theory and methods, 8 Posner's own admissions that tort
74. For instance, torts imposes liability for a failure to rescue when a special relationship
exists between the victim and the would-be rescuer. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30,
§ 56. Similarly, landowners can sometimes be held liable for failing to correct natural
conditions on their property, id. § 57, at 391, or can be liable for failure to remove
defamatory material placed on their property by others, id. § 113, at 801.
75. Having written an important article arguing for a limited duty to rescue, see
Wemrib, supra note 26, Weinrib could hardly have been unaware of tort law's occasional
proclivity to impose liability even in the absence of a defendant's "doing." His later work,
in which he develops his argument for the essentiality of doing, contains virtually no reference
to his earlier argument for a duty to rescue even in the absence of action. But see Wemrib,
supra note 34, at 967 (making ambiguous reference to essentiality of distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance in tort). His apparent willingness to accept some deviations in
doctrine as long as there is no "systematic absence" of the essential features of doing and
suffering, see Wemrib, supra note 38, at 493, and his recent effort to link his corrective
justice principle to the same Kantian natural rights tradition in which he also located a duty
to rescue, compareWeinrib, supra note 27, at 421-24 (linking corrective justice to Kant) with
Weinrib, supra note 26, at 287-92 (linking Kant to duty of easy rescue), suggest that Weinrib
can tolerate the tort duty to rescue. See also Ernest J. Wemrib, The SpecialMorality of Tort
Law, 34 McGiLL L.J. 403, 406-07 (1989) (demonstrating tolerance for cases in which element
of causation was not present, as long as pattern was not systematic). The duty to rescue,
however, clearly stands outside his doing/suffering framework.
76. Holmes, for instance, shrugs off the strict liability results achieved in Rylands v.
Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), aft'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868), and elsewhere at
common law as simply being negligence cases in disguise or else wrong-headed. HOLMES,
supra note 2, at 89, 116-19.
77 Holmes was well aware of these process and practice concerns, but seemed to view
them as impurities in a properly functioning tort system. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 12229; WHITE, supra note 1, at 58. Wemrib has not discussed at length the difficulties that
discordant process and practice pose, but it is likely that he would hold the similar view that
they should not interfere with the understanding or implementation of his theory
78. For several, albeit nonexhaustive, critiques, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRIcAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-85, 242-95 (1987); Unger, supranote 22, at 574-75; Wemrib,
supranote 38, at 503-10. Posner himself addresses some of the criticisms in POSNER, supra
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doctrine is not always efficient79 and that an efficiency analysis may be
difficult to implement in practice 0 drain the efficiency hypothesis of its
descriptive power.
Indeed, Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib all become too normative too
soon. Upon finding a fact with explanatory force over large areas of tort
law, they ignore the failure of that fact to explain all of tort doctrine
through the typical normative argument that the nonconforming aspects of
tort law can (or should) be rejected."' Moreover, none pays adequate
attention to the realities of procedure and practice, which can lead to results
at odds with the supposedly essential nature of tort law R And each is
guilty of attempting to find a single solution to irreconcilable tensions for
which a permanent solution is quite impossible.
In science, a theory of gravity that predicted the outcome of only
seventy-five percent of a series of gravity experiments would be rejected
even though the theory's ability to predict most of the actual results
suggests that a kernel of truth lies at its heart.8' I have the same attitude
about Holmes, Posner, and Wemrib. Their methodology of developing
theory from existing data is unassailable, and their ability to predict
important aspects of tort law suggests that kernels of truth inhabit each of
their views. Unfortunately, each of their theories ultimately fails to justify

note 29, §§ 1.3, 2.3, and LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 9-24.
79. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 27, 312-14.
80. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d
1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula
does not yield mathematically precise results in practice; that would require that B, P, and L
all be quantified, which so far as we know has never been done.").
81. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 77-78; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 95
(giving efficiency reading to doctrine of last clear chance even though it admittedly leads to
some inefficient results); Weinrib, supra note 38, at 514-15.
82. Although all three pay some attention to procedural concerns, only Posner attempts
to account for them in a systematic way See POSNER, supra note 29, §§ 21.1, 21.3, 21.6,
21.8, 21.12. But even his treatment is abbreviated and is more concerned with the effect of
process on rules than the integral nature of process itself.
83. Indeed, Niels Bohr constructed the notion of "complimentarity" precisely to deal
with this problem. Bohr, who was attempting to determine whether light is a wave or a
particle (it has empirical characteristics of both), hypothesized that the totality of physical
reality is explicable only through the use of contrasting, mutually exclusive models. Thus,
Bohr suggested that light was both a wave and a particle, which is a logical nonsequitor For
a short treatment of complimentarity, see ENGLARD, supra note 52, at 85-90. I discuss and
critique Englard's use of complimentarilty to understand tort law infra note 104.
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torts on its present terms. Holmes, Posner, and Wemrib have blazed trails
toward true understanding that we can follow but from which we must
ultimately depart.
The remaining issue is whether my hypothesis of torts as perpetual
process helps us understand torts-from the dual viewpoints of validity and
value-better than their theories did. Before I turn to the issues of validity
in Part II and value in Part III, however, I should caution against two
inaccurate conclusions that might be drawn from my hypothesis. The first
is to assume that because torts is engaged in irresolvable conflict, we can
understand torts without reference to that conflict. Like the biologist who,
unable to decide whether humanity is good, evil, or neither, chooses to
describe humaity in clinical terms that omit reference to our opposing
proclivities, we could simply say that tort law is the body of legal rules and
policy arguments that we find in a Restatement, a hornbook, or a digest for
a particular jurisdiction. Avoidance of the underlying tensions, however,
does not make them disappear; it merely makes the inexorable flow of torts
incomprehensible. Put in the terms I have chosen here, avoidance lacks
validity and value: validity because avoidance neglects a critical dimension
of torts and value because avoidance is reactive and docilely descriptive
rather than predictive and justificatory
Equally inappropriate is an assumption that perpetual struggle makes
torts a formless system capable of spreading like cancer to choke off
criminal responsibility, environmental regulation, tax legislation, and the
like. If a system of perpetual process is to survive, it must possess some
measure of order; it must an at certain ideals or forms and not at others.A4
In the system we call "torts," therefore, the struggle at any given moment
must be over something-some irreducible, immutable "form" or group of
"forms" around which the battle swirls. Necessarily, the form or forms
must be mimmalistic; if they become too specific, they run into the
problems of validity experienced by Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib.
Nonetheless, as a system that has survived for centuries, torts must contain
some form.
84.

COBB & GRiFFIN, supranote 16, at 14; MODES OF THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 73-

76, 118-23; PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 15, at 311, 515. The relationship between
form and process is considered at greater length infra part HI and in Jay Tidmarsh,
"'Perpetually Perishing'- The Relevance of Whitehead's Metaphysics to Law" (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
85. My claim that torts must have a "form," but that the form is largely unable to
determine specific consequences, is another example, at a heightened level of generality, of
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"Form," of course, is a loaded word, and I use it advisedly I do not
mean to suggest that torts has a "form" inthe way that those engaged in the
formalist/realist debate understand the term. That type of "form"-a set of
a priori or imminent principles from which all issues of doctrine and practice
are deduced logically and definitively --is clearly antithetical to the hypothesis of torts in perpetual and indeterminate conflict. The essence of torts
must be understood in terms of structure-what problems does torts concern
and how does it go about addressing those concerns-rather than in terms of
immutable substantive principles. In other words, the "form" of torts is its
boundaries: the outer limits within which the perpetual struggle occurs.
To use a spatial analogy, the traditional notion of a "form" is a dense
and rigid nucleus from which the orthodoxy of tort rules is inexorably
extracted. My view of a "form" is an empty and flexible shell within which
an indeterminate struggle takes place. When the struggle punctures the shell,
we are no longer "doing torts"; as long as the conflict remains within that
shell, however, the shell can take an infinite variety of equally acceptable
shapes. Like a balloon continually expanded and contracted, any particular
shape of tort law is evanescent, but all shapes are given form by the
shell-the structure-and thus are recognizable as torts.
The ultimate mistake of Holmes, Posner, and Wemrib was to attempt
to divine the nucleus of tort law and build outward from that discovery I
propose instead to describe the outer shell of tort law and to see whether that
structure accurately predicts the nature and the breadth of actual tort theory,
rules, and.practices occurring within its boundaries. If this methodology is
accurate, we have at last a valid description of torts, and we are closer to
understanding the value of torts as well.
I. Validatingthe Hypothesis
In the last Part, I demonstrated that in the effort to understand tort law,
we should not fall prey to either the Scylla of conceptualism or the
Charybdis of anti-conceptualism; rather, sailing a third course is necessary
the inherent tension between a conceptualist thought, which builds forms, and an anti-

conceptualist thought, which destroys them. It is obvious that some form must exist (else the
anti-conceptualists will have triumphed), but that the form cannot hold to immutable,
unchallengeable propositions of substantive law (else the conceptualists will have triumphed).

86. For a modem example of the debate over formalism in this sense, compare Unger,
supra note 22, at 570-73 (rejecting formalism) with Wemrib, supra note 34 (advocating
formalism) and Schauer, supra note 34, at 546-47 (advocating "presumptive formalism"). See

also Smith, supra note 38, at 428-29 (discussing various understandings of "formalism").
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and, at least in theory, possible as well. In this Part, I bear the burden of
making that theoretical possibility concrete. I do so in three stages. In the
first stage, I describe the outer structure of torts. Rather than being a
simplistic structure, however, torts must be understood as the loose
confederation of two distinct methods for allocating loss. This first stage
sketches the basic features of the two methods, which I call the "causal
model" and the "community model," and demonstrates their loose and
overlapping nature.
In the second stage, I examine each of the two models independently as
a means of determining kinds of issues, both practical and theoretical, that
are likely to be encountered when that model is used to adjudicate actual
cases. Because the two models do not operate in isolation from each other,
my discussion will not be exhaustive; we need get only the general flavor of
the concerns with which each model grapples.
The third stage is the heart of this section. Because the two models
overlap, torts can be divided into three categories: losses for which both the
causal model and the community model can resolve allocational issues,
losses for which only the causal model operates, and losses for which only
the community model operates. In the third stage, I show that the tensions
inherent in each model are redoubled in the real world where the models
overlap and that these tensions shape the practical, doctrinal, and theoretical
problems that inhabit tort systems.
Remembering the counsel of the last Part-that doctrinal or practical
solutions vary over time and among cultures-this Part does not attempt a
resolution of specific tort problems. Rather, it argues that torts must be
viewed in structural terms, as a process within which each society decides
for itself how to deal with the problem of allocating loss. The most that can
be said is that the two loosely joined models of torts combine to establish the
outer limits on these decisions and foreshadow the common problems that all
tort systems must confront.
A. Torts as the Confederation of Two Models
Trying to find any limit on the outer boundaries of tort law is a tricky
business. Without a least common denominator-an element or elements
without which a controversy would not be a tort controversy-it is
impossible to think fruitfully about torts as a distinct enterprise.8 7 On the
87 It might still be possible to think about branches of tort law (like negligence cases,
landowner liability cases, or product liability cases) as distinct enterprises. My interest,
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other hand, it is difficult to see what common theme(s) or structures umte
cases as diverse as Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad,88 Rylands v
Fletcher,9 and Tarasoff v Regents of University of California,9° yet
exclude cases such as Hadley v Baxendale,91 Brown v Board of Education,9 and Regina v Dudley ' In my view, the only way i which we can
productively think about what torts is, and about how it is distinct as a
descriptive matter from other legal enterprises, is to ask two empirical
questions: What does torts concern, and how does it act on those concerns?
The answer to the first question-what does torts concern-is simply
this: Torts concerns the allocation of loss.94 Nothing more, nothing less.
Loss allocation is the only common concern of all tort cases.
The immediate objection to this answer is that the concern for the
allocation of loss is not unique to tort law Although a concern for loss
allocation distinguishes torts from criminal law, which deals with societal
punishment for actual or threatened harm,95 it cannot distinguish torts from
many other fields of law or human endeavor. Loss allocation also drives
large areas of the civil law, such as breach of contract and antitrust claims,
as well as important extralegal processes, such as insurance or, more
generally, contract.
The objection is unfair in some ways and fair in others. It is unfair
because I am not attempting a rigid, essentialist definition of torts that
however, is to see whether we can join all of those branches into a coherent whole and learn
anything useful from that description.
88. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928).
89. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), af4'd, 3 L.R.-H.L.

330 (1868).
90. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
91. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
that takes the
94. See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 320 (describing torts as "practice
victim's loss as its point of departure"). In some cases, torts also concerns the risk of future loss.
For further discussion of this point, see'infranotes 119-24 and accompanying text.
95. Even this statement is a generalization. With the rise of victim compensation
statutes and the power of a sentencing judge to order restitution, criminal law has taken on an
increasingly allocational approach. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)

(allowing restitution as aspect of crinmal sentencing). See generally Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating "Son of
Sam" statute that required criminals to repay victims from profits of literary accounts of their
crimes).

A PROCESS THEORY OF TORTS

1339

neatly excludes all "nontorts." Such a definition would be impossible. We
are all aware that a single set of facts might give rise to a tort claim and a
breach of contract claim; we all know that torts might abstain in favor of
contract, insurance, or antitrust law as the proper vehicle for formulating
an allocational response. Just because loss allocation is the concern of
torts-an outer permissible boundary, if you will-does not mean that torts
must necessarily expand to the full limits of that boundary or that other
methods of loss allocation might not overlap the boundary
On the other hand, the objection is fair because it forces us to ask
whether loss allocation is the only boundary on tort law Here, the answer
is no: Torts in fact has two additional aspects that narrow its outer
boundaries. Both aspects, however, are "process constraints." In other
words, they concern the second of the two empirical questions that I set out
above: How does torts act on its concern for allocation of loss?
The first of the two process constraints is, at least on its face,
noncontroversial: Torts allocates loss through an adjudicatory process.
Indeed, the adjudicatory dimension of torts is so obvious that it is usually
ignored. At the same time, it is vitally important. It distinguishes tort law
from legislation, which can also be used to allocate loss, 96 and from
contract and insurance, which typically allocate loss er ante through private
agreement. Moreover, the adjudicatory nature of torts suggests that torts
must conform to the limitations established by the form of adjudication.'
Finally, it brings to the fore a matter almost universally neglected by
conceptualists, but widely understood by anti-conceptualists: Process has
as much influence over liability decisions as doctrine and theory 98
Of course, objections to even this process boundary for tort law are
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (authorizing
petitions against government compensation fund for injuries due to childhood vaccines); 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. IV 1993) (authorizing compensation for victims exposed to radiation
from nuclear weapons testing).
97 For a complete development of those limits, see infra note 134 and accompanying
text.
98. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESs 31 (1988) ("What
is not so
distinguishes the American tort system from its counterparts in other countries
much the substance of its 'black-letter' rules as its unique institutional arrangements.");
GREEN, supra note 4, at 145; James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1982) (identifying four process concerns that influence doctrine). See
generally JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. & RIcHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROcESs (3d ed.

1988) (intertwining study of procedural and substantive tort rules); id. at 14 ("Adjudication
is the heart of the torts process
").
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possible. An empiricist might claim that because most tort claims
ultimately settle, adjudication cannot be a necessary condition of torts. 99
But that argument simply repeats in different fashion an objection
previously refuted. People are free to allocate loss through nonadjudicatory means such as a settlement agreement, which is simply a type of
contract. Torts and contract overlap in their allocational concerns; and
torts, with its adjudicatory process, can certainly defer to contract, with its
negotiation process, as the proper velcle for loss allocation.it ° The desire
to avoid a threatened or impending adjudication may serve as the catalyst
for agreement, but it does not turn that agreement into an adjudication.
The only way that torts itself is capable of allocating loss is by means of
adjudication.
Quite a different attack upon adjudication as a constitutive element of
torts could be launched by conceptualists, who might view adjudication as
a distinct field with independent constraints that prevent torts from reaching
its true potential.101 Yet any claim that process and torts are distinct simply
flies in the face of our history, in which the study of torts was the study of
process at least until the time of Holmes, 1' 2 and of our present practical
experience. As any tort practitioner will acknowledge, knowledge of
procedure is at least as crucial (and perhaps more so) to the success of a
tort case than knowledge of "the law." To contend that these concerns are
mere side constraints upon perfection is to live in an idealized world. Any
99. See JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR., ET AL., THE TORTS PROCEss 6-7 (4th ed. 1994)
(arguing that because most cases settle, "it is important not to overstate [adjudication's]
function" in tort law); Saks, supra note 10, at 1226 (estimating that 85% of tort claims that
result in demand for payment settle before trial).
100. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV L. REV 353,
357-65 (1978) (demonstrating that organization by common aim (such as elections), by
reciprocity (such as contracts), and by adjudication are different methods of resolving dispute);
see also mfra notes 115-17, 298, 309-12 and accompanying text (discussing relationship

between torts and contract).
101. It would be unfair to attribute this precise criticism to any particular conceptualist,
but Coase's Theorem, which holds that all legal rules are efficient in the absence of transaction

(e.g., litigation) costs, and the legal economists' concern with effects of adjudicatory "errors"
on efficient outcomes, suggest that law and economics adherents would be willing to make the
argument. See POSNER, supra note 29, §§ 21.2, 21.6; SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 79-85.
Other conceptualists, however, have integrated, albeit incompletely, some procedural insights
into their view of torts. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; Richard A. Epstein,
Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974);
Richard A. Epstein, IntentionalHarms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, supra note 24.

102. See WHrrE, supra note 1, at 4-19.
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system to allocate loss must be accompanied by some process to accomplish that result.
By combining these first two boundaries of torts, we can begin to see
the structure within which the tort debate must occur. Torts is an
adjudicatory process designed to allocate loss. But that description is
broad, for it suggests that torts has the potential to expand to consider
many types of losses that it presently leaves to other legal or extralegal
processes. Moreover, neither of these two elements suggests any sort of
doctrinal or theoretical limitations within which tort principles must be
crafted. The issue, therefore, is whether some additional criteria delimit
the structure of torts.
The answer is a qualified "yes"; torts does make allocational decisions
within certain "meta-doctrinal" boundaries. But this answer has two
qualifications. The first should be obvious from the nature of my
descriptive enterprise: The meta-doctrinal parameters for torts are of such
generality that they can shape only the outer terms within which the debate
about specific rules occurs; they cannot resolve conflicts when two or more
rules are both consistent with the parameters. The second qualification is
that tort law is not consistent with any single meta-doctrmal parameter.
The examples of Holmes, Posner, and Weinrib illustrate the futility of
trying to organize all of tort doctrine around any single principle, 10 3 and I
cannot pretend to possess a single explanatory principle that has eluded tort
law's many extraordinary thinkers.
At this point, however, the vision of torts as perpetual conflict comes
to our aid. Although there can be no single meta-doctrinal principle that
informs all specific choices of rules, two or more such principles may
together have the potential to describe all of tort law Because multiple
principles cannot be entirely consistent, they contend for outcomes that are
inconsistent. That sort of tension is precisely what a vision of torts as
perpetual conflict would predict.
In our search for such metadoctrinal parameters, we can quickly reject
three methods of searching. The first would be to seek parameters that are
diametrically opposed: for example, to suggest that all tort doctrine can be
accounted for by a model that imposes liability for action and one that
imposes liability for non-action. 4 Although it is certainly true that all tort
103.
104.

See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
Two scholars have attempted to create a tort structure out of the clash of opposing

tendencies. See ENGLARD, supra note 52, at 7-92; Balkin, supra note 9. Englard develops
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doctrines must be either "A" or "not-A," that approach defines the entire
umverse and thus imposes no doctrinal or theoretical limitations on torts
except that it be an adjudicatory process allocating loss. Moreover, the use
of mutually exclusive parameters also makes the growth and regeneration
of tort law, which is an observable phenomenon, difficult to explain.
the more interesting approach. He argues that torts must be understood as the combination
of three sets of mutually opposing pairs of tendencies: moral responsibility and social utility,
corrective justice and distributive justice, and fault and strict liability He then adopts Bohr's
theory of complementarity, discussed supra note 83, to justify the basic nature of tort
law.
Two observations about Englard's effort are m order. First, his three sets of principles
are not m complete opposition. Fault and strict liability are not always opposed, see generally
Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L.
REV 963 (1981); often tort doctrines can simultaneously meet moral and utility concerns; and
they frequently lead to results that are just from both distributional and corrective perspectives.
Thus, Englard is closer to the position of other scholars who see overlapping rather than
mutually exclusive tendencies in tort, see infra note 106 and accompanying text, and has less
need of his principle of complementarity than he appreciates.
Second, whatever its merits in the physical sciences, the principle of complementarity
is poorly suited to the legal enterprise. For the reasons given in the text, describing creations
of the human mind (such as tort law) in "A" and "not-A" terms creates little value. Bohr's
hypothesis was responding to experimental data, some of which pointed to light being a wave
and some of which pointed to light being a particle. No middle ground was possible. Legal
outcomes are usually more ambiguous and are capable of being understood in many different
ways. To force the case to be either "A" or "not-A" is to impose an order on tort cases that
Moreover,
is not reflective of the large middle ground that most cases occupy
complementarity becomes necessary only when no single explanation can describe all of the
observed results. This Article demonstrates that a single explanation is possible, thus
obviating the need to resort to complementarity.
For similar reasons, Balkin's approach, which seeks to explain torts in terms of the
tension between models of individualism and communalism, fails. This opposition of principle
to counter-principle, which is a basic methodology of critical scholars, see Unger, supra note
22, at 616-48, reveals nothing valuable about the nature of torts qua torts; at most, it tells us
something about the proclivities of a specific tort system.
Interestingly, Englard critiques Balkin for employing the same type of effort to construct
torts out of opposing tendencies that Englard does. ENGLARD, supra note 52, at 60-64. The
strong impression that Englard's critique leaves is not that Balkin's approach is wrong, but
only that the opposing categories that Balkin chooses are wrong. Englard's denomination of
his set of choices (moral responsibility vs. social utility; corrective justice vs. distributive
justice; and fault vs. strict liability) as correct and all others (e.g., individualism vs.
communalism) as incorrect sounds merely like a particular author's opinion that his mutually
opposing categories are superior to another author's mutually opposing categories. Again, the
appeal to complementarity breaks down. Unlike Bohr, who knew that light was either a wave
or a particle, torts scholars face innumerable ways of characterizing torts. How one author's
set of choices emerges as victorious is entirely unclear.
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Because the distinctive arguments favoring "Model A" and "Model Non-A"
are opposing, a choice to adopt Model A reflects a judgment of both the
correctness of "A" and the wrongness of "non-A." Change in torts is then
possible only if we overturn our initial normative decision to credit A's
distinctive arguments. When the meta-doctrinal parameters have an
overlapping, concurrent claim to validity, however, the opposite is true.
The overlapping parameters impose some limits on torts other than
"process allocating loss," but they avoid definitive normative judgments
about the correctness of specific doctrines. In short, overlapping
parameters provide both more defimtion of the scope of tort law and less
security about the correctness of any particular set of answers. 05
The second method of choosing meta-doctrinal parameters is simply
to list the present doctrinal structure of tort law as the parameters: To say,
for instance, that torts judges behavior according to models of intent,
negligence, or strict liability or that torts involves losses from car
accidents, slip and falls, product injuries, defamation, and so forth. This
method has all of the flaws of the prior method, for it simply describes a
universe without a sense of the irrepressible struggle. It also suffers from
an important additional flaw- It might be underinclusive. New torts are
continually recognized, and it is possible that new levels of scienter,
unforeseeable today, might be important in 500 years. Describing
the outer boundaries of torts by assuming that it can go no farther is
myopic.
A third approach to choosing parameters is to identify the various
theories or policies that have driven aspects of tort law- to posit, for
instance, the overlap of a corrective justice model, a utilitarian model, and
a distributive justice model; or perhaps to describe competing models of
loss spreading, deterrence, compensation, and fairness." ° Although it has
105. This does not mean that torts is free to change its doctrinal mind on a daily basis.
As we shall see, there are significant structural constraints to the frequent change of doctrine.
See infra notes 150-58, 275-84 and accompanying text. My only point is that our choice of
meta-doctrinal parameters need not reinforce those constraints. Because this is an admittedly
debatable proposition for many, it is perhaps enough to fall back on my other point-that
opposing parameters limit nothing-as a criticism of their use.
106. For examples of similar efforts, albeit with different academic projects in mind, see,
e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 303 (describing torts as mixture of markets and morals);
Fletcher, supra note 37, at 1672-78 (contending that torts arises in borderland between
criminal and contractual liability). See generally STEINER, supra note 32 (arguing that torts
is combination of moral justifications, both utilitarian and natural rights, and social vision);
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some merit, this approach must also be rejected. First, it risks
underinclusiveness; torts must allow room for the infusion of new
theories and policies that redirect torts in ways not now imaginable to us.
Second, the approach is unfaithful to the history of torts. Tort theorizing
is of relatively recent origin; 11 ex post rationalizations of doctrines that
predated those theories create a great risk of failing to appreciate what
tort law was attempting to accomplish in its own time."' Third, the use
of theoretical or policy models to set the boundaries of torts suggests that
the conceptualists are correct, at least in matters of doctrine, about how
torts should be done. Having already disproved that suggestion in a
related context, 'I it would be odd to accept conceptualism here.
Although it has not always had its present fascination with theory and
policy, torts has always had, and will always have, concern for doctrines
and rules. 0 Hence, the only sensible way to find the meta-doctrinal
parameters on the tort process for allocating loss is a fourth approach: to
find the common denominators among the myriad, often conflicting rules
themselves. In order to avoid falling victim to describing only the latter
twentieth-century status quo and so that we have something of value to
study, however, we must also assure that we find denominators that
explain the broadest possible range of rules. Because one denominator
cannot encompass all rules, it would be best if two, or perhaps three,
Fletcher, supranote 28 (finding two paradigms of fairness and utility in tort law); Martin A.
Kotler, Competing Conceptions of Autonomy: A Reappraisalof the Basis of Tort Law, 67 TUL.
L. REv 347 (1992) (finding torts to be comprised of efficiency and changing autonomy

paradigms); Owen, supra note 24 (describing torts as combination of autonomy and
community models); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV 1163
(1992) (describing Libertarian, Conservative, Liberal, Collective, and Socialist models
operative in torts).
107 See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 78 (arguing that judges "should base their judgments
upon broad considerations of policy to which the traditions of the bench would hardly have
tolerated a reference fifty years ago"); WHrTE, supra note 1, at 3-19.
108. Cf. Schwartz, Tort Law, supra note 2 (using nineteenth century cases to refute ex
post thesis that negligence rules were created to subsidize industry).
109. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
110. For much of the early history of torts, the fascination lay with procedural rather than
substantive rules. See MILSOM, supra note 2, at 285-313. But even in those forms of action

we can discern certain doctrinal rules-like causation-that were so fundamental that they were
taken for granted as the lawyers performed their procedural dance. See, e.g., The Thorns
Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 4, fo. 7, pl. 18 (1466); Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.
1616).
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parameters did so. In this way, tis fourth approach combines a focus on
the reality of tort rules, which was the strength of the second methodology, and the abstraction into broad overlapping parameters that facilitate
the eternal struggle of torts, which was the strength of the third methodology
With this methodology in mind, I have identified two meta-doctrnnal
parameters that constrict the manner in which tort adjudication allocates
loss. The parameters operate in the disjunctive; although it is possible
that both will be satisfied, it is necessary that only one of the two
parameters be satisfied in order for a reallocation to occur through the
tort process.'II The parameters are these: the tort process can (not "must"
or "should," but "can") reallocate loss when (a) the defendant causes the
plaintiff's loss, or (b) when the commumty's values demand realloca2
tion. "
Stated differently, and combnung the prior two limits within the
third, there are two distinct sets of boundaries on torts. The first set of
boundaries, which I will call the "causal model," defines torts as being
an adjudicatory process designed to reallocate loss to a defendant only
when a defendant can be shown to have caused the loss suffered by a
plaintiff. The second set of boundaries, which I will call the "commumty
model," defines torts as an adjudicatory process designed to reallocate
loss to a defendant only when the community's norms permit reallocation.
The models are a ceiling and not a floor: any process that exceeds the
combined scope of the two models cannot be a tort process, but torts need
not swell to its fullest potential.
To a certain extent, the two models of torts are independent, but they
are nonetheless confederated in two important ways. First, they share a
single foundation: adjudicatory process allocating loss. Second, the two
models have a potential for overlap. Indeed, if we posit a society in
111. In other words, my claim is that the only necessary condition in torts is an
adjudicatory process designed to allocate loss. But that condition is not sufficient. In order
for such a process to be suffictent as a torts process, it must also satisfy one of two additional
elements.
112. Given the prior elements of loss allocation and adjudicatory process, a precise
description of torts' boundaries allows us to invoke torts only when we (1) are involved in the
allocation of loss, (2) adopt an adjudicatory process, and (3) limit our reallocation response
to situations in which the defendant either (a) caused the loss or (b) violated community

norms.
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which commumty norms demand a causal connection before reallocation
from a defendant is allowed,"' then the community model becomes a
14
subset of the causal model.
It also bears emphasis that the boundaries of these models are
permeable not only between themselves, but also to other, nontort
processes. For example, contract law, which operates as a private process
of loss allocation through agreement, can enforce breaches of contract (i.e.,
loss allocation contrary to agreement) through adjudication. Because
breaches are actionable when they cause loss, the outer parameters of the
enforcement of contract and the causal model of torts overlap," 5 either or
both models can address problems of loss resulting from contractual
breach." 6 Once again, the operative word is "can." Neither system must
swell its boundaries to their full potential. Contract may defer to a tort
solution, torts may defer to a contract solution, both
may assert suzerainty,
117
dispute.
the
m
interest
any
or both may disavow
113.

For the most part, ours is such a society See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY
THE LAW, at lxxvii-lxxxi (2d ed. 1985) (discussing centrality of
causation to liability questions); Symposium, Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI.-KENT
L. REV 397 (1987) (developing different views on proper analysis for causation); cf.
Christopher H. Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice andLiabilityfor IncreasingRisks, 37 UCLA L.
REv 439 (1990) (recognizing fundamental nature of causation in torts and attempting to craft
argument alainst it). Exceptions, however, prevent the overlap from being complete. See
infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
114. Conversely, of course, the models might not overlap at all. If the only community
norm was "Rich defendants should pay poor plaintiffs when the defendant has not caused the
plaintiff's loss," then the two models would share only their common heritage of both being
adjudicatory processes to allocate loss.
115. The overlap is not complete, for torts can concern itself with reallocations of loss
not resulting from breach of agreement, and contract can concern itself with nonadjudicatory
processes of loss allocation and with loss resulting from nonaction. But the two systems
intersect in the field of loss-causing breaches of agreement.
116. Indeed, in Roman law and in some civil law systems, breach of contract and torts
are simply branches of a more general law of obligations. See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN &
JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 18, 566 (2d ed. 1977). Even in our own
common law history, the modern law of contract largely developed out of the writ of trespass.
When common lawyers were finally stymied in their efforts to bring cases of nonfeasance
(promise without any overt acts of performance) within the writ of trespass, the common law
created the writ of assumpsit. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAw 637-46 (5th ed. 1956). For further discussion of the relationship between torts
and contract, see infra notes 298, 309-12 and accompanying text.
117 See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 n.8
(1986) ("We recognize, of course, that warranty and products liability are not static bodies of
HONORE, CAUSATION IN
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The same analysis pertains to a host of other legal fields that overlap
with aspects of the causal and community models. Other fields intersect
the causal or community model in part, but all are ultimately distinguishable from torts. Many fields, like securities regulation or constitutional
law, do not necessarily depend on loss allocation or adjudicatory process;
others, like antitrust, have rules whose common denominators vary from

the disjunctive combination of causation and community norms found only
in tort.
Having now sketched the description of torts, the next step is to prove
its validity Before turning to that task, however, I will need to clarify
some terms which, in the interest of setting out the descriptive model of
torts as efficiently as possible, I passed over quickly
The Meaning of "LossAllocation." The statement that torts concerns
the allocation of loss has all the qualities of a truism. Whether we read
hundreds of cases in a single jurisdiction or spot-check the cases used in
leading casebooks and treatises, we see that a common feature of disputes
sounding in tort is a loss."' Just as there can be no damnum absque
mnjuna, there can be no injuna absque damno.
Beneath the truism, however, lie three situations that seem to rob loss
allocation of its claim to umversal stature: issuance of an injunction to
prevent possible loss," 9 compensation for future consequences of past
injury, 12 and compensation for risk of future injury 121 These examples,
Nonetheless, the main currents of tort law run in different
law and may overlap.
" (citations omitted)). It is also possible
directions from those of contract and warranty
that in areas of mutual interest, contracts and torts may vindicate only certain aspects of the
loss, thus reducing the overlap further. Id. at 873 & n.9.
118. On this point, conceptualists and anti-conceptualists would seem to agree. See, e.g.,
GREEN, supra note 4, at 8; HOLMES, supra note 2, at 96; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29,
at 1; Weinrib, supra note 38, at 494; Wells, supra note 8, at 2350-51.
119. In some circumstances, torts has issued injunctions to prevent threatened loss rather
than await the loss and award damages retrospectively. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§§ 933-943.
120. When the repercussions of a plaintiffs past injury will continue into the future,
damages may be awarded for future income loss, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and
anguish. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); In re Air Crash
Disaster near Cerritos, Cal. on Aug. 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1992); Shaw v.
United States, 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
121. American jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they are willing to reallocate the
risks of future injury The usual rule is that future injuries that might develop from present
losses can be reallocated when there is a reasonable probability that they will develop. See,
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in which the physical or emotional loss has not yet occurred, refine the
precise scope of the "loss allocation" criterion. Just as the torts process has
never insisted on absolute proof of an existing loss,'2 it does not insist on
certainty with respect to future losses. It is only necessary that a loss be
possible; torts is not in the business of providing remedies for past risks
with no chance of materialization m future injury '2 But the degree of
certainty upon which torts insists is entirely a positive matter. The choice
of the appropriate standard-whether it be "possible," "more likely than
not," or "beyond a reasonable doubt"-relies on notions of fairness, utility,
policy, or admimstrative convemence and cannot be extracted from the
element of "loss allocation" itself.2
e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412-13 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). When the chances are less than 50%, however, recovery is
denied. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Herber v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d. Cir. 1986). Some jurisdictions are reversing this
rule, at least in the medical malpractice arena, to allow for the award of damages for "loss of
a chance" of recovery of less than 50%; thus far, however, the rule has been invoked only
when the risk materialized in the patient as a present (rather than future) harm. See, e.g.,
Waffen v. United States, 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1986); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop.,
664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). But see Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1991)
(overruling Waffen and denying recovery for "loss of a chance"). Cf. Beeman v Manville
Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1993) (denying recovery
for reduced life expectancy due to asbestos exposure, but holding open the possibility of
recovery for increased risk of injury); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J.
1989) (rejecting theory of increased risk for toxic exposures over adamant dissent). Even
when recovery for increased risk has not been allowed, courts have been willing to allow
recovery for losses closely associated with the risk, such as fear of the future risk and costs
of medical monitoring. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); Beeman, 496 N.W.2d at 251-53; Ayers v.
Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Herber, 785 F.2d at 83-85.
122. As with the other elements of the prima facie case, the plaintiff typically bears the
burden of proving that, more likely than not, she sustained damage. See, e.g., QuinonesPacheco v. American Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992). In some instances, the
standard is less stringent, with damages being "presumed." See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 30, §§ 112, l16A (discussing damages available at common law in defamation
action); Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV
782, 793 (1986) (justifying common law use of general damages in defamation cases "because
it is quite often impossible to reconstruct the ever-expanding web of influence that false
statements can spin"); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (holding
that in absence of actual malice, First Amendment requires proof of "actual injury" in case
of defamation against private individual speaking on matter of public concern).
123. See GREEN, supra note 4, at 8.
124. Subsequently, I suggest that the interaction of tort law's constitutive elements pushes

A PROCESS THEORY OF TORTS

1349

A skeptical student of torts would also point to a second necessary
refinement of tort law's concern for loss allocation. Although reported
decisions are impossible to find, it is inevitably true that in some cases,
juries, motivated more by sympathy or vengeance than logic, have awarded
damages to those who suffered no actual or potential loss, and judges have
not overturned the verdict. Nonetheless, the occasional malingerer fails to
disprove the claim that torts is a system designed to allocate loss. Torts
cannot insist on absolute certainty with respect to present losses. Indeed,
the acknowledged illegitimacy of faking loss strengthens the claim that the
only appropriate function of torts is loss allocation.
Taken together, these refinements suggest that the concern of torts
should more precisely be described as the allocation of "actualorpotential
loss."" 2 The reality that torts, at least on occasion, awards punitive
damages requires a third refinement."2 Because the usual view is that
punitive damages are intended to punish rather than to reallocate existing
losses, 27 their availability may suggest that loss allocation is not a
necessary element of torts. But that view is inaccurate for two reasons.
First, the availability of punitive damages in torts is triggered by the
existence of a loss; torts does not award punitive damages when a plaintiff
has suffered no loss whatsoever.1'2 But "loss allocation" does not
necessarily require that the remedy for loss be precisely that which restores
naturally toward the adoption of a standard of proof somewhere around "more likely than
not." See infra note 158. This standard is not, however, required; it is optimal, rather than
necessary.
125. Although I will continue to use the phrase "loss allocation" as a shorthand
throughout the remainder of this Article, the phrase should be read to encompass these
refinements.
126. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981);
cf. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (discussing
constitutional limitations on award of punitive damages).
127 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 908; DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11
(2d ed. 1993). In Michigan, however, the purpose of "exemplary damages" is to "make the
plaintiff whole for damages, not readily calculated, which are caused by malicious, willful,
or wanton conduct, such as 'feelings of humiliation, outrage and indignity.'" Latham Seed
Co. v. Nickerson Am.Plant Breeders, Inc., 978 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. 1982)). Under this view, there is no
difficulty with the allocation of these actual losses to defendant.
128. The loss needed to justify an award of punitive damages does not have to be a
physical or pecuniary one. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 908 cmt. c (noting that "an
award of nominal damages
is enough to support a further award of punitive damages").
Nominal injury is sufficient to invoke the allocational concerns of torts. See infra note 132.
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the plaintiff to his or her rightful position; 29 it could be more or less. 30
The extent of the loss allocated to the defendant, which is a positive matter,
should be distinguished from the existence of loss, which is a constitutive
element of torts. Second, one can view punitive damages as a dimension
of criminal law that overlaps with either the causal or the community
model. The same conduct can evoke both the loss allocation concerns of
torts and the punitive concerns of criminal law Rather than separating the
conduct into two component suits, the tort and some of the criminal
interests in the defendant's conduct are joined in a single adjudicatory
process, much as overlapping tort and contract interests are joined in a
single products liability action.'
This last refinement suggests a final point about loss allocation: The
concept of "loss" is a matter of positive law From the viewpoint of torts,
any deprivation of any conceivable interest in body, mind, spirit, property,
or community can constitute a "loss."' 32 As the examples of wrongful
129. On the relationship between a remedy and the rightful position, see DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1-19 (2d ed. 1994).
130. Instances in which damages might be more or less than actual loss include
defamation, which allows presumed damages, and trespass, which allows nominal damages.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text; infra note 132. Moreover, our real-world
experience suggests that we do not always compensate plaintiffs only in accordance with the
extent of loss; other factors, like the fact finder's views about the relative culpability of the
plaintiff and defendant, often influence the size of the award. Indeed, there is no other way
to explain widely disparate awards given to a plaintiff whose case is, for some reason, heard
twice. Compare, e.g., Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974) (noting that
plaintiff received $50,000 verdict in defamation trial) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680
F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming award of $100,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in
punitive damages on retrial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
131. Nothing in the nature of adjudication forces it to give effect to only one type of
substantive interest at a time; hence, tort and criminal interests can be pressed in a single suit.
See Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
JudicialPower, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1683, 1751-52 (1992).
132. See Dunn v Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 1992 WL 228875, at *5-11 (3d Cir. Sept. 18,
1992) (discussing whether asymptomatic pleural thickening of lungs can constitute
compensable injury); PROSSER & KEFTON, supra note 30, §§ 54, 111, 117 (discussing
recovery for emotional distress, defamation, and privacy); see also sources cited supra note
121 (describing circumstances under whiuh there can be recovery for increased risk of injury,
fear of injury, and medical monitoring costs). Within this broad notion of loss should be
included the concept of "nominal damages," which can be awarded when a plaintiff either
cannot demonstrate actual physical or pecuniary harm from an invasion of an interest or fails
to prove adequately the extent of that harm. See REsTATEMENT, supranote 12, § 907 cmts.
b, c. Although there has been no "harm" in the sense in which American tort law has
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death, consortium, and emotional distress claims have shown, our cultural
notions of loss have vaned through history 133 Such withdrawals from the
full potential scope of torts depend again on notions of fairness, utility,
policy, convenience, or precedent. Because the concept of loss is an outer
boundary, nothing in the descriptive model of torts can definitively resolve
whether torts should expand to the limits of that boundary or, if not, where
it should draw the line within that boundary
The Meaning of 'AdjudicatoryProcess." A definition for adjudicatory
process takes us afield from the usual concerns of torts scholars and into
the arena of procedural theory A complete description of adjudicatory
process, which is itself an outer shell that envelopes a never-ending internal
struggle, would be largely tangential to our purposes here. In brief,
however, an adjudicatory process requires the following: the existence of
a dispute concerning the allocation of an obligation recognized under
existing legal arrangements, a claim asserted against a person required to
provide a remedy if the claim is justified, a state-provided decision maker
that reaches a decision through the use of reasoned judgment, and like
treatment of parties with factually and legally identical claims. 34 It Is
traditionally conceived of the term, an invasion of an interest worthy of legal protection has
occurred. This invasion constitutes a loss sufficient to invoke the torts process. Id. Because
the notion of loss allocation does not require that the amount of reallocation be precisely that
which the plaintiff lost, see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text, the disparity between
the actual amount of this loss and the nominal award does not defeat the assertion that torts
is concerned only with loss allocation.
133. For discussion of the historical evolution of our willingness to recognize these
injuries as losses, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 789-98, 1003-63.
134. Tidmarsh, supra note 131, at 1735-54. For other treatments of the nature and
bounds of adjudication, see COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984); MIiJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986); POSNER, supranote 29, § 21.1, RAwLS, supra note
37, at 235-39; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV L.
REV 1281 (1976); Fuller, supra note 100; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153,
1172-77
It should be noted that "reasoned judgment" does not demand the application of heartless
logic to the liability issue; a certain amount of sympathy and bias is built into the term.
Tidmarsh, supra note 131, at 1736 n.246; see also William L.F Felstiner, Influences of Social
Organizationon Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC'Y Rv 63, 70 (1974) ("In adjudication,
outcomes may be sensitive to a wide range of extrinsic factors including class membership,
political alliances, economic consequences and corruption, but in the main the behavior of the
disputants is evaluated by reference to generalized rules of conduct."). Hence, the
requirement of reasoned judgment is not hopelessly at odds with the community model, which
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enough to describe these outer boundaries and to leave to later parts of the
article the ways m which specific dimensions of those boundaries influence
tort law
The Meaning of "Causation." Because liability within the causal
model hinges on the existence of causation, it is necessary to define a term
whose many permutations in its "factual" and "proximate" branches make
it one of the most slippery legal concepts. 35 The nature of the descriptive
enterprise, which seeks to develop outer limits that validate rather than
exclude, requires a broad meaning of causation.
In describing the type of causation needed to trigger the causal model,
I use "cause" m the sense of an act that is necessary to the loss suffered by
the plaintiff. More precisely, given the inherent inability of an adjudicatory process to make accurate causal judgments in each case, "causation"
requires evidence that (1) the defendant's act increased the risk of a loss to
plaintiff to a level above that associated with the "background risk" (i.e.,
the risk of a particular loss created by actions other than the defendant's),
and (2) the plaintiffs loss is associated with the risk posed by the
defendant's act. 136 This definition of causation, which avoids some of the
conundrums of "but for" causation, 37 does not require that the evidence of
is often influenced by sympathies and biases; but these two elements generate a friction with
which torts must constantly be occupied.
135. For important efforts to describe the boundaries of cause-m-fact and proximate
cause, see, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 944 (1965); Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991); Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. v Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound), 1961 App. Cas. 388 (P.C. Austl.);
In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (1921); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§§ 430-461, HART & HONORE, supra note 113; ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE INTHE
LAw OF TORTS (1963); Calabresi, supra note 33; Symposium, Causation in the Law of Torts,
supra note 113.
136. To take a simple example of a pedestrian whose leg is broken by a negligent
motorist, the causal model is satisfied once there is evidence that (1) the motorist's driving
increased the risk of injuring the pedestrian's leg above the pedestrian's background risk of
a broken leg from sources such as an open sewer cover or a crack in the sidewalk and (2) the
plaintiff was walking with no difficulty just prior to the accident, the car struck the leg, and
an X-ray taken shortly afterwards revealed a broken bone. Other evidence might also suffice.
137 "But-for" causation requires a fact finder to engage in a problematic counterfactual
prediction about how events would have turned out had the defendant not acted. See, e.g.,
HART & HONORE, supranote 113, at 110-14; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 41. The
approach suggested in the text focuses instead on the risks created by the defendant and the
evidence tending to show that this risk materialized in the plaintiff's loss. The definition also
avoids some of the difficulty that "but-for" causation faces in addressing "sufficient cause"
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causation be of a particular quality (e.g., "more likely than not," "clear and
convincing," or "possibly")' 8 or in a particular form (eyewitness vs.
expert, written vs. oral). Nor does this definition involve notions of
proximate cause such as "directness," "foreseeability," "substantial factor,"
"legal cause," "intervening" and "superseding" causes, or causal para39
digms. 1
Although we recognize with near unanimity that the responsibility for
our causal conduct must end at some point,""' the causal model cannot
choose a definitive method for accomplishing the result.' 4' The reason is
that a valid description of torts must seek the least common denominators;
cases, i.e., cases in that two or more independent causes (one associated with the defendant
and one not) which are each capable of causing injury simultaneously occur. See, e.g.,
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 211 N.W 913
(Wis. 1927). Because this definition of causation does not require a particular level of proof
(e.g., "more likely than not") that the plaintiff's injury is associated with the defendant's risk,
see infra notes 158, 176 and accompanying text, it is possible to find that a defendant caused
the loss even though another, independent event would also have done so.
Of course, it remains available to a tort system to adopt a more restrictive "but-for"
standard for causation; the definition given in the text is the outermost boundary of the causal
model. It is equally true that this definition cannot explain all tort decisions and commentary
about sufficient cause cases and thus cannot avoid all of the "but-for" conundrums. For
discussion of those instances, see infra notes 173-79, 183-86 and accompanying text.
138. In the rare instances in which torts allows presumed damages, see supra note 132,
this burden of proof issue, the issue of loss vel non, and the community model become
intertwined. Thus, the common law's award of presumed damages for certain types of
defamation can be understood either as a recognition that potential harm to reputation is itself
a loss requiring reallocation, as a reduction in the level of proof necessary to show actual harm
to reputation to a "mere possibility" standard, or as an instance in which the community model
imposes liability without regard to causation. It is not especially important to our present task
to decide the precise etiology of presumed damages.
139. Directness, foreseeability, substantial factor, legal cause, and intervening and
superseding cause are the usual methods that courts and commentators use to preclude
responsibility for remote (or nonproximate) causes. See, e.g., HART & HONORE, supra note
113, at 1-8;.sources cited supra note 135. Causal paradigms were created by Richard Epstein
to serve the same function of cutting off responsibility. See Epstein, supra note 24. But see
Epstein, supra note 34, at 657 (disavowing some of his earlier theory).
140. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 41, at 266 ("It should be obvious that,
once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of causation, no place to stop. The event
without millions of causes is simply inconceivable
").
141. As we shall see, the causal model has some optimal or preferred approaches, but
they cannot be deduced as a matter of ineluctable logic from the model itself. See infra notes
161-70 and accompanying text; see also Weinrib, Causation, supra note 72, at 417-18
(describing problems associated with "causation's excessive generality").
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it cannot take sides. We cannot exclude the possibility that some tort
system might desire, hundreds of years after the fact, to hold the estate of
Christopher Columbus liable for all the causal consequences of his conduct.
The appropriate limits of proximate cause have always been, and are likely
always to be, a battleground of tort law The goal of the causal model is
to provide the boundaries within which that struggle can occur, not to
attempt the impossible feat of predetermining an inherently indeterminate
conflict.
The Meaning of "Community Values." In the community model, the
torts process gives effect to the community's values about when a
defendant should make good a plaintiff's loss. Consequently, this model
requires that we develop an understanding of two terms: "community" and
tvalues. " A "community" is the set of people who lie within the juridical
reach of the particular tort process that establishes the terms of loss
allocation. "4 2 Its "values" are the principles or standards of fairness and
propriety with which the community operates. These values are not
necessarily based on any normative theories of justice or morality; they are
culturally determined through the community's practices and shared
beliefs.143 These values might well be viewed as unfair or misguided in
other contemporaneous communities and are capable of evolution (or even
repudiation) within a community over time. Thus, a particular community
can vault the principle of economic efficiency to a primordial position; fifty
years later, the same community can legitimately jettison that value in
favor of widespread wealth redistribution or Kantian imperatives.
In any juridical community, of course, there will be those who dissent
from the general standards of fairness. In order that it not be rendered a
nullity by the lone dissenter, the community model does not insist on
consensus of opinion. It is enough that the community shares the value
widely and that the value can be fairly described as a highly dominant
perspective. 14 Such values are most likely to be a part of hierarchial,
142. It is therefore possible that a single person might belong to more than one
community I assume here that only one community's values will decide the issue of loss
allocation. Should two or more communities with interests in having their values applied

agree on a compromise or third approach, cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580
F Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y 1984) (adopting "national consensus" products liability law), the
relevant community would then encompass all subcommunities agreeing on the compromise.
143. Cf. Abel, supra note 9, at 791-92 (noting that "moral intuitions of judges and juries
lack a principled basis").
144. F.S.C. Northrop used to emphasize the lessons from sociological jurisprudence,
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monolithic, and moralistic communities, 45 but they can also occur in
diverse communities with nearly universal experience of and agreement
about the proper ways of conducting certain activities. 46 Community
values can also be created in two other ways. First, the different senses of
fairness of the various nondommant subgroups within a community might
all agree on a particular loss allocation." Second, community values can
is dominant, agree to
be created when various subgroups, none of whom
148
be bound by the values of a particular subgroup.
Even with this broadened understanding of community values,
however, it may be difficult for a diverse community to come to agreement
about the appropriate allocational consequences for important categories of
defendants' conduct. When community values are inapposite, torts must
rely on the causal model to allocate loss; and if that model too is inapposite, then it must defer to "nontort" responses to the loss. The boundaries
of torts are broad, but they are not limitless.

which descended from the belief that a critical distinction exists between the positive law
and the "living law" of a community The "living law," which is the set of postulates
"shown to enjoy the acceptance and support of most, but never all, of the people," equates
with the notion of community values I describe here. See NORTHROP, supra note 19, at 9394; see also id. at 115 ("[I]t is only common beliefs that are community beliefs and hence
effective living and positive legal principles.").
145. An example of such a community might be a hamlet in medieval England, in
which persons shared a common heritage, a common religion, and common life
experiences. The jurors were the witnesses, and the lack of legal doctrine and appellate
processes often assured a loss allocation that accorded with community norms. See
MLSOM, supra note 2, at 48-50, 295-300, 311-13; see also WLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 36-45, 87-88 (1975) (describing similar

experience in colonial Massachusetts).
146. For instance, even in our less homogenous American culture, we still widely share
certain experiences, such as automobile driving, and we can generally agree that loss
reallocation is proper when a defendant runs a red light or drives at 70 miles per hour
through a school zone.
147 Catharine Wells has called this agreement on result among nondominant groups
"local objectivity." Wells, supra note 8, at 2409.
148. For instance, peasants and artisans whose values diverge from the aristocracy's
values might nonetheless acquiesce in the aristocracy's codal principles for tort; women
might accept tort principles propounded by men; or a community of persons not schooled
in legal principles might defer to the values of the attorney elite. Although this deference
raises issues of false consciousness, the community model cares not about the propriety of
the community's values, but only about the fact of their existence.
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B. The CausalModel and the Community Model:
Basic Featuresand Optimal Conditions
The two models described in the last section do not operate independently; in some ways they reinforce, and in some ways they clash with
each other. Before we can appreciate the ways in which that interaction
shapes the actual practice, doctrine, and theory of tort law, however, we
must examine more closely the features of each model. Although the three
elements of each model'49 cannot dictate all dimensions of tort practice,
doctrine, and theory within its bounds, they do establish certain optimal
parameters for the operation of each model and also suggest certain areas
of tension within the model. This section identifies the optimal parameters
and irresolvable tensions of each model in theory and then compares the
predicted results with our actual experience of torts.
1. The Causal Model: JoiningAllocationalProcess
with CausalAct
The outer boundaries of the causal model stake out far more territory
than any tort system has ever occupied. The reason that actual tort systems
have never reached their theoretical potential is that the interplay of loss
allocation, adjudicatory process, and causal act do suggest certain optimal
conditions that effectively rein in the causal model's territorial ambitions.
There are four optimal conditions associated with a causal model. The
first is a relatively high degree of formal analysis. By its nature, the causal
model is formal: It focuses on two "objective" facts (loss and causal act)
and a process that is norm-bound and deductive. Although the intuitive
dimensions of law-finding and fact-finding admittedly temper the model's
formalism,"5° a system built around objective facts and norms is uncomfortable with intuitive, relativistic, policy-oriented solutions to loss allocation.
In order to avoid this potential misfortune, the model is likely to turn
within itself and attempt to tease out from facts that are objective and
unchanging-loss and causal act-norms that are equally neutral and
immutable.'
From those norms, further norms can be developed and
149. The three elements of the causal model are loss allocation, adjudicatory process, and

causal act. The three elements of the community model are loss allocation, adjudicatory
process, and community values. See supranotes 111-12 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 134.
151. For a more general, normative defense of this methodology, see Weinrib, supra note
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hardened. Through this process of repetition and refinement, the model
controls and marginalizes the intuitive, experiential dimensions of the
adjudicatory process.
Second, the formal limits that are likely to arise in the causal model
will ideally be manifested in the terms "loss," "causation," and "act."
These are the objective, knowable dimensions of a model that attempt to
solve problems through application of an inner consistency rather than
through appeals to belief or intuition. Furthermore, the limits imposed on
these terms should optimally avoid moral judgments, for a moral methodology threatens the neutrality and immutability of the model's limits by
including dimensions external to the objective parameters of the model.'52
Thus, the model should couch itself in neutral, "black-and-white"
propositions such as "Torts does not recognize economic loss" or "A
defendant is liable for injuries directly caused." 53 Rules are clearly stated
and easily applied. 54 Factual determinations are kept to a minimum.
When facts are needed to determine liability issues, they should be
historical and objective rather than predictive and judgmental; after all, the
model is geared to retroactive analysis of an historical event ("Did A cause
B's loss?"), rather than prospective estimation of future consequences
34.
152.

This statement may seem counterintuitive, since moral judgments often partake of

the same formal quality that I ascribe to the causal model. Indeed, in a society that is highly
moralistic in tone and generally sympathetic with the causal model's view that loss allocation
follows causal action, people might observe no difference between the neutral rules of law and

their moral beliefs. As people pull away from a monolithic moral compass, however, the gap
between qualitative moral judgments for loss reallocation and flat neutral rules that cause an
occasionally unjust allocation of loss becomes visible. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 1 (1987) (noting distinction
between "formal" and "substantive" reasoning in law and describing use of moral considerations as type of substantive, rather than formal, reasoning). If the causal model chooses to
hold onto its formal rules, as its elements naturally encourage it to do, the model cannot stake

its rules on the shifting sands of morality. For the classic argument that torts must stake itself
on neutral principles rather than on individual moral justice, see HOLMES, supra note 2, at
107-11.
153.

Simple and natural methods of control would be to impose objective, direct

limitations on causation, as Epstein's causal paradigms attempted to do, see Epstein, supra
note 24, or to specify the acts for which liability attaches and those which can be done with
impunity, as Fletcher's model of reciprocity attempted to do, see Fletcher, supra note 28.
154. Thus, the model prefers the statement "When a defendant runs a red light, she is

liable for injuries caused" to the statement "When a defendant fails to drive with reasonable
care, she is liable for injuries caused." See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 111-13, 121-29.
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("What is the effect of this rule on social interactions?"). Likewise, the
loss that the defendant actually caused correlates precisely with the damage
award. Little room remains for contentions that tort liability should depend
on the faulty quality of the defendant's action, on notions of good policy,
or on a factfinder's particularistic assessment of appropriate loss allocation
under the totality of the circumstances.
Third, the causal model works best in conjunction with a highly
structured codal system, in which the legal consequences of action are well
described in advance of the defendant's act. The obvious advantage of
such an approach is that it best assures fidelity to norm and discourages
resort to intuition. Although the development of specific codes may be a
desirable method of acluevmg this result, 55 a common law method of caseby-case adjudication with a high degree of adherence to precedent
adequately satisfies this aspect of the causal model."5 6
Fourth, the model works optimally with certain procedural protections
that protect the neutrality and immutability of its principles. In order to
prevent the unaccountability of ad hoc case-by-case determinations, the
model prefers that the pronouncement of norms be controlled by a
relatively small cadre of individuals rather than by widely dispersed
decision makers.11 The same cadre would ideally find the facts and apply
the proper norms to the facts, although entrusting the fact-finding and lawapplying functions to other entities would be acceptable as long as strict
review assured conformity with established norms. The critical importance
of accurate findings on loss, causation, and act also suggests that factual
determinations regarding these elements be made by those with personal
experience of them. For instance, questions of causation in a medical
context would ideally be made by dispassionate and objective physicians;
the use of lawyers or lay persons inevitably risks the introduction of
noncausal notions of responsibility into a clinical inquiry When experi155.

Codal principles for loss reallocation are typical in civil law countries. The level

of generality of the principles, and hence the need for subsequent interstitial interpretation,
vary greatly among codes. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supranote 116, at 555-66.
156. For the argument that common law adjudication is not necessarily impermissible as
a means of developing and applying norms, see Fuller, supra note 100, at 372-81. Indeed,
even those jurisdictions that adopt codes cannot provide for every circumstance of loss

allocation (at least if that code is not to proceed m a meat-ax fashion), so that a certain amount
of case-by-case "working out" of the codal principles for loss allocation can be anticipated.

157

See WHTE, supra note 1, at 58 (noting that legal scientists of late mneteenth century

saw "the subversive effect of jury determinations on the theoretical integrity of Torts").
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enced observers are unavailable, the causal model would prefer that the
model not act at all rather than risk a verdict that exceeds the objective
facts. 51

Of course, the causal model will never attain every detail of its optimal
features. The intuitive nature of law-finding and fact-finding and the need
to strike a balance between the plaintiff's right to loss reallocation and the
defendant's right to act brake the free-fall into formal analysis. So does the
inability to tease many concrete norms out of "loss" and "causal act,"
which are the only foundational elements of the model."59 Nonetheless,

these optimal features are important. They seek to set the model on a
course toward a hierarchically controlled, highly deductive, and substantively and procedurally strait-jacketed system of torts in which values,
situational judgments, and discretionary standards are eliminated.
158. This statement implies that a causal model would insist on a very high burden of
proof on the objective facts of loss, cause, and act. Counteracting that tendency would be an
adjudicatory system's broad preference (in our society at least) for a "more likely than not"
standard and the due process concerns that a higher standard would entail. In addition, the
desire not to allow defendants to escape the consequences of their actions and the model's
balance between the defendant's act and the plaintiffs loss, see Weinrib, supra note 38, at
511, also pull the model back from an unduly stringent burden of proof. A possible, albeit
not necessary, compromise is the use of lay decision makers assisted by expert testimony when
expert experience is important. That result, of course, conforms to the American experience.
See, e.g., Boburka v. Adcock, 979 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2933
(1993).
159. Ernest Wemrib has attempted to construct the essential structure of a negligence
system from these two elements. See Weinrib, supra note 38, at 511-24. Although a
complete critique of Weinrib's important effort is beyond the scope of this Article, a short
example might suggest the flaw in Weinrib's theory. Consider a hypothetical tort system in
which plaintiffs recovered for torts committed in odd months and defendants escaped liability
for torts committed in even months. That system would also provide an accommodation of
the interests of plaintiffs in recovery and of defendants in action. So, for that matter, does a
strict liability system with severely constricted notions of proximate cause. Neither of these
alternatives can be excluded by the objective facts of loss and causal act. See Epstein, supra
note 34, at 663-64 (suggesting similar critique).
Moreover, negligence partakes of a certain moral quality; it is in essence a judgment of
fault. But formal analysis resists the appeal to concepts external to itself. See Weinrib, supra
note 34, at 953-57; supranotes 150-54 and accompanying text. Far more consistent with the
tension between causal act and loss are the models of Epstein and Fletcher, both of whom
avoid uncertain judgments of the quality of an act by establishing certain acts for which there
is absolute liability and certain acts for which there is no liability; these latter approaches more
easily lead to the pigeonholing of claims and reduce the discretion of factfinders. Hence,
Weinrib's claim that negligence is an element logically derivable from the accommodation
between plaintiff's loss and defendant's right to act is dubious at best.
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In its broad essence, the model validates nearly all of our experience
of torts, for in all but a few instances, tort theory, doctrine, and practice
concern situations in which causation provides the basis on which to
reallocate loss. The strongest, most resonant claim in any plaintiff's case
is "Defendant hurt me"; the strongest defense, outstripping even "It was
not my fault," is "I did not do it." Proof of causation-of increased risk
and the defendant's association with that risk-is not only necessary to
satisfy theorists and doctrinally attentive judges, but is also a critical tool
of practical persuasion.
Nonetheless, the immediate problem of this model, in both its essential
and its optimal features, is its failure to reflect accurately our entire
experience of torts. As we shall soon see, there are a few instances in
which a causal act is not an essential criterion of tort liability 160 Furthermore, when the optimal is teased out from the essential, the dissonance
between the causal model and our experience of torts becomes patent.

Although torts has historically had and continues to enjoy a certain formal
flair in theory, 16 ' doctrine,

62

and even practice,

63

torts also deviates from

160. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
161. For an historical treatment of formal thought in torts, see WHrm, supra note 1, at
4-8, 37-41, 56-62. For more modem formal theorists, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 24;
Fletcher, supra note 28; Wemrib, supranote 38.
162. Many tort decisions simply purport to apply existing doctrinal principles without
either questioning the continued validity of those principles or asking what policy justifications
or goals are served by the extension of the principles to new circumstances. Admittedly, we
find few of these cases discussed in leading casebooks and treatises, which often select cases
precisely because of their nonformal insights and then edit out whatever formal (and often
lengthy) discussion of precedent they contain. Nonetheless, anyone who reads the mine run
of tort decisions cannot help but notice the rote application of precedent that occurs in most
cases. See Jay Tidmarsh, Tort Law: The Languages ofDuty, 25 IND. L. REV 1419 (1992)
(noting unwillingness of Indiana state courts to change pat duty analysis in light of Indiana
Supreme Court's development of new test for duty).
163. Here, I must rely primarily on my own observations in years of tort practice. In
their briefs and arguments, practitioners often avoid any discussion of policy, preferring
instead to recite the formal doctrinal lessons of precedent and to dissemble any strategic or
policy objectives. Whatever the precise cause of the practitioner's attempt to reduce
everything to rule, formal analysis in legal thought is endemic. See, e.g., Martin v United
States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[n]either party addresses the public
policy considerations which inform the court's analysis of whether to impose liability for
negligently caused emotional distress"; court itself then ducked issue). The same formalism
is evident among jurors who conscientiously attempt to apply jury instructions to the facts of
the case without questioning the instructions' wisdom or the biases that prevent objective
assessment of facts.
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the model's optimal features in significant ways.
Some-indeed,
most-tort theorists reject a strictly formal methodology 164 Tort doctrine,
especially in the areas of negligence and proximate cause, embraces
discretionary, situational judgments; even its duty analysis often engages
in efforts to fashion appropriate prospective behavior. 16s Tort practice,
with its appeals to the factfinder's sympathy and occasionally to the
lawflnder's sense of good policy, often runs counter to the causal model's
direction.
Faced with the reality that the outer boundaries of the causal model
capture nearly all of torts, it is tempting to do what Holmes, Posner, and
Wemrib have also done in similar circumstances: to ignore the few realworld deviations. 64 Alternatively, we could pass the exceptions off as
specific, limited models that appear like warts on the outer bubble of the
causal model. Adopting either approach, however, loses sight of the
strong resistance in torts, even among cases that fit within the outer
boundaries of the causal model, to the model's implications for an optimal
tort system. That resistance suggests that something else must compete
with the causal model-and not merely at the margins. Rather, it must
wrestle with the causal model for tort law's very soul.
I have already identified that "something else" as the community
model. In order for my claim to be correct, the community model must
explain two issues left unanswered by the causal approach: Its outer
boundaries must envelope the exceptions in tort law and practice to the
causal model, and its optimal features must justify tort law's resistance to
the causal model's hierarchical, formal nature.
2. The Community Model. JoiningAllocationalProcess
with SocietalNorms
Two recurring problems in torts fall outside of the boundaries of the
causal model. The first is the situation-notably the failure to effect some
easy rescues, 67 the failure to make natural conditions on the property safe
164. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7-10, 30-31; sources cited infra notes 218-22.
165. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 761 (Cal. 1992); PROSSER

& KEETON, supra note 30, § 53, at 358 (recognizing that "'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself,
but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection").
166. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
167 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 56, at 375-77 (discussing traditional duty
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for others,16 the failure to remove defamatory material, 169 and the failure
to disclose certain information in business transactions' 70-in which a
plaintiff's loss is allocated to a defendant even though the defendant has
done no act that increased plaintiff's risk of injury 171 The second is the
situation m which the defendant is forced to bear the loss even though the
evidence fails to prove that the plaintiff's injury is associated with the
defendant's conduct. 72 For instance, the decisions in "sufficient cause"
cases like Kingston v Chicago & North West Railway, 7 1 Summers v
Tice, 74 and Sindell v Abbot Laboratories75 could, in theory at least, be
interpreted to allow recovery even in the absence of an association with
defendant's risky conduct. In reality, however, these cases merely shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove the association between the
defendant's risky conduct and the plaintiff's mjury, which is a permissible,

of rescue imposed on carriers, innkeepers, and ships). The circle of these actionable
relationships continues to expand. Id. (discussing extension of duty to property owners,
jailers, schools, and perhaps family members). See also Weinrib, supra note 26 (advocating
general duty of easy rescue).
168. See, e.g., Husovky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Valinet v
Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. 1991); Taylor v. Olsen, 578 P.2d 779 (Or. 1978); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 363; see also id. § 364(c) (imposing duty on landowner to remove
dangerous conditions placed on property without landowner's consent).
169. See Heller v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 12, § 577(2).
170. See Ollerman v O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 1980); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 12, §§ 353, 358, 551.
171. Some, but not all, of these obligations can be justified as contract actions masquerading as tort claims. In other cases, however, there is no pre-existing contractual relationship.
If these claims are to be subsumed by torts, there must be a model other than the causal one.
172. Admittedly, some cases have also gone the plaintiff's way on thin evidence of
increased risk. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Oxendine v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100 (D.C. 1986); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1964). Nevertheless, that
issue, on which the burden and quantum of proof become the critical questions, see supra note
158, is distinct from the issue presented here: the allowance of recovery when there is no
evidence that the defendant's actions increased the risk.
173. 211 N.W 913 (Wis. 1927).
174. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
175. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. demed, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). For reasons discussed infra
notes 290, 331, 348 and accompanying text, I do not believe that Sindell itself lies within the
community model. I include it here because its approach is consistent with the community
model's focus on wrongdoing, even if its facts are not.
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albeit disfavored, tactic of the causal model; 76 thus, their results are

consistent with the broad parameters of the causal model."

Nonetheless,

some commentators 78 and at least one case 179 have gone well beyond the

causal model to permit the imposition of liability against defendants who,
having so increased the risk that they can be deemed a sufficient cause, can
nonetheless demonstrate conclusively that their conduct did not materialize
in harm to this plaintiff (i.e., that they were not a necessary cause).
Both groups of circumstances can be explained within a community
model. Although other social communities might disagree,1m our own
176. Although the necessary elements of the causal model do not determine the level of
proof required for a causal association, see supra note 158, the causal model's optimal
preference for a fairly high standard of proof, as well as its disfavor of particularistic and
nonneutral rules, see supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text, makes the causal model
clearly uncomfortable with the burden-shifting approach.
177 See supra note 137
178. See Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Erposure Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv L. REV 851 (1984);
Schroeder, supra note 113.
179. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. demed, 493 U.S. 944
(1989). The problems of Hymowitz are considered further infra notes 336-43, 348 and
accompanying text.
Unlike a market share case such as Hymowitz, "enterprise liability" cases pose no
explanatory problems for the causal model. These cases, best represented by Hall v E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y 1972), permit loss reallocation to
defendants that developed industry-wide standards for their products through a trade
association. Although there may be no evidence that a particular defendant's product caused
the injury, the act of participation in designing the standards for the product is a sufficient
causal act to satisfy the terms of the causal model. Moreover, Hall's use of a burden-shifting
device, which allows a defendant's individual exculpation on a showing of lack of causal
association, brings the case easily within the causal model. See supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
180. Some communities might So value the right of individual liberty that they would
impose no duty to rescue. Cf. Epstein, supranote 24, at 198-200 (austifying no duty to rescue
rule on libertarian grounds). Others might find a failure to rescue so abhorrent that they
would demand loss reallocation on terms even broader than those of the common law. See
Aleksander W Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91, 111-15 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) (discussing European
civil codes that arguably impose civil liability for failure to rescue); cf. id. at 91-110
(discussing criminal liability in European codes for failure to rescue). See generally F.J.M.
Feldbrugge, A Comparative Study of CriminalLaw Provisions Concerning the Failureto
Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP L. 630 (1966) (comparing criminal codes of 22 European, Asian,
and African countries regarding duty to rescue).
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communal norms recoil at the idea that a defendant in a close relationship
with a plaintiff and with the easy power to prevent injury would walk away
from the plaintiff's peril."'1 As a community, we have not yet adopted the
view that we owe an obligation of rescue to strangers," but we are willing
to condemn the failure of those who have control of and opportunity to use
the means of rescue to aid a hapless victim whom they know Parents must
rescue children and ships must rescue sailors because, in our view, the
bonds of family or employment demand a rescue. The duty to correct
certain natural conditions on the land reflects our evolving sense of
appropriate behavior as we shift from an agrarian society largely powerless
to correct nature's defects to an urban environment m which cherry pickers
and chainsaws make correction an easy task and home insurance washes
away whatever lingering doubts we might have about forcing property
owners to act. Although they may change again tomorrow, our sensibilities today tell us that these types of defendants deserve to pay
The same intuitive sense of a wrong demanding correction inhabits the
sufficient cause cases. Two of the paradigmatic sufficient cause casesKingston and Summers-justify their results largely in the language of fault;
the burden shifts to the negligent fire-setter in Kingston because an opposite
conclusion "would certainly make a wrongdoer a favorite of the law at the
expense of an innocent sufferer "l18 and to the trigger-happy hunters in
Summers because "[tihey are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward
plaintiff."8 The same is true of enterprise and market share theories of
181. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1947) (holding that
failure of host to attempt to rescue guest who had fallen off yacht was "shocking to

humanitarian considerations and the commonly accepted code of social conduct"); Ames,
supra note 26, at 110-13; Francis H. Bohlen, The MoralDuty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV 217, 316 (1908). See generally Marc A. Franklin, Vermont
RequiresRescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV 51 (1972); Warren A. Seavey, I Am Not My
Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV 699 (1960); Weinrib, supra note 26.
182. Cf. Antony M. Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND
THE LAw, supranote 180, at 225, 227-28 (questioning whether society has shared community
values on matters of rescue); Hans Zeisel, An InternationalExperiment on the Effects of a
Good SamaritanLaw, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 180, at 209, 210
(describing survey in which 92% of Americans believed law should not require non-rescuer
to pay for stranger's damage); 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y TIMES, Mar.

27, 1964, at 1 (describing failure of three dozen neighbors to call police during murder of
Catherine Genovese).

183. Kingston v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 211 N.W 913, 915 (Wis. 1927).
184. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948). Summers also offers as a reason the
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recovery of Hall v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. I and Sindell, which

similarly allocate the burden of loss "as between an innocent plaintiff and
86
a negligent defendant."
Of course, the community model has the power to explain far more
than the odd cases left out of the causal model. On the level of theory, it
explains the policy-oriented, often pragmatic approaches of a wide variety
of scholars who, for all their differences, share the view that torts should
establish rules and practices that best advance the community's interests. 187
On the level of doctrine, the community model readily explains the long
endurance and widespread existence of negligent and intentional (i.e., faultbased) torts, as well as the use of open-ended, value-infused concepts like
"the reasonable person" to determine liability 8 It explains the historical
contractions and expansions of defendants' duties of care 9 and justifies
culturally disparate doctrines and outcomes for similar occurrences of loss.
It can even explain certain instances of strict liability, once we understand
that the typical form of a strict liability rule ("When you do Act X, you are
strictly liable") can simply be a generalized expression of the community's
defendants' better position to offer evidence, see id., which implicitly suggests that defendants
would otherwise have an incentive to conspire among themselves to suppress information.
Because we view perjury and suppression of truth in legal proceedings to be contrary to our
social norms, this independent form of wrongdoing confirms the appropriateness of the
Summers rule.
185. 345 F Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y 1972). For a discussion of Hall v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 345 F Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y 1972), see supra note 179.
186. Sindell v. Abbot Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
see also Hall, 345 F Supp. at 371 (developing theory of enterprise liability in part in order
"to avoid denying recovery to an innocent injured plaintiff because proof of causation may be
within defendants' control or entirely unavailable").
187 See Smith, supra note 38, at 420-23 (describing pragmatism as effort to promote
greatest social good). See generally Smith, supra note 8 (arguing that torts should be seen as
system that resolves disputes in accord with social norms). Some of these scholars work
within the already accepted social norms; others attempt to influence and sometimes reshape
those norms. ComparePROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 4 (describing generally accepted
goals of tort system) with Abel, supra note 9 (seeking to reorient tort system away from
protection of present distribution of wealth and property). But all begin with the assumption
that we should start with the community's true interests and build toward their realization.
188. Cf. sources cited supra note 2 (discussing long-standing use of negligence principles
in Anglo-American and other cultures).
189. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the FaultPrinciple:A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981) (discussing gradual expansion of fault principles
and decreased emphasis on duty analysis during last century).
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judgment that Act X is so inherently wrong that merely performing the act
is grounds for loss reallocation." 9 Finally, the community model justifies
our usual insistence on proof of causation, for our society, in most
instances, recoils at the notion of loss reallocation in the absence of a
causal link between plaintiff and defendant.
The descriptive power of the community model is even greater in the
area of tort practice. The community model validates the use of lay
decision makers who may lack knowledge of the specific conduct at issue,
but bring the community's values to the courtroom. It explains the trial
lawyer's strong emphasis on fault, or lack thereof, even when available
theories of strict liability obviate the need for proof of fault. The model
further accounts for lawyers' anecdotal claims that juries do not always
decide strictly in accordance with the "law,"'91 that theoretically separate
issues of causation and amount of damage are often influenced by the
defendant's fault (or lack thereof),"9 and that appeals to shared values,

emotion, and intuition are critical persuasive tools. 93 Rather than finding
190. See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 368-69. This may have been the import of Lord
Cairnk's famous statement that strict liability is appropriate when a defendant makes a "nonnatural use" of his or her land. Rylands v Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 339 (1868).
Although the meaning of the term is not entirely clear, a "non-natural use" could be
understood as an activity whose injurious consequences the community refuses to tolerate
under any circumstances. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520(e), (f)
(stating that two
factors in classifying activity as abnormally dangerous are "inappropriateness of the activity
to the place where it is carried on" and "extent to which [the activity's] value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes"). But not all strict liability rules can
be justified on the basis of the community's hostility to opprobrious conduct. For instance,
the community might be so unfamiliar with the defendant's activity that it has not yet formed
a communal judgment about its appropriateness. Similarly, strict liability can be used when
the community, although having had sufficient opportunity to observe an activity, has failed
to develop a consensus about its propriety Both possibilities suggest quite a different meaning
for the term "non-natural use." For further consideration of these forms of strict liability and
of the meaning of "non-natural use," see infra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
191. See Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1970) (calling jury's verdict for
elderly plaintiff instance of "Vermont justice" that was not justified under existing law).
192. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 306-20 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing but
rejectihg plaintiff's claim that trial limited to factual causation but not fault issues violated due
process because of its sterile trial atmosphere), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); Kenneth
S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural
Changeson Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989) (finding that bifurcation of liability and
damages phases of trial resulted in significant increase in defense verdicts, while aggregation
of claims resulted in more plaintiffs' verdicts).
193. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 29-83 (1979).
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the adjudicatory process a necessary evil fraught with possibility for error
and thus in need of tight regulation, the community model embraces a
process that avoids obeisance to slavish rule.
Indeed, the community model is as pragmatic as the causal model is
formal. Like the causal model, however, the community model has certain
features that optimally advance its nature. First, loosely textured,
discretionary rules that impose liability based upon violations of community norms can be expected. The existence of any duty (other than the
tautological duty not to violate community norms) is problematic, 94 and the
relevance of causation hinges entirely on the extent to which the community is willing to accept liability without causation. The community's sense
of fairness provides the basis from which to measure damages, so that
identical injuries are not necessarily expected to receive identical
compensation; supercompensatory or undercompensatory damages can be
anticipated.
Second, although necessarily-indeed, gleefully-indeterminate in
most of its specifics, legal analysis under the model possesses both
pragmatic and moralistic qualities at various times. Often the debate is
pragmatic because the nature of most communities' reaction to loss is to
judge wrongdoing situationally and experientially and to weigh the
perceived risks of conduct against the expected utility 195 Yet the debate
can be moralistic because communities-especially traditional commumties-often clothe their particular sense of wrongdoing with the aura of a
universal code of conduct. 96 In reality, of course, the community cannot
hold to its code for long, for each generation of the community must
remain free to re-examine pragmatically the lessons of the past and apply
them to the problems of the present and future. Thus, at any given
moment, the arguments about wrongdoing may project moral certitude and
outrage. Two generations later, the moralistic tone of legal analysis may
not have changed, but the theories, rules, and practices may well have
changed.
194. Cf. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting old invitee-licenseetrespasser classifications in favor of generalized duty of due care under circumstances);
Heaven v Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883) (Brett, M.R.) (contending that defendants
should have universal duty of due care); Rabin, supra note 189 (describing twentieth-century

retreat of "no duty" rules in favor of duty of due care).
195. See Smith, supra note 38, at 423; Wells, supra note 8, at 2353-54.
196. This tendency to universal norms is reinforced by the norm-bound nature of the
adjudicatory process. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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A third optimal feature of the community model is the existence of
a highly cohesive society in which few disagreements about the values
that inform loss allocation arise. Obviously, when the community has
insufficient experience of a defendant's conduct or else its views about
that conduct are m a state of flux, the community model functions poorly,
if at all. Although a "consensus" outcome can sometimes be forged
among "nondominant" groups," 9 that result will not always occur.
Therefore, the community should optimally enjoy a homogeneity of
background and experience, and the society should be relatively stable in
the sense that new experiences and ideological challenges to dominant
modes of thought should either be kept to a minimum or at least be
capable of immediate comprehension for a quick, communal decision
about their assimilation or rejection.19
Fourth, certain procedural features best advance the aims of the
community model. The lawfimder and the factfmder should be members
of the community whose values inform the allocational decision. In a
democracy, in which the entire commumty participates in the community's direction, the lawfinder and factfmder should be chosen from the
community's dommant group;' 99 in an aristocracy, in which the community has agreed to defer to the values of an elite, 2" the decision maker
should come from the elite. The role of postverdict or appellate review
should be insubstantial, limiting itself to a check that the decision maker
gave effect to the commumty's norms. Finally, we should expect an
ambivalent attitude about precedent. The pragmatism inherent in the
community model cannot discard the accumulated wisdom (or folly)
197 On the ability of divergent subgroups nonetheless to form cohesive community
values on some issues, see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
198. This optimal feature reinforces the moralistic quality of tort discussion and
simultaneously reduces the need to resort to constant reexamination of established principles
and practices.
199. It is, of course, possible to draw the decision maker from a nondommant group on
the understanding that she will represent the values of the dominant community group. But
the risks of such an approach are obvious and thus nonoptimal.
At this point it should be evident that the use of the values of the dominant group raises
serious problems of underrepresentation and even repression of minority value systems. The
normative dimensions of the problem are considered infra note 391 and accompanying text.
For now it is enough to note that the model's strong preference for a cohesive community
modulates these concerns to some extent.
200. On the legitimacy of this choice, see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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reflected in precedent. On the other hand, precedent threatens to
transform open-textured standards into increasingly rigid rules of conduct
out of touch with the sensibilities that initially motivated them. Hence,
there is an acceptance of precedent for the lessons that it provides, but a
distrust of its power to maintain outmoded judgments of appropriate
behavior. 20'
Just as it reflects some elements of the causal model, the American
tort system partially reflects the broad essence and the optimal features
of the community model. For the types of injuries that comprise the bulk
of tort practice-car accidents and premises liability-there is widespread
knowledge of and opportunity to form opinions about the proper (and
improper) methods of driving and of keeping property reasonably safe.2 2
In these areas, the view that improper conduct causing injuries requires
compensation and that proper conduct causing injuries does not is also
widespread. An amorphous negligence standard, the movement toward
a generalized duty of care, and the limited nature of appellate review into
and precedential effect of a negligence finding also reflect optimal
features of the community model. Moreover, because our country
professes to determine community values by referring to the will of all
citizens rather than to the values of a ruling elite, the community model
supports the American use of lay juries.
Like the causal model, however, the community model cannot justify
significant aspects of tort law and practice. To the extent that duty rules
201. Perhaps the best demonstration of this ambivalence is a pair of opinions by Holmes
and Cardozo. In Baltimore & 0. R.R. v Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), Holmes held that
a plaintiff who failed to stop, look, and listen at a railroad crossing was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Apparently confident that "[a] judge who has long sat at nist
prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the

common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury,"
HOLMES, supranote 2, at 124, Holmes thought that the standard of appropriate conduct was
sufficiently "clear [that] it should be laid down once and for all by the Courts." Goodman,
275 U.S. at 70.
A scant seven years later, Goodman was gone. In Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98
(1934), Cardozo cautioned against the use of legal standards that are "not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed
from without." Id. at 105. The issue of contributory negligence at the crossing was returned
to the jury.
202. The same sense of wrongfulness operates for other, albeit less frequent, types of
conduct, such as supplying chattels to a neighbor, warning of dangers associated with everyday
activities, punching people in the nose, and taking another's property
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conflict with the community's norms, the persistence of the duty issue is
problematic.3 The movement to turn fault into an efficiency inquiry finds
little justification in a society in which efficiency has not been demonstrated
to be a primordial value.' The nearly universal insistence on causation
and the limitation of damages to those which recompense actual losses are
not always compatible with the desires of the community model, and the
reversal of verdicts against faulty actors on the grounds of no duty, no
causation, or excessive damages suggests that these rules have a permanence that resists notions of community justice. Similarly, the community
model has significant difficulty explaining tort law's adherence to, and
even expansion of, strict liability concepts in recent years. 205
A more telling critique of the community model is the failure of
community values in significant and volatile areas of torts. The community
simply lacks the widespread knowledge of (and thus ability to form
opinions about) conduct such as proper medical treatment, appropriate
203. It is so problematic, infact, that there have been occasional calls for its elimination
or drastic overhaul. See, e.g., Fazzolari v Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or.
1987); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 281 (not listing duty as element of negligence claim);
GREEN, supra note 4, at 150-52. Although torts has expanded the scope of actionable duties
in response to these concerns, see Rabin, supra note 189, torts has for the most part resisted
the effort to eliramate or streamline the duty question. See Tidmarsh, supra note 162.
204. My claim here is minimal. First, there is little doubt that tort theory and doctrine
have been influenced to a considerable degree by the efficiency analysis of the law and
economics movement. See generally Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE
L.J. 53, 53-54 (1992) (discussing influence of law and economics movement on legal
academy). Second, I am unpersuaded that the community's norms value efficiency as highly
as the adherents of law and economics do. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (Cal. 1981) (allowing assessment of significant compensatory and punitive damages
against product manufacturer whose Hand Formula calculation led it not to provide additional
safety precautions). To the extent that the law and economics literature is an attempt to
reshape community norms, the dissonance between theory and reality can be expected. See
infra note 346 and accompanying text. At the same tune, however, its prominence in doctrinal
analysis and its consequent effect on legal rules is out of proportion to the community's
sensibilities, for which efficiency is merely one value among several in making loss allocation
decisions. Consequently, the recent popularity of economic analysis in American tort law
cannot be entirely explained by the community model.
In making this claim, I do not suggest that the community model is necessarily
inconsistent with efficiency In a society of rational wealth maximizers, the two would
correlate perfectly
205. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 519-520 (prescribing strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 78, at 548-56
(describing increasing acceptance of Rylands's strict liability rule in American jurisdictions).
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product design, or the handling of novel dangers. Even in more routine
cases in which a significant opportunity exists to form opinions about
conduct, the community's values may not have galvanized around a single
position; consider, for instance, the widely divergent views toward
trespassers on land,2' the duty to effect an easy rescue of a stranger,0 7 the
obligation to compensate the sufferer of a foreseeable and statistically

expectable injury, 28 and the need to repay a property owner for damage
caused by circumstances beyond the injurer's control.20 9
The community model lacks the power to prescribe the results in areas

of doctrine or practice in which community values do not provide the rule
for decision. Like the causal model, therefore, it is a useful model upon

which a system of tort law could be built and upon which much of our
system has been built.

Like the causal model, however, it does not

describe all of our present experience of torts.
3. Summary
Two points about the community model and the causal model should
now be apparent. The first is that at their broadest boundaries, they can,
between them, capture the full breadth of tort theory, doctrine, practice,
and history The second is that each model is not entirely neutral about the
way in which it prefers to "do torts."
The causal model ultimately descends from formal theory The causal
showing is foundational; it admits of no exception and it refuses to bend
206. Compare DiGildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio 1969) (retaining separate
categories of duties owed to trespassers, licensees, and mvltees) with Peterson v Balach, 199
N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972) (retaining common law rule of limited liability only for trespassers)
and Prigden v Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974) (extending general duty
of care to trespassers).
207 Compare Epstein, supra note 24, at 198-200 (arguing against duty of easy rescue)
with Weinrib, supra note 26 (arguing for duty of easy rescue) and Ames, supra note 26, at
110-13 (same).
208. Compare Stone v Bolton, 1 K.B. 201 (C.A. 1950) (Jenkins, L.J.) (imposing
liability on the basis of foreseeable, albeit unlikely, injury) with Bolton v. Stone, 1951 App.
Cas. 850 (Reid, L.J.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (rejecting foreseeability as test of negligence
in favor of standara of substantial risk) and United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting that there should be no liability for foreseeable, and perhaps
even likely, injuries when benefit of conduct outweighs risk of injury).
209. See Vincent v Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W 221 (Minn. 1910). For further
discussion of Vincent, see infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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before the demands of utility or community sensibilities. The community
model is precisely the opposite. It is political in the sense that it derives
justification from the power of the community to insist on obedience to its
norms of conduct. Nothing-other than the existence of a sense of
communal fairness-is absolute. No rule of loss allocation is illegitimate,
210
as long as the community can agree to it.
These differences play themselves out in the optimal conditions
associated with each model. As a formal theory, the causal model prefers
clear rules, logically derived from first principles in a neutral, objective
fashion. It accepts the uncertainties of adjudication as a necessary evil that
should be subject to strict, hierarchical controls and checks. On the other
hand, the community model is more comfortable with indeterminacy, for
adherence to rule and hierarchical control of decision-making suffocate
each generation's power to reflect its sense of fairness in the tort process.
If the decision makers are chosen well, the process will, by definition,
yield the right result.
The dichotomy between the formal causal model and the pragmatic
community model reflects itself again in the principal weaknesses of each
model. For the causal model, the primary weakness is the fact that no
society could countenance liability that extended to the model's outer
boundaries. Because the sparse essence of the model itself cannot create,
as a formal matter, any limits on causation, the causal model must resort
to positive notions of restraint. Although the inherent indeterminacy of this
enterprise does not necessarily offend the causal model itself, it sits poorly
with the formal theory of law on which the model rests. On the other
hand, -indeterminacy presents no obstacle to the community model. Its
immediate weakness is its inability to address the problem of loss whenever
the community lacks-either because of a lack of experience or because of
a lack of consensus-a sense of whether particular conduct is unfair.
The emphasis in this section, and thus far in this summary, has been
on the distinctions between the two models. Nonetheless, it would be an
enormous mistake to dwell too long on that issue. The two models are not
210. It would be inaccurate to associate all conceptualists with the causal model and all
anti-conceptualists with the community model. Nonetheless, the optimal features of the causal
model are likely to appeal more to conceptualists---especially those whose theories of liability
make essentially retrospective inquiries like reciprocity, see Fletcher, supra note 28, or causal
responsibility, see Epstein, supra note 24, and Weinrib, supra note 38. Conversely, the
community model is more likely to find support among anti-conceptualists.
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mutually exclusive by their nature; for instance, a car accident at the comer
comfortably fits within both. The overlapping potential of the models
suggests that actual tort theories, doctrines, and practices will arise from
the interaction of the two models-in other words, from the models'
ceaseless tug-of-war for supremacy
Hence, the initial effort at description justifies further study of the
models' relationship in practice. This final step, which I undertake in the
next section, is ultimately the test of the models' validity- whether the
interrelationship of the two models accurately describes the basic structures
and the sources of continued debate in torts.
C. Merging the Models: The IrresolvableTensions in Torts
Because the causal model and the community model have the potential
to overlap, 211 the most useful way to consider the formation of actual tort
systems through the interrelationship of the two models is to divide the
world of torts into four areas. The first area involves the cases in which
the models overlap; here, we can expect the greatest conflict between the
models' contrary tendencies. The second and third areas are the places in
which, respectively, only the community model operates and only the
causal model operates; here, the issue is the extent to which the efforts to
reconcile the conflicts in the first area spill over to areas which need not
necessarily be influenced by that reconciliation. The final area lies beyond
the boundaries of either model; here, tort principles are inoperative.
I The Consequencesfor a Tort System with Both Models
Functioning:Intentional Torts and "Classic"Negligence
When both the causal and the community models are operative, they
will overlap in their coverage as long as the community views factual
causation as an important norm in some cases in which the community's
values require loss reallocation. In this circumstance, when neither model
211. The overlap is not necessary First, we could conceive of a tort system in which
community norms dictated that causal responsibility not only was irrelevant to loss allocation
decisions, but was actually antithetical to those decisions. See supra note 114. Second,
neither model needs to expand to its full boundaries, and each can even lie dormant. See
supra notes 112, 115-17 and accompanying text. In both situations, no overlap would occur.
The potential for overlap nonetheless suggests that the two models will influence each other
even when there is no actual overlap. See infra notes 280, 334-35 and accompanying text.
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defers to the claim of the other model to handle the issue, the overlap
results in a conflict between the models' divergent approaches to loss
allocation. Some accommodation of the models at all three levels of
torts-theory, doctrine, and practice-is manifestly required.
A wide array of possible accommodations is possible. Because neither
model has deferred, torts cannot accept all of the features of one model and
reject all of the features of the other. But whether torts will look mostly
like a causal model with a bit of the community model's preferences,
mostly like a community model with a bit of the causal model's preferences, or like a mongrel mix of both models cannot be definitively resolved
from the collision of models. Because both models are entitled to equal
weight, it seems likely that they will try to reach some mid-range
compromise in which each model sacrifices equally Even this outcome
leaves the field of choices wide open. Given the number of preferences
associated with each model, myriad permutations of permissible accommodations remain open.
It is impossible to describe in a few pages all of the possible reconciliations at which the models might arrive. Rather, this section will focus on
the critical elements of tension between the models and on the types of
mid-range solutions that a tort system with two operative models is likely
to reach.212 The section also demonstrates that the experience of American
tort law mirrors the expected tensions and accommodations.
(a) Theory Finding middle ground at the level of theory appears
impossible. The causal model is formal; the community model is pragmatic. The causal model looks backward to historical events; the community model looks forward and attempts to realize the values of society
Outcomes are determined through the application of cold logic and
deduction from uncontestable premises; outcomes are intuited from experi212. For the sake of simplicity, I have divided the discussion of the tensions and likely
accommodations into the separate components of theory, doctrine, and practice. However,
the models need not engage each other m conflict at all three levels. For instance, a causal
model could let the community model utterly have its way on matters of practice in return for
the causal model being permitted to implement its optimal features in matters of theory and
doctrine. Because of the interrelationship of theory, doctrine, and practice, however, such a
compromise would be unlikely, and it is not the one chosen by our own tort system.
On the other hand, more subtle compromises-such as allowing the causal model a bit
of an upper hand on one aspect of theory in return for a bit more deference to the community
model on a close question of practice-are likely to occur. The possibility of these trade-offs
should be considered as the nature of the trade-offs in the separate areas of theory, doctrine,
and practice is examined.
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ence and situational judgments. Certain rules are immutable; no rule is
immutable.
Although it is admittedly impossible to embrace simultaneously both
the formal and the pragmatic, it is possible to find middle ground that is
not entirely faithful (or entirely disloyal) to either.2 13 For instance,
different dimensions of the reasoning process in torts-particularly
factfinding and lawfinding-could become associated with different
theories; thus, lawfinding could become a more formal process, while
factfinding could become a more intuitive process.2" 4 Similarly, formal
theory might require adjudicatory norms more precise than "Don't do
things the community believes to be wrong," but pragmatic theory could
demand as compensation that the norms be chosen with at least some eye
to the prospective effect of those norms on the community Another likely
accommodation is that the norms will have an apparent specificity and
precision, but they will also possess an open-textured undercurrent that
belies their seeming certainty Next, the clash in models could result in
legal reasoning that is inclusive of both models: It checks its outcomes both
against established, formal legal principles and against the community's
values.
As a final compromise, essential values of the community could be
isolated and exalted to a formal status, with the result that the community
values of Year X become the limiting forces on the causal model. For
example, if we posit that the community generally holds dear the values of
compensation, loss spreading, deterrence, and punishment, we might be
able to abstract those principles from the contextual judgments that gave
them life and then use them to deduce the rules under which a causal act
requires loss reallocation. Obviously, resort to these prospective, policy213.

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,

Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends
of the earth!
RUDYARD KIPLING, The Ballad of East and West, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE DEFINITIVE
EDITION 233 (1945).
214. The converse would also be possible, but the nature of our procedural system's
division of responsibilities between judges (who are professionally trained in law and
accountable to the system) and juries (who are neither) suggests that it would be easier to
entrust judges with a more formal role and juries with a more intuitive role. Hence,
lawgiving, which is the judge's role in our system, is more formal, while factfinding, which
is the jury's role, is more intuitive.
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oriented concepts is somewhat disconcerting to the causal model, but the
model must acknowledge that the indeterminacy of retroactive notions like
"cause" and "act" ultimately requires resort to other sources. 215 As long
as the causal model can harden these community predispositions into
principles with the precedential power to outlast the community's fondness
for them,216 this approach, although second-best from the perspective of
both models, is a fair compromise of competing concerns.
These hypothetical compromises predict with remarkable accuracy the
state of American tort theory Among American scholars, almost no one
is entirely formal or entirely pragmatic. Holmes, who sought to construct
the formal dimensions of a tort system from the concept of "act,"2 7 also

justified his structure with heavy doses of policy 218 Epstein has injected
utilitarian strains into his formal theory;219 Posner has developed a formal

theory from a utilitarian, pragmatic methodology I The dean of American
torts, William Prosser, was fond of attempting to shape torts by distilling
vast quantities of unruly cases into concrete doctrines with the texture of

215. See supra notes 140-41, 159 and accompanying text.

216. The reason that the values must have staying power is that if the values freely
changed as the community changed, the needs of the causal model for immutable principles
would receive insufficient respect. On the other hand, the needs of the community model
dictate that principles truly at odds with communal norms be disposable. Hence, it is likely
that the principles can be changed, but only after considerable lag time between the
community's rejection of the principle and the tort system's more reluctant abandonment.
Indeed, it might even take a legislative act that reflects the community's concerns to force
the common law's hand.
In an optimal world, it is unlikely that the fight to replace or retain outmoded values
will occur with any frequency After all, the community model operates best in a
homogenous society with little internal conflict. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying
text. Once selected, therefore, the fundamental principles should serve the tort system for
a very long time. In this regard at least, the causal and community models share common
ground.
217 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
218. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 78, 95-96.
219. See Epstein, supra note 34, at 656-57 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LiABLrrY LAw (1980); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
220. Compare Posner, supra note 48, at 1667-69 (defending his theory of economic
efficency in pragmatic terms) with Smith, supra note 38, at 425-26 (highlighting formalist
nature of Posner's work). But cf. Hayes, supranote 68, at 754 (criticizing Posner for his
misunderstanding of scientific method).
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formal rules, yet he was acutely aware of the policy orientation of the tort
process.? 1 Most scholarship and most precedent-setting judicial opinions
follow in Prosser's footsteps.'m Those of us who work in torts are, for the
most part, eclectic-deducing results from precedent when the law supports
us and appealing to policy when it does not.
The other predictable consequences of the theoretical clash also flower
in American tort law We have a division of function between judges and
juries, with judges performing the more formal task of lawfinding and
juries assigned the more intuitive task of factfinding. The law has a surface
consistency-duty, breach, causation, and damage-and a set of precedents
that make this structure increasingly crystalline. Yet any first-year law
student knows the horrible conundrums of "duty" and the open-textured
nature of terms like "intent," "negligence," and "proximate cause." Cases
and pattern jury instructions ring with hierarchial absolutes, yet leave great
latitude for intuition and hunch. There are rules, and there is discretion.
There is Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road v Goodman2' and there is Pokora
v Wabash Railivay,' 4 and both are valid.
Most telling, however, is the manner in which much of the modern
tort discourse is accomplished. There operates in tort law a series of
principles to which many of us return to decide specific doctrinal and
221. See WHITE, supra note i, at 153-63.

See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv 383 (1960).
222. For a few examples of scholarship that seeks to deduce rules from policy-oriented

principles or else to justify the validity of the methodology, see Wells, supra note 8, at
2353-54 (recognizing place for legal rules within pragmatic vision of torts). See generally
David G. Owen, Rethmkng the Policiesof Strict ProductsLiability, 33 VAND. L. REv 681

(1980); Joseph A. Page, GenericProductRisks: The CaseAgainst Comment k andfor Strict
Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV 853 (1983); Smith, supra note 8. For examples of cases

that attempt to deduce rules from fundamental policy premises, see Brown v Superior
Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Halphen v Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Beshada v Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J.
1982). As with any theoretical enterprise, there are some who stand outside the

mainstream. Ernest Wemrib, for one, is an unapologetic formalist. See Wemrib, supra
note 34; Wemrib, supra note 38.
223. 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (agreeing with railroad that driver involved in collision with
train at crossing was contributorily negligent).
224. 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (rejecting railroad's contributory negligence defense); see
supra note 201.
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procedural issues; they are, in no particular order, cheapest cost avoider,
compensation, deterrence (utility), fairness, loss spreading, and punishment.' Our methodology is, in a sense, formal and deductive; we accept
these principles as given absolutes and attempt to extract from them
specific rules and results. But the principles themselves are largely policyoriented, and, as the relatively recent rise of the loss-spreading rationale
shows, 226 our notions of good policy can change. Nonetheless, once
identified and elevated to a judicially cognizable level, these policies have
enjoyed a staying power independent of the community's sense of their
relevance to a particular issue. They become our sacred irrefutable
principles of tort law And this is exactly what the conflict between models
would predict.
The operation of such a system in modem American society is likely
to result in a heavy theoretical emphasis on two concepts: justice and
efficiency The reason is that both bridge the gap between the formalism
of a causal model and the pragmatism of a community model in ways
intuitively appealing to us. The concept of "justice" reverberates with
formal notions of natural law and inalienable rights. On the other hand,
"justice" can be understood in terms of community norms. Indeed, in a
community that develops a natural law theory of justice to support its
norms, the causal and the community components can become
indistinguishable.
In a society more conscious of the relativism of its own norms,
however, the difference between "justice" in the causal model's sense and
"justice" in the community model's sense cannot be overlooked. Under
certain circumstances, "efficiency" can then step in to fill the breach.2 7
The causal model can a9ccept "efficiency" because, whatever its flaws in
225. See sources cited supra note 30.
226. The loss-spreading (or insurance) rationale, which inhabits much of our tort
discourse today, was once considered illegitimate. See Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35
N.Y 210 (1866); HOLMES, supra note 2, at 96. Its present popularity owes a great deal to
Justice Traynor's forceful concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436
(Cal. 1944), and to the pioneering work of Fleming James and others, see Fleming James, Jr.,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact ofLiability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948);
see also WHITE, supra note 1, at 147-52 (describing rise of loss spreading rationale); George

L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (same).
227 See Abel, supra note 9, at 794 (noting that efficiency will supplant moral arguments

in liberal state).
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terms of its prospective policy orientation, "efficiency" is a principle
capable (in theory at least) of piercing the indeterminacy inherent in formal
analysis and providing specific, scientific, demonstrably correct answers
to doctrinal questions." The community model can also accept "efficiency" as long as the community holds wealth maximization as a central
value-and as long as we are not too rigorous in its application.229 Thus,
efficiency can be shared as a norm by both models, although it is likely to
be embraced more at the level of theory than at the level of result.
Our recent history of tort theory, with its emphasis on justice and, to
a greater extent, efficiency, again confirms the predicted consequences of
the merged models. But neither justice nor efficiency is a permanent
feature of the tort enterprise. Torts functioned for centuries without welldescribed notions of justice or efficiency, and it might well be that in the
future, neither notion will bridge the gap between the causal and community models as well as some other principle that permits a degree of formal
deduction, but also corresponds to widely shared sensibilities. Justice and
efficiency may then slowly fade away in the same way that the distinction
between trespass and case, for all its influence on the present structure of
tort doctrine, has receded from memory On the other hand, because of
their influence on the present (and therefore future) shape of torts, justice
and efficiency will always remain a dimension of torts subject to renewal
and reinvigoration over time. The fate of justice and efficiency lies in the
hands of the future, and neither notion can do anything to predetermine it.
(b) Doctnne. The competing methods that each model uses to place
limits on its loss allocation decisions are likely to lead to a rather muddied
doctrinal picture. The causal model prefers to work out those limits
through its fundamental elements of "cause" and "act. " In contrast, the
community model uses the defendant's fault as the touchstone of liability z1
As with theory, however, there is a middle ground on which the models
can compromise.
228. Of course, the causal model must abandon efficiency if efficiency's logic suggests
that causation is dispensable. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 228-55 (discussing
role of causation in economic theory of torts).
229. The community always reserves the right to reject the efficient result when, for
sufficient reasons, it is willing to tolerate inefficiency. See supra note 204 and accompanying
text.
230. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
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We can begin with the element of causation, on which both models
agree? 2 Next, the causal model is forced to accept fault (i.e., a violation
of community norms) as a doctnnal limit on responsibility; to do otherwise
would violate a fundamental dimension of the community model for a
reason not required by a fundamental dimension of the causal model. But
the causal model would obviously be displeased with this lopsided result,
for the community model would have had its way entirely at some
considerable expense to the optimal desires of the causal model. 3 Hence,
the causal model can be expected to demand that its preferred doctrinal
limits on causal responsibility-duty and proximate causation-also
operate. Because the community model cannot resist the inclusion of these
limitations on fundamental grounds,3 they too are likely to become a part
of the prima facie case. But both models can be expected to fight a
rearguard action-the causal model by trying to harden communal notions
of fault into clear rules and the community model by infusing the concepts
of duty and proximate causation with communal notions of "fairness" and
"policy ,23s

The same dynamic informs matters of damages and defenses. With
damages, we can expect to see tension between the actual damage
preference of the causal model and the sliding scale approach of the
community model;236 our present system, which formally compensates for
actual loss, but permits jurors (subject only to minimal judicial review) to
232. Although causation is not always an essential component of the community's norms,
it is present in those areas in which the two models overlap. See supranotes 111-12.
233. Here, the distinction between necessary and optimal features is important. Although
it prefers as an optimal matter not to rely on community values because such reliance is
mcompatible with its more formal nature, the causal model cannot as a logical matter exclude
reliance on these values. Nonetheless, such a system deviates from the system that the causal

model optimally prefers.
234. It is important to remember that just as it need not expand to the full dimensions of
the causal model, torts need not expand to the full dimensions of the community model.

Rather, it may choose not to permit recovery for some conduct that violates community
norms.
235. More than 60 years ago, Leon Green recognized this timeless battle by suggesting
that "fault" could be determined either with reference to "very accurate and precise rules" or
with an instruction to the jury of "Give us your judgment." GREEN, supra note 4, at 161. We
now can recognize in Green's choice the competing approaches of the causal and community
models. As Green accurately reported, torts has for the time being steered a middle course
by adopting the "reasonable person" standard. Id. at 161-63.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 154, 192.
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set the precise amount of loss, is a middle-of-the-road compromise that
deftly gives something to both sides. The same tension between rigid rules
of duty and situational judgments of fault occurs when considering defenses
and creates the same indeterminacy of outcome. Consent and assumptionof-the-risk principles partake of a more formal quality; 7 contributory
negligence is community-based." The idea that defenses should absolutely

bar recovery is consistent with the hard-and-fast approach of the causal
model; 9 the idea that recovery is only reduced proportionally according
to our sense of relative wrongdoing is consistent with the community
model; 2' the middle ground of reducing recovery until a particular point

(for example, fifty percent of fault) and barring recovery thereafter is a
nice, although not a necessary, compromise.24
Through this process, the doctrinal struggle is cast. The causal model
will push for more formality and more control through particularized rules
on duty and proximate cause; whereas, the community model will attempt
to insist on communal fault and simultaneously to subvert duty and proximate cause. The struggle is necessarily indeterminate; an infinite variety
of combinations is possible.242 In a system locked in perpetual struggle, the
237 These defenses are the equivalent of plaintiff-side strict liability: If you agree to the
injury (or its risk), you must bear the loss. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1065 (1972). In recent years,
however, assumption of the risk has increasingly tended to blend into either no duty or
comparative negligence rules. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992);
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959); COLO. REV STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-111.7 (West 1989); DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 294 (2d ed.
1993). The former approach of "no duty" remains consistent with a causal model; the latter
approach represents a victory of the community model.
238. Other defenses-especially self-defense, defense of person or property, and
necessity-seem at present to be especially in tune with the community's accepted norms as
to when one person can legitimately inflict injury on another. See also infra notes 269-70 and
accompanying text (discussing communal grounding of necessity defense). On the other hand,
insanity is a matter on which the community lacks general knowledge and thus must be
resolved within the causal model. See infra part I.C.3. On the general parameters of these
defenses, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 28-60; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, §§ 19-24.
239. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). An approach in which
the plaintiff's fault was irrelevant would be equally consistent.
240. See Brotherhood Shipping Co. v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1993); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
241. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W Va. 1979); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
242. One expected manifestation of the struggle would be a bit of a sliding scale among
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apparent victory of one model on a particular issue is interesting primarily
as a cultural and historical artifact. The losing model cannot be suppressed
forever. It will carry the fight to other issues and, with sufficient
analogical support on those issues, return eventually to the original
battleground. The losing views may prevail the second tune around, they
may lose again, or some middle ground might be reached. It is all the
same. With an eternity of struggle ahead, the patience to endure setbacks
comes easily
Even in the midst of struggle, however, interludes of doctrinal
harmony are possible. First, in a community with a highly refined code of
obligations that admits of few situational exceptions, community norms will
be indistinguishable from the optimally functiomng causal approach. Next,
even in less structured communities, both models might agree on a single
principle around which to unite the disparate notions of duty, fault, and
causation. As long as the principle roughly conforms to social sensibilities
and also provides some ability to guide the specifics of the doctrinal
inquiry, the models might compromise on the principle and bring torts into
a state of apparent harmony
Although a highly structured community has not been the recent
American experience, students of twentieth-century tort law will recognize
two ways in which the latter approach has been used to create a state of
relative peace. Both involve the effort to adopt an overarching principle
to give con istency to unruly doctrine. The first principle, fashioned by
Holmes and given judicial life by Cardozo, is "foreseeability "243 In recent
the elements. For instance, as our sense of defendant's wrongdoing increased, the need for
a strong causal showing would weaken; as our sense of wrongdoing decreased, a stronger,

more immediate causal link might be required.

Our system's more expansive view of

causation in the context of intentional wrongdoing, see Vosberg v. Putney, 50 N.W 403, 404
(Wis. 1891), confirms tlus expectation. So does the widely shared belief that the defendant's
wrongdoing influences the amount of damages.
243. In Holmes's view, foreseeability was the fundamental principle that could be derived
from tort law's insistence on "act." HOLMES, supra note 2, at 90-95. Cardozo used the
notion in his landmark decisions in MacPherson v Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y
1916), and Palsgraf v Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928). But see Ultramares
Corp. v Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y 1931) (refusing to use foreseeability principles to
fashion tort of negligent misrepresentation); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159
N.E. 896 (N.Y 1928) (in absence of privity of contract, declining to impose duty on water
works whose negligence foreseeably resulted m fire damage to plaintiff's building). Following
their lead, significant decisions of the latter half of our century have invoked foreseeability to
abolish doctrinal limitations on recovery See, e.g., Dillon v Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal.
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years, foreseeability has become a thread that neatly ties together the forces
of duty, breach, and proximate cause: the issue of breach (negligence or
intent) asks whether a defendant could foresee any injury from his or her
conduct, duty asks whether the defendant could foresee injury to this
plaintiff, and proximate cause asks whether the defendant could foresee
injury of this type.2' This reconciliation is satisfying, at least to some
degree, to both models. Foreseeability corresponds roughly to community
norms; in abstract terms, we would generally agree with the proposition
that defendants should pay for injuries they can foreseeably prevent. At
the same time, it is an essentially retrospective inquiry to distinguish
between causal acts for which responsibility attaches and those for which
it does not.

The second principle is efficiency As we have seen in the context of
tort theory,24 efficiency is appealing to both models. Like foreseeability,
efficiency can keep the opposing doctrinal forces of torts harnessed. In
some instances, efficiency requires flat rules (hence, "duty"), and in other
instances, it requires more particularistic assessments of conduct (hence,
"negligence" or "intent"). 2' Efficiency has the general support of our
pragmatic and capitalistic society; although it is not as "backward-looking"
as the causal model would like, it can produce the doctrinal certainty that
the causal model prefers.
In a system of perpetual conflict, however, neither foreseeability nor
efficiency will quell the ferment in tort doctrine forever, and neither has.
Foreseeability of harm cannot always capture the commumty's sense of
fault,247 nor does foreseeability always accord with the formal demands of
1968); Rowland v. Christian, 433 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v Adler, 461
A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
244. See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107,
115-16 (N.J. 1985); Fazzolari v Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987);
MoRRIs & MoRRIs, supra note 31, at 172-74, 179-85; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30,

§ 43.
245. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
246. See generally POLINSKY, supra note 35, at 113-17 (describing instances in which flat
rules establishing or precluding liability might be more efficient than case-by-case

adjudication).
247 The classic case is Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y 502 (1871), in which the
plaintiff's decedent died while pushing a four-year-old boy out of the path of an oncoming
train. The jury refused to find that the decedent was contributorily negligent, and the New
York Court of Appeals refused to overturn that finding. Such a heroic effort was clearly
worthy of community approbation in spite of the foreseeability of death. See also Bily v.
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the causal model. 2' Thus, m spite of occasional claims to the contrary, 249
foreseeability has never been the sole measure of duty, 2 0 negligence,2 1
proximate causation, 2 or damage. 3 Likewise, an efficiency analysis can
miss the mark on both the community's sensibilities and the causal model's
preference for a retrospective focus;' it too is incapable of explaining the

Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) (stating that with respect to intangible
injuries stemming from emotional distress or negligent misrepresentation, foreseeability
permits liability "out of proportion to fault").
248. There are two problems. The first is that foreseeability sets no "bright-line"
limits-m fact, virtually no limits at all-on the causal principle. See East River S.S. Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986) ("In products liability law, where
there is a duty to the public generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake."); Thing v La
is endless because foreseeability,
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823 (Cal. 1989) ("[F]oreseeability
like light, travels indefinitely in a vacuum." (quoting Newton v Kaiser Found. Hosp., 228
Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986))). Indeed, even Holmes, whose work gave life to
the foreseeability principle, hedged on its actual breadth by redefining it sub silentio to mean
likelihood of harm. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 93-94. Second, to the extent that the causal
model has settled on principles such as deterrence, compensation, loss spreading, and fairness
to determine doctrinal structures, see supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text, those policy
goals often cut against the answer suggested by foreseeability alone. See Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988) ("[P]olicy considerations may dictate [that] a cause of action
").
should not be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk
249. See, e.g., Havard v. Palmer & Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 302 So. 2d 228, 232 (Ala. 1974)
("The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that
harm may result if care is not exercised."), overruled by Ex parte Insurance Co. of North
America, 523 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. 1988).
250. See, e.g., Berkel & Co. Contractors v Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 503
(Ala.'1984) (listing six factors, of which foreseebility is only one); Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (listing seven factors for assessing duty, of which
foreseeability is only one); Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223 (IlI. 1990) (listing factors
of probability of harm, magnitude of harm, and burden of precautions); Webb v. Jarvis, 575
N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991) (listing three factors for assessing duty: relationship, foreseeability,
and public policy); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 54, at 359 ("No better general
statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable
persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.").
251. For other approaches, see sources cited supra note 11.
252. For other approaches, see, e.g., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132
(Wis. 1976); In re Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (C.A. 1921); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 430-461.
253. A defendant in tort remains liable for the full extent of damage, even though the
"eggshell skull" of the plaintiff was not foreseeable. See generally Steinhauser v. Hertz
Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Vosberg v. Putney, 50 N.W 403 (Wis. 1891).
254. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
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breadth of doctrinal approaches to duty, negligence, proximate causation,
and damage.' 5
(c) Procedure. The disparate visions of the causal and the community
models on procedure also suggest a need to compromise on matters like the
nature and functions of the decision maker and the use of precedent. The
primary concern involves balancing the causal model's need for a high
degree of centrality against the community model's desire to locate
decision-making in the community One possible solution is a division of
responsibility between central authority (the judge) and community (the
jury, at least in a democratic society). Another is to assign functions to
each decision maker that are generally compatible with their nature; thus,
judges will be assigned the law-finding function and juries the fact-finding
function. 6 Each decision maker can exercise considerable discretion in
areas associated with their respective functions. Thus, duty questions will
be determined by the judge, and fault questions will, in general, be left to
the jury Because both models insist on causation, the division of decisionmaking responsibility on this issue is likely to be more ambiguous. 7
Nonetheless, the tensions between the models are likely to subvert
such neat divisions in important ways. The community model might want
the jury to decide the issue of duty, whereas the causal model might agree
that the judge should make findings of fault. Likewise, the judge might
claim the right to review and reverse factual findings with which she does
not agree, whereas the jury might insist on the right to decide what the
relevant law should be. Obviously, this conflict can give rise to a number
255. On the inability of the efficiency hypothesis to justify all of tort doctrine, see
Wemrib, supra note 38, at 506-09 (demonstrating that efficiency approach cannot justify
present damage rules); supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
256. For the reasons that this division of responsibilities between judge and jury best
advances their respective functions in a democratic society, see supra note 214 and

accompanying text.
257 Indeed, the division of decision-making resonsibility on the issue of causation is
ambiguous. The professed position of most courts is that the issue of proximate cause is a

factual one for the jury See, e.g., Healy v. Hoy, 132 N.W 208 (Minn. 1911); Pfeifer v
Standard Gateway Theater, 55 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1952); cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (discussing practical nature of proximate cause
finding). At the same time, there is no shortage of cases deciding the issue of proximate cause
as a matter of law. See generally PROSSER & KEaTON, supra note 30, § 45 (while advocating
greater use of jury, noting that present division of responsibility is confused); Green, supra
note 44 (discussing confusion surrounding-and consequent judicial control over-proximate
cause issue).
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of interesting judge/jury relationships, of which the middle-of-the-road
American solution is just one. 58
The use of precedent also makes conflict likely The causal model
treats precedent (at least that which is rightly reasoned from accepted
principles) as a precious truth; the community model treats precedent as
data that is relevant to, but not conclusive of, the present case. If the
conflict is to be resolved in the middle range, we can expect a tort system
to select rules largely on the basis of precedent or analogy from precedent,
but also to depart from precedent when the community's sensibilities
demand it. Once again, that approach describes the American tort system
with striking accuracy 251
(d) Final Reflections on the Combined Models. In the effort to
describe the general workings and tension points of tort cases that fall
within the area of the models' overlap, I have avoided any attempt to
catalogue the types of cases that lie within that intersection. Now that the
more general description is complete, it is possible to do so. In American
tort law, the relevant cases are most intentional torts, some strict liability
torts, and all "classic" negligence cases-if we understand by the term
"classic" two things: (1) A causal link exists between plaintiff and
defendant, and (2) the community has sufficient experience with the type
of conduct at stake that it can, and has, formed communal judgments about
the conduct's propriety

258. The judge's right to review factual determinations (through devices like summary
judgment, judgment as a matter of law (both before and after verdict), an order for new
trial, and appeal) provides some check on the jury's fact-finding power, and the jury's right
to nullify legal principles behind closed doors, see, e.g., sources cited supra notes 4, 11,
check the judge's law-giving power. Although these checks and balances are in no sense
the only means of accommodation, they do reconcile competing interests in a way that
accords roughly equal respect to the desires of each model.
259. See supra notes 161-65, 217-22 and accompanying text. It can also be expected
that some jurisdictions will err on the side of precedent-bound formalism, and the others on
the side of pragmatism unencumbered by precedent. Compare Fuller v Buhrow, 292
N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980) (leavin& issue of comparative fault to legislature and upholding
contributory negligence bar) with Li v Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975)
(adopting comparative fault judicially). In the event of a dead tie (precedent clearly
counseling one thing, and the sense of the community counseling another), one model or
the other must be credited. Such a presumption may either be a part of a jurisdiction's
general decision to favor one model on close issues or else a quid pro quo for favoring the
opposite model on a different point.
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Intentional torts are, for the most part, the easiest. "[E]veryone can
understand a punch in the nose;"2 6° everyone has had some experience
(often as both perpetrator and victim) of interferences with land and
personal property We have intuitive feelings about lying (fraud) and the
purposeful infliction of emotional distress." The same is generally true
of intentional tort defenses, for which we have a fairly consistent
communal ethic, formed through experience, about matters such as selfdefense, defense of property, and necessity At the same time, however,
some intentional torts escape the model; our experiences with contract law
may not take us very far in determining the proper limits on the torts of
intentional interference with contract or prospective economic advantage. 262
With respect to unintentional injuries, some strict liability and many
negligence claims fall within the intersection. Some strict liability claims,
such as snakebites that result after you allow two or three dozen pet
rattlesnakes to roam your property, are merely statements of the community's opprobrium toward conduct that the community, with full knowledge
of and opportunity to judge its nature, finds unacceptably dangerous. 263
Landowner, liability claims and car accidents are the two largest categories
of "classic" negligence, 264 but other discrete types of conduct-such as
negligently discontinued rescue operations, negligent infliction of some
types of emotional distress, some failures to warn, and even clear instances
of malpractice-would also involve matters of common experience and
common sense.
Because the combined effect of these models cuts across doctrinal
lines, this descriptive theory of torts has the power to explain the outcomes
260. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3.
261. In order for an intentional infliction of emotional distress to be recoverable, "the
conduct [must be] so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community " RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 cmt. d.
262. See id. §§ 766-774. An exception may be the tort of wrongful discharge, in which
our common experience of holding a job may give us sufficient opportunity to decide
whether certain interferences with employment are legitimate. See, e.g., Frampton v
Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Brockmeyer v Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983); PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 30, § 130, at 1027-30.
263. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
264. The exception is the failure to protect passers-by from natural conditions on the
land. Here, the causal model cannot explain liability See supranote 168 and accompanying text.
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of cases that fit uneasily within the typical tripartite structure of intentional,
negligent, and strict liability torts.2 5 An excellent example is one of the
grand chestnuts of tort law, Vincent v Lake Ene TransportationCo. 21 In
Vincent, a shipowner that remoored its ship to an unloading dock during
an unexpected squall was ordered to pay the dock owner for damages
caused when the ship crashed against the dock. Although intentional tort,
negligence, and strict liability were all candidates as the theory of
recovery, 7 the court ultimately seized on the captain's conscious decision
to remoor the ship as sufficient intent to make out the tort of trespass. The
court's line of reasoning has been largely ignored by Vincent's many

commentators. 268
From the perspective of the causal and the community models, Vincent
is an easy case. The facts fulfill the causal model: The ship's captain
performed an act that increased the risk of damage to the dock, and the risk
materialized. The facts also fit within the community model: We share the
experiences of natural disasters, we can visualize easily the taking of (or
having taken from us) property in an emergency, and we widely share the
value that when I consciously take and destroy your property in order to
save my own, I should pay for the damage.269 In this respect, the single
265. Casebooks, treatises, and torts courses typically divide the study of torts into
sections on intentional, negligent, and strict harms. Although that approach may be
necessary pedagogically, I do not find it to be especially helpful as a method of thinking
critically about torts-partly because intent, negligence, and strict liability often blur in the
effort to work out constant themes.
266. 124 N.W 221 (Minn. 1910). Vincent does not lack for critical commentary, partly because its wonderful facts are considered something of a proving ground for any theory
of torts. A slice of this commentary includes COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 371-72; LANDES
&POSNER, supra note 29, at 178-80; MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 31, at 40-42; Fletcher,
supra note 28, at 546-47; Weinrib, Causation,supra note 72, at 420-22. For a treatment
of Vincent as a case of restitution rather than tort, see LAYCOCK, supra note 129, at 532-33.
267 The plaintiff obtained a verdict on the theory that the ship captain was negligent
in not casting off and taking his chances in the open harbor, but the Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected that theory. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W 221, 221 (Minn.
1910). Alternatively, the case could be understood as a strict liability claim (the defendant
is liable for any damage that its actions cause) or an intentional tort (the defendant imposed
on another's property with the substantial certainty that plaintiff would be injured).
268. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 263; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30,
§ 24, at 147-48; sources cited supra note 266.
269. My belief in this common value comes from anecdotal information. In the first
place, the jury found the shipowner liable, even though it used a clearly inappropriate
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most important fact that justifies Vincent is the one that the court itself
seized upon: the remoonng of the ship. The act of remooring is critical to
the causal model. If we postulate (as the facts apparently suggest) that the
dock suffered no damage before the new lines were tied, then it is only the
risk of remooring that materializes in harm; had the lines not been tied
again, the ship would have floated into the harbor and the dock would have
been spared. Similarly, remooring is essential to the community model;
I suspect that we do not have widely shared norms about whether the ship
should pay when it was imtially moored in fair weather and a great,
unforeseeable gust of wind suddenly threw the ship against the dock.27
Therefore, Vincent's intuitive sense about the centrality of tying new lines
is correct. That act keeps Vincent from floating beyond the boundaries of
both the causal and the community models into the sea of "nontorts."
Doctrinally, the case remains a puzzle, but from the viewpoint of the
models that define the boundaries of tort law, the outcome is correct.
Having now seen the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical portrait that
the two models are capable of painting, we might wonder whether the
result is worth the effort. At most, the models can develop the theoretical,
doctrinal, and practical structures within which specific manifestations of
tort can occur. The models cannot help us decide whether Arizona should
recogmze the tort of sexual harassment"7 or Missouri should adopt the
doctrinal theory to do so. Second, the commentary on Vincent almost always seeks to
justify its result. Third, each year when I teach Vincent to 75 to 90 first-year students, I ask
for a show of hands on the result in Vincent. With virtually no exceptions, the students find
the case rightly decided.
270. Some of us will feel the obligation of repair, but some will seek to avoid the
obligation by saying "It's not my fault." Cf. Vincent, 124 N.W at 222 (stating that there
would have been no recovery if ship "had entered the harbor, and while there had become
disabled and been thrown against the dock"); Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d
198, 202 (N.Y 1941) (finding cab driver who bailed out of moving cab in order to escape
from felon not negligent); Smith v Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (holding that
defendant who had been forcibly carried onto plaintiffs property was not liable for
trespass); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-I, Q. 105, Art. 2, Reply Obj.
1, at 1095 (Dominican trans. 1947) ("[I]t should be lawful for a man, entering on his
neighbor's vineyard, to eat of the fruit there
for among well-behaved people, the taking
of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and accustoms
men to give things to one another."); COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 387 ("Being innocent of
blame, indeed, being worthy of praise, is not a bar to liability in morality."). On this issue,
our community does not have a sufficiently high degree of cohesion.
271. It did. See Ford v Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987).
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consumer-expectation or the risk-utility test for defective products.27 On
the contrary, the methodology suggests that within very liberal parameters,
virtually any position is legitimate.
My answer to the charges is guilty in part and innocent in part, with
a plea for an extension of time to answer further. The criticism is
essentially a normative one. But the nature of this enterprise thus far has
been descriptive; I have tried to describe what tort law is. In Part III, I
will come to the normative lessons that the description might hold.
At another level, however, it should be obvious by now that the
descriptive theory that I have developed will not be particularly useful in
rendering specific answers to tort problems. The theory is inclusive rather
than exclusive; it accepts torts-inconsistencies and all-rather than prunes
those aspects that are disconcerting. I have said that it is impossible to
reconcile torts at the level of outcome;273 the consistency in torts must be
found instead at the level of structure and process. This does not mean that
precise answers are unavailable; each society need look no further than the
principles that it has selected to give effect to the notions of "act" and
"causation," the values which that society desires to promote through law,
and the methodology that it has selected to resolve tensions between these
principles and values. But it does mean that the nature of torts cannot
provide those solutions and that torts cannot be counted on to defend any
given solution against the barbarians at the gate.
Simply put, the overlap between the causal and community models
possesses the remarkable ability to predict the theoretical debate, the
doctrinal structure, and the practical consequences of large areas of
intentional, negligence, and strict liability claims.274 Nonetheless, an
important descriptive problem remains. Although many intentional,
272. The jury, so to speak, is still out. See, e.g., Fink v Foley-Belsaw Co., 983 F.2d
111 (8th Cir. 1993).
273. See supra text accompanying note 23.
274. Indeed, even granting that generally opposing positions can justify most solutions
in the middle, I know of no other models with the power to predict the actual theoretical,
doctrinal, and procedural compromises that torts has developed to deal with causal conduct
that has violated communal norms. For instance, Balkin's opposing models of individualism
and communalism would have difficulty explaining why torts has generally insisted on a dutybreach-causation-damage formula, why juries and judges split functions, why we care about
precedent, and why we might choose to revisit the selected precedent 30 years later. See
Balkin, supra note 9. The same inability to predict various structures or doctrines infects
Englard's opposing models of strict liability and fault, corrective and distributive justice, and
morality and utility See ENGLARD, supra note 52, at 7-27
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negligent, and strict liability torts fit within the intersection of the models,
many others do not. The question remains whether the theory that I have
proposed accurately describes the theoretical, doctrinal, and procedural
features of those tort cases that lie within the ambit of one model, but not
both.
2. The Consequencesfor a Tort System When Only the Community
Model Functions:Duty to Act and Sufficient Cause Cases
Although the community model must seek an accommodation of its
optimal features with those of the causal model when the models overlap,
it would appear to have no similar constraints in the duty to act and
sufficient cause cases, in which only the community model operates. In
these cases, we might anticipate a system of loss allocation in which there
were no judges, no duty or proximate cause limits, and no patience for
formal analysis.275 When we examine these cases, however, we find that
the opposite is true. No dramatic theoretical, doctrinal, or practical shifts
result.
On the surface, this fact suggests that the descriptive theory that I have
developed lacks validity That impression, however, is wrong for two
reasons. The first, and weaker, reason is that we should not confuse the
essential with the optimal. In order for the theory to be valid, it is
necessary only that the duty to act and sufficient cause cases comport with
the community's values; it is not necessary that the cases adopt the features
that best advance those values.
But that reason sounds like the last resort of the damned. A second,
stronger reason is that a series of real-world constraints, which keep these
cases close to the path already hewn by the cases lying in the intersection
of the causal and community models, provides the descriptive theory that
I have proposed with its validity The first of these constraints is the low
number of cases in which the community's values demand reallocation
without a causal link. The incidence of negligently maintained trees falling
on passersby or ships failing to rescue sailors is so low that, in most
jurisdictions, years pass between reported decisions.276 Similarly, the
275. For a fuller discussion of the optimal features of a community model, see suprapart
II.B.2.
276. Indeed, Prosser's hombook is only able to surmise that the common law would now
require a parent to effect an easy rescue of a child; it cites no reported cases to support the
thesis. PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 30, § 56, at 377; see Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., Inc.,
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notoriety of Kingston, Summers, and Sindell make us forget that the
simultaneous occurrence of two sufficient causes is so freakish that their
rules get a sparse workout in practice.'" Such a low incidence makes the
development of entirely different doctrines and practices to cover these
cases impractical. It is more administratively convenient (convenience, we
must remember, is a widely shared value in our community) to borrow the
framework already established for the more numerous claims that lie
outside of the community model.
A second constraint is the fact that causal notions, albeit weakened,
still play a role in the duty to act and sufficient cause cases. Remember
that factual causation consists of two elements: increased risk and
association of defendant's conduct with that risk.278 In rescue cases, the
community permits loss reallocation only when the counterfactual rescue
effort would have been successfulY 9

In sufficient cause cases, the

defendant's act must at least have increased the risk of injury Thus, in
rescue cases, the inaction must have been necessary to the injury (the
second element of factual causation), and in sufficient cause cases, the
action must have increased the risk of injury (the first element of factual
causation). Because causal notions are not completely irrelevant to our
275 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to impose duty to act on aunt who failed
to warn son of her twin sister about latent danger of which she knew, but did not create).
277 For instance, the appendices to the Restatement list approximately sixty cases (or
about two a year) that have discussed § 433B(3), the section that codifies the burden-shifting
solution of Kingston and Summers. Only a handful of that number actually adopt and apply
the rule; most either reject § 433B(3) on the facts or cite it as tangential support for other
propositions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, APPENDIX VOLUME THROUGH
DECEMBER, 1975, §§ 403-503, at 217-25 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
APPENDIX VOLUME THROUGH JUNE, 1984, §§ 403-503, at 322-42 (1986); TORTS SECOND
CUMULATIVE ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT [§§ 403-503], 191-215 (1992); see also Maldanado v
State, 618 So. 2d 537 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (granting summary judgment when prisoner was
unable to prove which of two manufacturers, both of whom were joined in case, made
handcuffs that injured him; citing neither Summers nor § 433B(3)). Likewise, Sindell has
received limited attention, and even more limited acceptance, in practice. See City of
Philadelphia v Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
market share approach); 210 E. 86th St. Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 821 F Supp. 125
(S.D.N.Y 1993) (same); Smith v Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (same);
Mulcahy v Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986) (same).
278. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
279. See sources cited infra notes 286-88. As those sources reflect, the quantum of proof
on the association between the counterfactual rescue attempt and the plaintiff's injury may
often be weak, but proof is nonetheless required.
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present sense of proper loss allocation, the tensions that informed the

structure of torts at the intersection of the models also affect (albeit more
weakly) the structure of those cases that lie beyond the intersection.280
Finally, the use of a single set of tort structures and methods appeals

to a different communal sense of fairness that derives from the adjudicatory
nature of torts: the belief that similarly situated people should be treated
similarly 281 Both the claimant whose case falls in the intersection of the

models and the claimant whose claim does not are asserting a legal theory
that shares common bonds of loss, adjudicatory process, and effectuating
community values. Although the lack of causation in the latter cases
absolves adjudication of the absolute obligation to give the cases identical
treatment, our American procedural system strongly prefers identical
treatment whenever possible." 2 Moreover, our constitutional structure,
which has somewhat rigidly defined roles for judges and juries as well as
a concern for due process and equal protection, 283 hampers efforts to
distance cases within the community model from their cousins which lie in
the intersection of the models.
Thus, the adjudicatory nature of torts propels duty to act and sufficient
cause cases to adhere to the structures and methods developed to handle the

cases that intersect both models. 21

Because acquiescence to these

280. If the community's values departed entirely from causal notions (for instance, with
a norm that the defendant, if rich, must pay the plaintiff, if poor, regardless of causation), this
point would have less force. But the other real-world constraints would still prevent wholesale
abandonment of the structures and methods developed in the intersection of the models.
281. For fuller treatments of the idea that adjudication implies like treatment of like
people, see RAWLS, supra note 37, at 237; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV L. REV 1, 51 (1980); Tidmarsh, supra note 131, at 1746-54.
282. See Tidmarsh, supra note 131, at 1752-54.
283. See U.S. CONST. art. III; id. amends. V, VII, XIV
284. I recognize that this statement has something of a "chicken and egg" quality We
could assume, for instance, that a society initially based tort decisions exclusively on
community values. The optimal features of such a system would be quite different than the
likely features of cases that lie in the intersection of the models. Compare supra part II.B.2
with supra part II.C. I.If the tort system later expanded to rely on causal notions, then the
"like treated alike" principle would apparently demand that those cases adopt the procedures
previously adopted for purely "community value" cases.
Whatever the theoretical answer, this problem is not important in reality At our tort
system's inception and continually since, causal notions have been an important dimension of
our understanding of the circumstances under which loss reallocation should occur. See 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119-28; FIFOOT, supra note 2 (collecting ancient

common law cases, all of which involve causal link between defendant's conduct and
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structures and methods is more a matter of convenience and choice than
obligation, however, some theoretical, doctrinal, and procedural shifts can
be expected at the margin.
(a) Theory At the level of theory, we can expect more explicit
reliance on notions of morality, utility, public policy, and distributive
justice and less concern for departure from precedent and harm to
established principles. That expectation is correct. Appeals to the
community's sense of fairness rather than to precedent are the mainstay of
advocates for duty to act and sufficient cause principles.2 8
(b) Doctrine. A second shift should occur at the level of doctrine.
Although causal notions still play some role in "community model" cases,
the chafing of these cases against causal principles could result in a
relaxation of proof for any remaining causal concerns. For example, in
Reyes v Vantage Steamship Co., 6 a sailor overboard case, the court
shifted to the shipowner the burden of showing that a counterfactual rescue
would have been unsuccessful.' Likewise, the measure of damages might
turn on a sense of fairness rather than on precisely corrective compensation. In Reyes, for instance, the ship ultimately paid 15% of the sailor's

plaintiff's injury); see also supra note 116 (discussing inability of writ of trespass to deal with
nonfeasance cases that later developed into writ of assumpsit). Hence, the "like treated alike"
principle would require community model cases to defer the structures established for cases
lying in the intersection of the models rather than the other way around.
285. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
286. 609 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1980).
287 Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co., 609 F.2d 140, 144-46 (5th Cir. 1980). Other duty to
act cases also weaken the quantum of causal proof. See Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers,
Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir.) (imposing liability when ship acts in total disregard of duty
to rescue, even though there was no significant evidence that attempt to rescue would have
been effective), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1962), Kirincich v Standard Dredging Co., 112
F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1940) (allowing recovery as long as sailor "might [the appropriate
grammatical mood] have saved himself"); Zinnel v United States Shipping Bd. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925); cf. Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th
Cir. 1991) (interpreting Gardner to impose liability for breach of "specialized duty" by
"highly culpable ship master" through "'watered-down' causation requirement"). Because the
failure in Zinnel and Kirncich was the failure to provide better life-saving equipment, there
was arguably an act (the provision of some, albeit insufficient, equipment) that would bring
the case within the causal model. The analysis would be the same, however, even if no
equipment had been provided. Cf. Haft v Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970)
(shifting burden of proof to motel owner to show that hypothetical lifeguard would have been
unable to save guests who drowned in unguarded pool).
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damages; 2 8 in Kingston and Summers, the operation of joint and several
liability effectively resulted in a division of damages equal to the degree of
risk that each defendant created. 8 9 The use of several liability, which ties
damages to the precise level of risk created, remains available to avoid
even the occasional unfairness of joint and several liability 290
(c) Procedure. Finally, on a practical level, cases located only within
the community model are likely to see greater entrustment of issues to the
jury, with exceedingly light appellate review That prediction also has
proved to be at least partially true. 91
3. The Consequencesfor a Tort System When Only the CausalModel
Functions: Contract, Custom, Plaintiff'sExpectations, Legislative and
JudicialSurrogacy, Strict Liability, and No Duty
It should come as no surprise that cases lying only within the causal
model will accept the received structure and methods generated by the
cases in the remaining areas of torts. The reasons for this acquiescence
parallel those which led "community model" cases to accept the structure
of cases lying in the intersection of the causal and community model;
adjudication's preference that similarly situated parties receive sinilar
treatment' is especially powerful in a model that prides itself on devotion
288. Reyes v Vantage S.S. Co., 672 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1982).
289. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 211
N.W 913, 915 (Wis. 1927). Although Kingston and Summers can technically be seen as cases
that fit within the causal model, see supra notes 137, 176 and accompanying text, they have
relevance for those cases that are truly sufficient cause cases, for a similar division of liability
among sufficient causes can be expected there.
290. Joint and several liability, which was imposed in Kingston and Summers, imposes
liability in excess of risk when one or more of the defendants is judgment-proof or
unavailable. Because the community model pegs damages to wrongdoing rather than to
precise compensation, see supra text accompanying note 194, the community model regards
compensation in excess of risk as inappropriate and several liability as more fair. See Brown
v Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (imposing several liability in "market share"
case). Although Brown was technically located within the causal model because the
community's values were powerless to judge the propriety of the defendant's conduct (the
manufacture of a drug), its choice of several liability was influenced by the same notions of
fairness that inform the community model. Reliance on its outcome in community model cases
can be expected.
291. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 366 ("The modem cases are explicit in conferring
upon the jury broad powers of decision in cases of rescue at sea.").
292. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
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to formal analysis from received precedent. Moreover, courts in a causal
model must find limits on the naked notions of "act" and "cause"
somewhere, and reliance on extant structures avoids the need to develop
entirely new structures and methods.
At the same time, adoption of the structures and methods of the other
cases presents an immediate problem. For cases in the intersection of the
models, the tension created by placing causal act in opposition to
communal responsibility resulted in a duty-fault-causation-damage
structure.2" By definition, however, there can be no "fault" (in the sense
of violation of community norms) associated with cases that lie beyond the
community model. How, then, can a causal model respect the fault
element of the merged causal-community structure? Finding the answer to
this question is the central puzzle of the causal model.294
Faced with the dilemma of needing to accept "fault," but being unable
to do so, the causal model has three options: choose not to adjudicate cases
in which a fault determination is impossible, eliminate fault and adjudicate
cases purely on duty and causation principles, or select a standard external
to community norms that can act as a surrogate for fault. Neither the first
choice (a "no duty in tort" approach) nor the second (a strict liability
approach) is especially appealing. The "no duty" approach concedes the
battlefield to the community model; only cases in which fault determinations can be made will concern torts.295 Conversely, the strict liability
approach denigrates the community model, for it blithely pretends that that
model and the perpetual friction that it generates have no effect on the
shape of the causal model. This approach also suffers from the reality that
unless the causal model is to expand to its full and nearly limitless
boundaries, it must draw lines beyond which strict liability will not be
imposed. Drawing lines, however, puts great pressure on duty and
proximate cause, neither of which can be supplied an immanent meaning
by the causal model itself.296
293. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
294. Rather than separating the ways in which theory, doctrine, and procedure bear on
this problem, as I have for the two prior subsections, this section will marshal the theoretical,
doctrinal, and procedural issues in a single discussion intended to solve this puzzle.
295. Of course, causal principles will continue to operate in the subset of community
model cases in which a causal connection is an important community norm. Because the community already insists on causation, however, the broader implications of the causal approach
can be minimized. That is a result which the causal model is unlikely to accept peacefully
296. See supra notes 140-41, 159 and accompanying text.
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Hence, the causal model funnels most of its cases through the last
option: the use of surrogate fault principles.297 This result is a happy one
for torts, for it keeps the structure in all three areas of torts parallel. But
it also leads to a conundrum: What should be the source of these "quasi-

fault" norms? Necessarily the norms must be either internal to the parties
or external to them. An internal fault norm would ask whether the conduct
at issue violated the norms of the actor, the victim, or both. An external
fault norm would compare the conduct of the defendant to the conduct of
similarly situated actors, to the standards of relevant private organizations,
or to public standards established by legislation, regulation, or judicial fiat.
The American tort system evidences adoption of each of these
positions. In some cases, torts defers to the principles expressly agreed
upon by the parties themselves; using the rubric of "no duty," they are
handled through breach of contract claims or arbitration.29 In some cases,
torts defers to the standards of the defendant or the community to which
that defendant belongs; best represented by the instance of professional
299
malpractice, these cases fall under the general heading of custom.
297 For an explanation of the circumstances in which the former two options (no-duty
and strict liability) remain valid, see infra notes 309-30 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Redgrave v Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 557 F Supp. 230, 238
(D. Mass. 1983) ("[A] breach of contract is not, standing alone, a tort as well."); Madden v
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 92.
Cases that defer to contractual standards should be distinguished from "no privity" cases in
which the tort claims of plaintiffs with no contractual relationship to defendants are barred.
See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y 1928); Winterbottom
v Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Viewed from the perspective of contract, both
pose a similar issue: The enforcement of existing agreements and the nonenforcement of nonexistent agreements both protect the freedom to bargain. Viewed from the perspective of
torts, however, there is a great difference between deferring to contract law when mutually
agreed upon standards of conduct are present and deferring to contract law when such
standards are absent. Although the use of a single "no duty" label has a tendency to conflate
these distinct circumstances, it can be expected that torts will demonstrate far greater
reluctance to defer to contract law for "no agreement" cases than actual agreement cases. That
expectation has been fulfilled. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y
1916) (rejecting Winterbottom's privity rule); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 402A cmt.b
(same); EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 508-11 (discussing dissatisfaction with and departures from
Moch); see also infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Ellis v Louisville & N.W R.R., 251 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky 1952);
Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968); Titus v. Bradford, Bordell & Kinzua R.R.,
20 A. 517 (Pa. 1890). Torts has ambivalent feelings about deference to the defendant's
custom, see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932),
except in the instance of malpractice. Even in malpractice cases, however, custom may not
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Somewhat rarer is deference to the plaintiffs expectations, but there are
some examples in doctnne ° and undoubtedly more instances in practice 0'
in which the plaintiffs expectations establish the standard of "quasi-fault."
Likewise, in instances in which statutory or regulatory pronouncements set
a standard of conduct, torts can borrow those standards to provide a readymade structure for liability 302
be absolute. See Quintal v Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161, 174 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor,
C.J., concurring) (noting that "expert testimony is not required when scientific enlightenment
is not necessary to show that failure to make such preparations is unreasonable"); Helling v
Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974). See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Pathto The
T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1992) (discussing positive and normative dimensions of custom).
300. The most famous example is the-"consumer expectation" test of products liability,
in which the test for defect is whether the product is more dangerous than the ordinary
consumer expects. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 402A, cmts. g-i; see also Henderson
& Twerski, supranote 45, at 1532-34 (noting movement away from consumer expectation test
for design defects). See generally Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1985).
Informed consent provides another example, at least in those jurisdictions in which physicians
must disclose the information which the reasonable patient would need to know in order to
make an informed choice. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F,2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Finally, pockets of tort law in which the plaintiff's reliance forms a
critical element of the tort also honor the plaintiff's expectation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
supra note 12, §§ 323, 324A, 402B, 525.
301. In the absence of clear communal standards of fault, it can be expected that a jury
will often attempt to answer the quasi-fault question in terms that its members understand:
What would I expect this defendant to do if I was in the plaintiffs shoes? See Peter Perlman,
Trial Strategy in Coal Mining Machine Cases, 1 PRODUCTS LIABILiTY L.J. 67, 70-71 (1988)
(reprinting closing argument in which arguments about risk-utility, which was legal standard,
were skillfully interwoven with arguments regarding plaintiff's expectation).
302. Hence, the negligence per se doctrine. See FOWLER V HARPER ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 17.6 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 36; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 12, §§ 286-288C. In order to ensure that the legislative or administrative standard
actually is a measure of fault with respect to defendant's injury toward plaintiff, some
narrowing of the doctrine (through questions about the purpose of the statute, the types of risk
the statute is designed to prevent, and the types of persons protected) can be expected. On the
other hand, an escape valve to permit nonliability in those circumstances in which community
norms override the "technical" statutory violation should also be expected. See Tedla v.
Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y 1939) (excusing plaintiff from statutory violation); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 288A.
As with contract, see supra note 298, two issues with the potential to conflate should be
kept separate. The first is the extent to which torts should borrow statutes to measure liability
in tort. The second is the extent to which torts should shrink its outer boundaries and defer
to an alternative legal scheme (for example, securities law) to set the terms of loss allocation.
For further consideration of the latter problem, see infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
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Each of these "quasi-fault" approaches, however, is handicapped by
its narrowness." 3 The first approach requires a preinjury agreement, the
middle two require pre-established customs or expectations, and the last

requires a preexisting legislative or regulatory scheme. None of these
approaches can cover situations in which no &a ante standard encompasses
the defendant's act. Thus, a default position-a judicially created standard

of "quasi-fault" that catches cases that slip through the cracks-is
necessary
Because of the desire to keep the causal model as closely aligned to the

intersection of the causal and community models as possible, the judge
(who, in the causal model, is the preferred person to set standards) is likely
to choose as the standard of "quasi-fault" those variables that most closely
mirror the factors that the community uses to assess fault. In our society,
those factors appear to include foreseeability of injury, likelihood of injury,
magnitude of injury, and the relative burden of taking precautions."
Therefore, the judge can be expected to export those concepts from the

contextual settings that gave birth to them and abstract them into general
principles of quasi-fault.
In doing so, however, torts generates standards that are internally
inconsistent and often work at cross-purposes. 5 Compounding this
problem is the impossibility of neutrality; because the community's norms
are inapplicable, the judge is sorely tempted to select the principle that
achieves a result conducive to her world view The net effect is a system

in which numerous and conflicting standards for "quasi-fault" are
expressed, available, and used.3" 6 The internal logic of the causal model
303. It is interesting to note the rules-oriented nature of all but the consumer expectation
approach. Deference to contract leads to a flat rule of no duty in tort; deference to custom
involves a world of precise, expert, and well-established codes of right and wrong behavior;
and the use of statutes or regulations brings into play codes that are often highly refined and
detailed. Thus, each of these approaches is consistent with the duty-oriented preferences of
the causal model and somewhat at odds with the more loosely textured preferences of the
community model. It is hardly surprising that the plaintiff expectation approach, which is
most akin to the loose texture of the community model, is also the least favored.
304. See sources cited supra note 11.
305. For instance, a foreseeability approach and the Hand Formula approach do not
always lead to the same conclusion about the existence of negligence, nor do they advance
policies like compensation and deterrence equally.
306. This prediction correlates perfectly with the reality of our present tort system. See,
e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 150-69 (describing different approaches used to determine
negligence); Stephen Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV 1015, 1015-19
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is simply incapable of excluding any of the options. At the same time, the
highly irregular pastiche of principles is an embarassment. One solution,
which is generally consistent with the procedural aims of the combined
causal-community model, is to cover the inherent ambiguities with a
general principle (the "reasonable person," who exercises "ordinary
care"3" 7) that masks the critical tensions among the various "quasi-fault"
principles308 and then to let the jury give the term meaning. As long as the
jury's decision does not deviate substantially from the judge's sensibilities,
the difficult problem of selecting a "quasi-fault" principle can be forgotten;
when the jury goes too far, the judge retains a wealth of "quasi-fault"
standards to void the jury's choice.

These predicted features of a causal model operating in the shadows
of a combined causal-commumty model find their affirmation in our
experience of torts. But the causal model cannot be validated entirely
unless some explanation can be given for the no duty and strict liability
cases that spill out of the funnel of "quasi-fault." Both phenomena can be
easily explained. For cases in which torts chooses not to adjudicate in the
absence of fault (i.e., "no duty" cases)," ° it is important to recall two facts:
(1994) (stating that cases use both Hand Formula and reasonable person definitions of
negligence). For a wonderfully confused jury instruction that blends notions of foreseeability
and likelihood in its definition of negligence, see CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL
§§ 3.10-.11 (Charles A. Loring ed., 7th ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993).
307 See, e.g., 1 NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 2.10 (2d ed. 1974);
1 VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 1-77 (1993).

308. It also masks the difference between the meaning of the "reasonable person" in the
community and combined causal-community models and its meaning in the pure causal model.
In the community and combined causal-community world, the "reasonable person" is the
person who obeys social norms; any more specific description of his or her characteristics is
unnecessary
The causal model dissociates the reasonable person standard from the
defendant's social fault (which, by definition, cannot be determined) and from the moral
judgments so antithetical to the causal model. Thus, for rather different reasons, the
community model, the combined model, and the causal model all favor an objective standard
for negligence.
309 To be clear, I am not suggesting that every case in which a court says "No duty" fits
within this category. For instance, some courts would hold that a landowner-defendant owed
no duty of care to a trespasser-plaintiff because, on the facts, the landowner did not intend to
harm the trespasser. This "no duty" holding is merely a statement that community norms (as
translated and hardened into rule by the causal model) were not violated under the facts.
Likewise, in Palsgraf-like cases that hold that there is no duty because the plaintiff is
unforeseeable, the "no duty" holding merely describes the failure of an individual plaintiff to
provide sufficient evidence on the dispositive "quasi-fault" element of foreseeability.
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that the causal model does not need to expand to the full scope of its
potential boundaries and that the interests of other bodies of law can
overlap the causal model's interest in reallocating loss.310 When the causal

model overlaps with other bodies of law, the same type of indeterminate
struggle that occurred between the causal and the community models will
occur at a heightened level; each field of law, with its own preferences and

optimal conditions, will jockey for superiority At any given moment, the
claim of another body of law to supremacy might be compelling, but
eventually that can be expected to change. As it does, torts might reclaim
(at least for a time) the right to apply quasi-fault principles to judge the
conduct. For example, as our century has seen growing skepticism about
the value of unfettered bargain, 1 we have also seen less willingness on the
part of torts to defer to contract solutions for loss allocation.1 2 ConRather, the "no duty" cases to which I refer here involve injurious conduct that torts
chooses not to address at all. Leaving to one side issues of federal preemption, in which a
federal statutory or regulatory scheme may preclude the expansion of the causal model into
some areas, see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), the incidence of
this type of "no duty" holding has tended to decline in the past century See generally Rabin,
supra note 189 (tracing decline of "no duty" rules during this century). But see Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the PossibleEnd of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26
GA. L. REV 601, 659-63 (1992) (observing that few inroads have been made on remaining
"no duty" pockets during last decade). But some examples still remain, particularly in the
uncertain borderland between contract and tort, and in the areas of psychic and economic
harms. See generally East River S.S. Co. v Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
(1986); Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214 (Kan. 1983) (no recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y 1931) (no recovery for negligent misrepresentation);
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y 1928); United Textile Workers
v Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (no recovery for
negligently caused economic loss); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (no recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress without breach of independent tort); see also
Wilber v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982) (rejecting claim of wrongful birth).
310. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
311. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
312. See supra note 298; see also Bily v Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752-54
(Cal. 1992) (discussing fate of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y 1931)). The
contract-oriented result in East River Steamship Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986) confirms rather than disproves the general statement. In EastRiver, the plaintiff
and defendant were commercially strong entities, and there was little reason to believe that the
plaintiff was incapable of protecting its economic interests in a world of unfettered bargain.
East River, 476 U.S. at 873, 875. The opposite is true for consumers who are physically
injured; East River's lineal ancestor, Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842),
has long since departed from the American tort scene.
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versely, our skepticism about the efficacy and scope of other areas like
securities or antitrust has led us, so far at least, to retain torts such as
misrepresentation and unfair competition. In the next century, the
relationship of torts to these other areas could well be different, with a
different pattern of "no duty" rules.
But it is also true that torts has refused to regulate loss-causing
conduct even in areas not of concern to other fields of law For instance,
claims of wrongful birth, wrongful life, and infliction of emotional distress
have been addressed only recently and with little consensus. The reason
that these cases also involve "no duty" rules are related to, but distinct
from, the prior "no duty" rules. Recall that the term "loss" is defined as
a positive matter by society 33 For a number of reasons, torts traditionally
professed a reluctance to recognize purely psychic peace as a compensable
loss. 3 14 Similarly, until recent advances in medical technology, we were
never confronted with the "loss" of an unwanted pregnancy or an imperfect
child that we could attribute to the causal actions of a third person.
In both cases, torts must decide whether this injury is a cognizable
"loss." The dual pulls of the causal model are obvious. On the one hand,
its formal nature resists the creation of new rules not logically derivable
from first principles, and it has an especially strong dislike for new rules
clearly rejected by prior precedent. On the other hand, it must be
internally consistent, and if the consistency on which it has settled is
foreseeability or efficiency, 1 ' it must follow where those principles lead.3" 6
313. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
314. For discussion of some of the reasons, see HARPER ET AL., supra note 302, § 9.1,
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 54. The exceptions were assault and defamation
because both types of conduct were likely to cause the sort of breach of the king's peace with
which torts initially concerned itself. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 568 cmt. b;
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, §§ 10, 14.
315. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
316. To promote greater certainty, the causal model would obviously prefer to pour new
torts into old doctrinal vessels, at least until there is sufficient precedent that the "new" tort
can be declared an entity distinct from the old doctrine. This approach can be seen best in the
torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Compare Wilkinson v
Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) (allowing recovery for emotional distress on very generous
understanding of battery) and Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 129 S.W 401 (Mo. Ct. App.
1910) (allowing emotional distress claim with arguable assault and trespass overtones) with
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 46 (recognizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress) and id. cmt. b (discussing evolution of intentional infliction tort). See Kerans v
Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 435 (Ohio 1991) (adopting tort of sexual harassment);
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Hence, with new types of loss or old "non-losses" subject to modern
reconsideration, a lengthy start-up time, many false starts, and considerable
confusion along the way to a solution can be anticipated.
In order to complete the portrait, the causal model must also be
capable of explaining the position that opposes "no duty"- strict liability 317
This part of the portrait requires us to recall the reasons that community
norms are sometimes inoperative: either a lack of knowledge about the
defendant's conduct or a lack of community consensus about that conduct.
When the community lacks consensus, the causal model's use of a quasifault standard, which is likely to reflect the norms of a fair segment of the
community, seems appropriate. When the problem is a lack of experience
with the defendant's conduct, however, none of the community's quasifault standards is particularly apposite.
Our present rules of strict liability reflect this dichotomy Many of
our famous pockets of strict liability actually involve the application of
quasi-fault principles to conduct with which we are familiar generally, but
incapable of judging specifically For instance, blasting, which is an
activity about which we have a general understanding, warrants strict
liability because of the foreseeability and magnitude of risk associated with
that conduct.318 But the result of the blasting cases would be no different
if the court required a showing of negligence and read a jury instruction
defining "negligence" to be "conduct which foreseeably poses a high
degree of harm to others." Indeed, half of the six "strict liability" factors
mentioned in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as relevant to a strict
liability determination-likelihood of injury, magnitude of injury, and costEPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1037-63 (discussing evolution of negligent infliction of emotional
distress); Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive
Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. ClI. L. REv 328, 356-62 (1988) (advocating
recognition of tort of sexual harassment as distinct from tort of infliction of emotional
distress).
317 I have already placed some strict liability claims in the intersection of the causal and
community models. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. Here, I refer to the
remainder of strict liability claims: those in which the statement "When you do 'X,' you pay"
does not reflect the community's norm that doing "X" is faulty under all circumstances.
318. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y 1969); see also Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184-86 (Wash. 1972) (finding strict liability for transportation of
gasoline because of magnitude of possible harm and likelihood of destruction of evidence of
cause of injury), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (holding asbestos manufacturer strictly liable when magnitude of
harm from exposure to asbestos products was great).

1404

51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1313 (1994)

benefit analysils319 - are simply expressions of three standard "quasi-fault"
principles transplanted into "quasi-strict" liability 320
Only a single (albeit important) difference separates quasi-fault and
quasi-strict liability- In quasi-fault cases, the jury selects the relevant
principles,32' whereas in quasi-strict liability cases, the judge selects those
principles."2 Two other features, however, minmize even that difference:
the power of the judge in quasi-fault cases to review and reverse the jury's
verdict when convinced that the wrong approach to quasi-fault has been
takens2 and the power of the jury in quasi-strict cases to reject strict
liability through the subterfuge of finding a lack of proximate causation. 24
Thus, the difference between quasi-fault and quasi-strict cases is quite
subtle. With a judge declaring rules and a jury left with a more ministerial
fact-finding role, quasi-strict cases are somewhat more aligned with the
optimal features of a causal model-a result which suggests that there is a
relatively weaker attraction of the community model in quasi-strict cases.
That suggestion appears to be true. As a society, we have a greater
opportumty to enter into contracts, seek medical services, and buy products
than we have to experience blasting; hence, our communal sense of the
utility and trustworthiness of the blasting industry is less refined, and our
need to give the blasting industry the benefit of a jury's justice is less
compelling. But the shadings here are rather refined. In spite of all the
attention paid to the critical differences between negligence and strict
liability systems, it would be a mistake to emphasize unduly the difference
between quasi-fault and quasi-strict principles as they actually operate in
tort law 121
319 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520(a), (b), (f).
320. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 78, at 555 ("When a court applies all of
the factors suggested in the Second Restatement it is doing virtually the same thing as is done

with the negligence concept, except for the fact that it is the function of the court to apply the
abnormally dangerous concept to the facts as found by the jury ").
321. They do so under the guise of the "reasonable person" instruction. See supra note
307 and accompanying text.
322. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520 cmt. 1.
323. See supra text accompanying note 308.

324. Defendants are liable in strict liability cases only for foreseeable types of harm. See
Madsen v. East Jordan Irng. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§§ 522, 524.
325. See Schwartz, supra note 104, at 1003-05 (suggesting that most strict liability cases
rely on negligence concepts and would have same result in negligence regime).
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The other head of strict liability, which derives from the community's
lack of sufficient knowledge to form a judgment about the defendant's
conduct, rests on quite a different footing. In these cases, the society does

not know how likely or foreseeable an injury is and whether its risks are
greater than its costs. It lacks a sense of the defendant's trustworthiness.
The natural human reactions are fear of the unknown and intolerance
toward any damage that the unknown produces. It is equally natural to

force the defendant who engages in an unknown activity to bear the burden
of its damages, at least until the defendant educates us about the utility of

the activity and demonstrates sufficient trustworthiness.326 Captured in the
fourth factor of the Restatement's strict liability formula-the "extent to
which the activity is not a matter of common usage "327-this fear of the
unknown constitutes the only "true" form of strict liability, i.e., the only
type of strict liability in which community norms or quasi-fault principles
derived from those norms do not inform our judgment to impose liability
The difference between "quasi-strict" and "true strict" liability, which
hinges on the level of general community experience with an activity, is
best captured in the famous dichotomy between Blackburn and Cairns in
Rylands v Fletcher We now can recognize in Blackburn's rule-"that the

326. The overlap between this human reaction and the "cheapest cost avoider" principle
so frequently invoked in the law and economics literature is apparent. As between a
community that is ignorant of the damages of an activity and a defendant who wishes to
perform that activity, the defendant is the one in the best position to decide whether to engage
in that activity, see, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 29; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 237,
and the defendant is also the one whom the community will wish to hold responsible.
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to assume that the "cheapest cost avoider" has
applicability only in cases of "true" strict liability. Rather, some of the community's norms
may be based on, or at least influenced by, cheapest cost avoider notions, so that it is a
principle which can cut across the models and be useful in cases involving the community
model, the causal model, and the hybrid causal-community model. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
327 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520(d).
For discussion of three of the
Restatement's six factors, see supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text. The remaining two
factors of § 520 serve different interests. The fifth factor-the "inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on," id. § 520(e)-reflects the type of strict liability
that is in fact an aspect of the combined causal-community model. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text. The third factor-the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care," RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520(c)-is either a refinement of the
likelihood and magnitude principles discussed in § 520(a) and (b) or else an unintelligible
makeweight. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 78, at 555-56 (criticizing
Restatement's use of multiple factors to determine strict liability).
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person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril"328-a statement of "quasi-strict" liability in which Blackburn blends
"quasi-fault" principles of likelihood and magnitude to judge conduct that
the community understands, but about which it has developed no consensus. Cairns's rule-that defendants act at their peril when they use land
"for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of
introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or
upon it"329-is arguably a rule of "true strict" liability, which finds liability
to inhere in the lack of community knowledge (i.e., "non-naturalness")
about an activity 330

In choosing among "true strict," "quasi-strict," and "quasi-fault"
approaches, three factors seem significant: the community's familiarity
with the nature of the defendant's enterprise, the perceived utility of that
enterprise to the community, and the perceived trustworthiness of the
defendant in keeping the community's safety in mind."' In general terms,
328. Fletcher v Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
329. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 339 (1868).
330. It is not clear what Cairns himself meant by the term "non-natural use," but it is subject to other interpretations than the one given in the text. The most obvious interpretation is
that "natural" should be distinguished from "artificial," but this would mean that homeowners
are strictly liable for damages that their "artificial" homes might cause. A second
interpretation is lo explain "non-natural use" in terms of quasi-fault principles of likelihood
and risk-utility See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520 cmts. i-j; COLEMAN, supra note
14, at 368; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 78; supra note 190. But the interpretation
suggested in the text-liability in the absence of community knowledge about an activity-also
has support. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 520; EPSTEIN, supranote 2, at 95.
331. These concerns can explain the apparently puzzling dichotomy between cases like
Beshada v Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), in which an asbestos
manufacturer was found to have a duty to warn even about dangers of which it was
unavoidably unaware, and Feldman v Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), in which a
drug company was allowed a defense that it was unavoidably unaware of its product's dangers.
If we were a robust and healthy species that lived on the edge of Hell, I suspect that our
perception of the relative merits of asbestos and drugs, and hence the results in the cases,
would be reversed.
A fourth concern may also be relevant in some cases: the strength of the causal showing.
As the strength of the causal evidence weakens, there may be a greater need for the use of a
stringent standard of quasi-fault in order to prevent the case from escaping into the nether
reaches of the causal model. Hence, the causal model might insist that Sindell, which fits
poorly within the causal model because of its relaxed views on causal proof, see supra note
176 and accompanying text, be coupled with a quasi-fault rather than a quasi-strict or true
strict standard. That expectation has proven correct. Brown v Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470
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the issue of familiarity with defendant's conduct divides true strict from
quasi-strict and quasi-fault, and utility and trustworthiness then guide the
choice between quasi-strict and quasi-fault, as well as the specific principle
(likelihood, magnitude, plaintiffs expectation, defendant's custom, and so
on) that is used to judge the defendant's conduct. Application of these
factors, however, is not an exact science yielding precise answers, so that
some discord in approaches and principles is inevitable both over time and
among communities. The amount of discord will be heightened by the
filtering effect of the judge, who, consistent with the formal aspirations of
the causal model, makes the initial choice of approach. 3 2 With different
training and experiences, a judge's sense of familiarity, utility, and
trustworthiness will not necessarily reflect the sense of the community at
large.333 Adding to the distortion in common law jurisdictions is the
judge's loyalty to precedent, with the consequent reluctance to revisit a

declared rule in light of shifting senses of familiarity, utility, and
trustworthiness.
These community-oriented factors show that the community model
remains a brooding presence even in cases that lie only within the causal
model. Although the community is unable to make precise judgments
about the appropriateness of the defendant's conduct, it can nevertheless
make categorical judgments that help the causal model to select an
appropriate rule. Indeed, just as the community model is unable to shake
off the influences of causation, 334 so is the causal model unable to free itself
(Cal. 1988) (holding manufacturers of DES to negligence standard). Because the incidence
of a relaxed burden of proof in a causal model is so low, however, this fourth factor will not
typically come into play
332. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 285 (describing range of quasi-fault
standards from which judge is expected to choose in instructing jury); id. § 520 cmt. I (stating
that it is function of judge to decide whether strict liability pertains to defendant's conduct).
333. The variance may be most evident in professional malpractice cases, in which the
need to defer to the standards of the competent practitioner in the field is not necessarily
obvious to the average member of the community See Helling v Carey, 519 P.2d 981
(Wash. 1974) (rejecting standard of medical custom in case in which simple and inexpensive
test would have prevented foreseeable injury). But the judge, as a professional, is familiar
with the professional ethic to keep the interests of others foremost. Hence, the judge is willing
to extend the greatest level of quasi-fault immunity-absolute deference to the defendant's
custom-to professionals who, the judge believes, share this ethic. For other professionals
(for example, plumbers) and in other areas, a judge's sensibilities are likely to deviate less
from those of the community
334. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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from the values of the community "I In theory, the causal model and the
community model stand without the other. In reality, their relationship is
symbiotic and, therefore, far more complex.
4. Cases Outside the Scope of the Causal and Communty
Models: Beyond Torts
The final test of my theory's descriptive validity is to determine
whether the models fail to account for significant dimensions of tort theory,

doctrine, and practice. As it turns out, I have not led everyone on a wild
goose chase. In my view, the models do capture everything that we have
accomplished in centuries of doing torts.
Or at least nearly everything. One possible exception, which is brandnew, arose in Hymowitz v Eli Lilly & Co.336 Hymowitz involved plaintiffs
who were exposed to DES, but who were unable to prove which manufacturer of DES had made the DES to which they were exposed; put in the
terms that we have considered, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the
defendants increased the risk of injury, but failed to offer any evidence
which associated that risk with their loss.33 As we have seen, communal
notions of wrongfulness have influenced cases like Kingston, Summers, and
Sindell to weaken the quantum of proof needed to prove the association
between defendant's risk and plaintiff's injury, but in those cases the
defendants always retained the ability to prove that their risk did not
materialize in plaintiffs loss."3 ' Although the weakemng of the evidentiary
standards ran counter to the preferences of the causal model, the opportumty of the defendant to avoid responsibility for losses not associated with its
risks kept the cases within the model's permissible boundaries.
Hymowitz is different. Unlike Kingston, Summers, or Sindell, it gives
a defendant no opportunity to disprove causal responsibility Rather, in
Hymowitz, the New York Court of Appeals held that in DES cases, each
manufacturer successfully sued by a plaintiff was to be held liable for that
percentage of the plaintiff's damages which equalled the percentage of the
335.

This reality presents a final reason that the causal model cannot depart too much

from the structures established in the intersection of the causal and community models.
336. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y 1989).
337 See supra notes 136, 173-75, 280 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer's share of the national DES market.339 The court of appeals
specifically forbade evidence that a defendant's New York market was
substantially smaller than its national market, and it even forbade evidence
that the plaintiff was not injured by the defendant's DES; hence, a
defendant was liable for its share of the national market even though its
smaller local market for DES meant that the defendant posed substantially
less risk to these plaintiffs than its share of damages indicated, and even
though the defendant was able to prove, with the ironclad evidence of
twenty bishops, that a particular plaintiff never took that particular
Therefore, Hymowitz imposes liability without
defendant's DES."
requiring some quantum of evidence that associates defendant's risk and
plaintiff's injury In other words, Hymowztz cannot be located within the
causal model.
It is tempting to locate Hymowttz within the "pure" community
model.3" There is language to support that view; Hymowitz contends that
its abandonment of a causal connection is necessary "to achieve the ends
of justice in a more modem context" 42 and is consistent "with the reason[and] the ever-evolving dictates43
able expectations of a modern society
of our common-law system."1
heart
the
are
which
of justice and fairness,
Nonetheless, I doubt that the community of New York possesses sufficient
experience with the manufacture and distribution of DES so that it is
capable of forming judgments about a DES manufacturer's responsibility
for exposure to its product. Consequently, the wide consensus of
appropriate behavior on which the community model depends is as absent
in a case like Hymowttz as causation itself.
The problem represented by Hymowitz can be expanded to both theory
and practice. A trickle of recent scholarly work has called for the
abandonment of cause-m-fact and its replacement with other principles
(such as risk creation, loss spreading, or deterrence) that better achieve
339. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077-78 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989).
340. Id. at 1078. A manufacturer could escape liability only by showing that it did not
enter the national market for the use of DES in pregnancy. See id. The dissent in Hymowitz
urged that the burden-shifting approach of Sindell be used. See id. at 1083 (Mollen, J.,
dissenting).
341. See supra part II.C.2.
342. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075 (quoting People v Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901
(N.Y 1976)).
343. Id.
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certain ideals of justice or efficiency 11 When the community neither
widely supports these replacement principles nor has sufficient experience
and consensus to judge the appropriateness of the defendant's conduct,
such proposals push torts beyond the present boundaries of the two models
that I have described. Similarly, on the level of practice, we can easily
imagine a jury that ignores the utter lack of causal evidence and decides a
case purely on intuitions that they, but not the community at large, share. 5
When the judge fails to check the jury's excess, we have a tort result that
the models cannot accommodate.
With respect to theory and practice, however, the problem is actually
nonexistent. Communities are not stagnant, and legal theory often reshapes
communal norms. Hence, at least some legal theory, issuing its clarion
call to the community model to catch up and embrace it, will invariably
exceed the limits that tort doctrine must respect.' The practical problems
of juries ignoring both communal and causal principles can be accounted
for in a similar way- as a challenge from a community's subgroup to push
the community's norms in the subgroup's direction. Because most tort
verdicts receive little publicity, however, a more realistic interpretation of
the subgroup's action is that it is no longer "doing torts."347
The doctrinal solution of Hymowitz can likewise be seen in either of
these lights. The first, and more charitable, light is that it stands as a
clarion call from an influential subgroup of society (judges) to shift the
community's norms toward the allowance of compensation for risk. The
alternative view is that Hymowitz has simply exceeded the boundaries that
tort law has at present established as its limits. It is no longer "doing torts"
344. The classic piece belongs to Guido Calabresi, see Calabresi, supra note 30, who argues that cause-m-fact principles should be interpreted in order to achieve a proper mix of loss
spreading and accident avoidance. The past few years have seen the emergence of other
proposals to compensate plaintiffs for risks that do not materialize in loss. See, e.g., sources
cited supra note 178. See generally Richard W Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
Probability,Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruningthe Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IowA L. REv 1001 (1988) (criticizing other efforts to permit compensation for risk,
but concluding that liability based on increased risk is consistent with corrective justice).
345. Consider the possibility of a jury of Klansmen sitting in judgment of a black
defendant being sued by a white plaintiff.
346. Cf. Weinrib, supra note 34, at 967-68 ("Court decisions or legal scholarship may

call any of [the central features of a body of law] into question.").
347 Here, it is useful to remember the slip between the nature of torts and any human
(and therefore fallible) process to implement that nature. See supra text accompanying note
124.
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in the way that tort cases for the past twenty centuries have gone about
their business.
Although I wish that I could embrace the former interpretation, I fear
that the latter view of Hymowitz is accurate. It is not the role of doctrine
to reshape community norms. Occupying that tenuous middle ground
between theory and practice, the role of doctrine is to reflect community
principles rather than to instigate them-to follow rather than to lead. My
conclusion, therefore, is that Hymowitz cannot be explained by the two
models that have defined torts up to the present time. 4 Hymowtz cannot
be situated within the causal model, and the boundaries of the community
model have not yet expanded to embrace it.
This conclusion does not necessarily suggest that Hymowltz is wrong.
The nature of the descriptive enterprise that forms the basis of this Article
is to describe torts as it is, not to make normative judgments about what
torts should or should not be doing. Torts is not a lifeless form; it is alive,
and as long as it remains alive, it is always subject to change. New forms
can be injected into torts, just as old forms can be discarded. Hymowitz,
which can arguably be incorporated within explanatory models such as
contract, insurance, criminal law, or welfare, argues that torts should now
add a third model. Whether Hymowitz in fact signals the rise of a new,
third model in torts, or whether it is an aberration that, with time, will
have no effect upon torts' basic two-model structure, is not at all clear.
What is clear is this: Hymowtz stands outside the order of torts as presently
constituted, and the present models of torts must therefore disavow it.

348. This may well account for the frosty reception that Hymowitz has received, both
in New York and elsewhere. See City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d
112, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting Hymowitz and other forms of market share liability
under Pennsylvania law); 210 E. 86th St. Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 821 F Supp.
125, 128 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (refusing to apply Hymowitz to asbestos case).

I am not the only one to believe that Hymowitz is actually a distributive justice
decision masquerading as a torts case. See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 398-406. My
disagreement with Coleman lies in his view that Sindell likewise cannot be properly

understood as a tort case (or at least as a tort case that fits within the notion of corrective
justice). Id. at 405-06. Although the fit is admittedly uncomfortable, see supranote 176
and accompanying text, I have no difficulty locating Sindell within the permissible outer

boundaries of tort law's causal model. Nonetheless, the fact that it too has received a
somewhat frosty reception, see supra note 277, demonstrates that Sindell owes its existence

primarily to the penumbral influence exercised by the community model on the causal
model. See supra notes 280, 335 and accompanying text.
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IlL The Value of the Hypothesis
Having spent a great deal of time validating the hypothesis that torts
arises from the adjudicatory union of causal and community responses to
the problem of loss, I turn briefly to a consideration of the value of the
hypothesis. At one level, of course, a valid description of what torts
is-which has never been accomplished successfully-has its own intrinsic
value and perhaps needs no further justification. At another, normative
level, however, the theory that I have proposed can be critiqued by all of
the conceptualist and anti-conceptualist positions I surveyed before. 4 9 In
attempting to accommodate all, I have offended all as well.
Is it possible, then, to defend my hypothesis of torts other than in
descriptive terms-to argue, in other words, that what tort law is also is
what it should be? The answer is yes. Unfortunately, a complete
explanation would likely take a work comparable in length to that which
has come before. Let me, therefore, skate quickly over the ice, acknowledging my obligation at some future point to plumb the deep water
below 350
I begin with the disclaimer, which should come as no surprise, that no
normative theory can generate the precise descriptive theory that I have
" ' In other words, I know of no first principles from which
developed.35
torts as a confederation of causal and community models can be derived.
Torts must be experienced and cannot be understood apart from its
concrete manifestations. 5 2 The most that normative theory can do is to
justify the understanding of torts as a system in perpetual conflict. The
precise features which generate that conflict (the causal model and the
community model) can be described only through reflection on the concrete
manifestations of torts in history and culture.
It is, perhaps, surprising that the vision of torts in perpetual conflict
should need any justification at all. Frankly, I know of no other way to
understand torts properly Torts is filled with contradictions: differing and
plainly inconsistent theories and doctrines among cultures and throughout
history, varying procedures, disparate treatment of like claims of loss and
349. See supra part I.A.
350. I have begun this task in Tidmarsh, supra note 84.
351. See supra part I.B.
352. See PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 15, at 391 ("You cannot know what is red
by merely thinking of redness. You can only find red things by adventuring amid physical
experiences in this actual world.").
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damage. If we begin with an attitude of equal respect-that a decision
requiring proof of negligence in a case of blasting damages is as much a
tort case as a decision imposing strict liability-we can denominate one of
the decisions as the "right" decision only through some personal vision of
corrective justice, efficiency, morality, or intuition. But we cannot deny
that even the "wrong" decision (i.e., the decision that violates our
preferred normative principles) must be accepted as a tort case-a constitutive aspect of what torts is.
These "wrong" decisions are simply one manifestation of an even
larger phenomenon. First, consider more generally our life experiences.
Each experience forces us to face decisions and choices. I can walk to
work, ride my bike, or take a car. My choice is informed by a host of
factors: the weather; the amount of time that I have; my need for exercise;
my concerns for safety; the condition of my shoes, bike, and car. I bring
back to memory the prior occasions on which I faced similar choices, and
I recall their outcomes. I recollect that my choice yesterday to drive the
long way home means that the car does not have enough gas to get to
work. Then I make a choice. I am free to take the car, although that
would be a bad choice. Or I can walk or take a bike, which are better
choices.

Our lives are filled with series of experiences like these. Three
aspects of each of these experiences should be evident. The first is that our
past experiences help form our judgment about a present decision. The
second is that our past decisions cannot entirely determine our present
range of options. After having faced the same three transportation options
for years, a new bus line may one day come near my house, or I may
apprehend for the first time the always present but unknown possibility of
taking a taxi. Indeed, past experiences and their untoward consequences
sometimes spur us to discover or work toward previously unrealized
possibilities. Third, our present choices influence our future possibilities.
Having chosen to ride my bike to work, I cannot drive my car home. I
still have options-walking, riding the bike, the bus, or a taxi-but the
option of driving a car is not among them.
A moment's reflection proves that the law moves forward in precisely
this way A series of experiences and occasions of choice brings a person
to an occasion of suffering loss. That loss opens new ranges of possibilities. A person can simply suffer a loss, or she can seek the aid of others.
She can seek church-sponsored funding, government assistance, or
insurance. She can perhaps seek recourse in legal forms such as tort,
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' of
contract, antitrust, and so forth. Then, guided by the "prehension"353
past experience, she makes a choice. If the choice is to seek legal
recourse, then those involved with the administration of law and those from
whom recourse is sought are themselves called into an occasion of
experience. Like the person suffering loss, they now have a range of
possibilities from which they must choose.
Should the ensuing series of experiences and choices lead ultimately
to the point at which a legal decision on the allocation of the loss is
required, the decision maker (judge, jury, or both) must then choose an
outcome. The decision maker marshals known possibilities and (perhaps)
searches for unknown or forgotten solutions. Past experiences, which are
prehended through lenses such as precedent, justice, efficiency, morality,
intuition, bias, rhetoric, and sympathy,354 rush forward to screen the
possibilities. Then, the decision maker chooses, and the present outcome
recedes into the past to become one of the occasions prehended for future
questions of loss allocation. In the moment of choice, however, a range
of legitimate options is available, and nothing in the past can determine
absolutely the present response.355
So understood, each experience of loss (and loss allocation) must be
seen as unique, distinct, and conceivable primarily in terms of possibilities.
Many of the possibilities may appear to us to be "wrong" (i.e., less just,
less efficient, or less morally satisfying) on the basis of our prehensions
shaped by past experiences and beliefs. Many will conflict with each other
at the various levels of theory, doctrine, and practice. But it is their
process of having been brought to life that is critical. Having been
considered as a part of a present decision, possibilities gain a certain
immortality- both in the negative sense of having shaped an outcome
adverse to their counsel and in the positive sense of being available for
recall and use if the unfolding future reveals that the present decision was

353. I use the term "prehension" as Alfred North Whitehead did-the process of unifying
past occasions of experience in a present experience. See ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, supra note
15, at 226-27; MODES OF THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 205-06; Emmett, supra note 15, at

293.
354. Some of these influences predate the injury-causing event or the trial; others are
created by these events. In the creation of theory and doctrine, the preinjury influences are
likely to be relatively greater than the trial influences. In the adjudication of concrete
disputes, the opposite would be true.

355.

See ADVENTURES

OF IDEAS,

supra note 15, at 328 ("This process of the synthesis

of subjective forms derived conformally is not settled by the antecedent fact of the data.").
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ill-conceived. The conflicting possibilities may be forgotten,356 but their
existence cannot be denied.
Through the prehension of past experience and the continued existence
of the range of possibilities, each unique and individual legal outcome is
related to all others.357 Past outcomes are related to present choices both
because they establish and legitimize certain modes of analyzing possible
solutions and because they provide a sense of the untaken paths that may
avoid the pitfalls of prior solutions.358 Present outcomes are united to the
future in the same fashion: They set in motion events whose consequences
help to form the law's prehension of future possibilities.
The existence of conflicting possibilities and their simultaneous
interrelatedness has three further consequences with significance for the
understanding of law generally and torts in particular. The first is a
rejection of both determinism and unfettered free will. The law is at least
partially determined. Past outcomes foreclose some present possibilities
and also generate information that influences our prehension in a present
experience; thus, a particularly bad choice of doctrine, like a particularly
tiring bike ride on a hot day, inevitably will influence our choice about
whether to make the same choice in a similar future circumstance. At the
same time, however, free will remains. At the moment of choosing, we
retain the power to make a bad choice (like developing a no-duty rule for
careless motorists), a good choice, or perhaps a new choice just realized
and acted upon for the first time.
The second point is that law must be seen as a process of conflict not
only in the past and present, but also perpetually into the future. This
notion of perpetual conflict derives necessarily from the existence of
inconsistent past and present possibilities and the lack of any deterministic
way in which those present conflicts must be resolved. Human agents are
356. Even when they are forgotten, they remain subject to recall when a later occasion
"discovers" the possibility anew. Think, for instance, of CarrollTowing, an inconsequential
decision until its reinvigoration decades later by law and economics adherents.
357 Each legal outcome is related to nonlegal outcomes as well.
358. Not all past influences necessarily have a conscious relationship to present outcomes.
Whether due to lack of memory, lack of knowledge, or rhetorical simplicity, some past
influences are inevitably not raised to a conscious level from which they have the possibility
of being actualized either through acceptance or conscious rejection. Their influence on the
past outcomes that do rise to a conscious level in the present and the possibility of their
actualization in the future, however, make them actual even in the present. See ADVENTURES
oF IDEAS, supra note 15, at 325-28, 334-35.
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free at each moment of decision to choose a possibility for law that brings
it sharply into conflict with the past. In other words, no end state of law,
no idyllic world in which all principles are known and accepted, exists to
be discovered.359 Indeed, we even lack assurance that law will move
toward perfection or betterment because the power to choose freely
includes the power to choose wrongly And once a wrong choice is made,
there is no guarantee that the law will correct itself. There is only the
guarantee that the law has the capacity to change, and with that capacity
comes perpetual conflict.
Third, each present occasion is experienced most fully when the
possibilities for different options are greatest. This point requires greater
discussion than I can devote to it here."6 Let me simply state that the selfcreativity and free choice that inhere in each moment of present experience
are retarded when choices are essentially determined because of a dearth
of perceived available options; such retardation is relatively worse because
it fails to actualize the full range of creativity and freedom that is an aspect
" ' Thus, it is important for
of all objects in process, humans in particular.36
the intensity of experiencing present occasions that we remain open to the
novel possibilities that add zest and excitement.
These observations about human existence and law are vital to a
defense of my vision of torts. First, it should be evident that no theory of
torts can be adequate unless it accounts for past and present outcomes.
362
Each tort case-each moment of choosing-is the critical unit of torts.
359. This proposition, which I believe is nearly unassailable, has been advanced articulately
by Roberto Unger, see Unger, supra note 22, at 583-86, 648-65, and distinguishes him from both
Marxists and more traditional legal realists. But it is not a novel insight. See MODES OF
THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 109-14, 136; NORTHROP, supra note 19, at 121.
360. For short discussions, see COBB & GRIFFIN, supra note 16, at 28; MODES OF
THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 109, 119 ("Life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of
mere conformation.
[l]t is the realization of vibrant novelty which elicits the excitement of
life. The essence of life is to be found in the frustration of established order.").
361. It is the extraordinary ability to be less bound by instinct and other deterministic
forces that distinguishes humans from other forms of being that also experience present
occasions. See MODES OF THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 105-06, 169-71. Hence, resistance
to deterministic impulses and living with openness to our unique opportunities for creativity
and freedom better fulfill our humanity
362. To this extent at least, my descriptive theory can be described as "realist" rather than
"formalist." See WHITE, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that, for realist, tort case "overwhelmed
any principle that it allegedly stood for"); Weinrib, supra note 34, at 1009-11 (describing
formalism as being more concerned with generalized juridical relationships than with
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Each case possesses the totality of past remembered experiences (theoretical, doctrinal, and practical), the actualization of previously unrealized
possibilities, and the beginning of tort law's future. Theoretical work fails

to begin with these experiences. As a result, theoretical work is an
abstraction from torts and, as an abstraction, can never reach its essence. 63
Hence, my claim in Part I that torts must first be understood on its own
terms-which in turn led to the descriptive methodology employed in Part

II-proves true.
Second, if torts is not to play itself out as a relevant response to the
problem of loss, it must have the internal capacity-the lebensraum-to
regenerate itself over time. Any effort to allocate loss that is onedimensional or single-principled can survive for a time, as it works its own
approach into a state of perfection. Yet no state of perfection can maintain
itself forever; it inevitably will collapse before the onslaught of new data
or events in discord with the perfected object.364 This lesson is especially
relevant to civilizations and the legal institutions that support them:
"[P]erfection will not bear the tedium of indefinite repetition. To sustain
a civilization with the intensity of its first ardour requires more than
learning. Adventure is essential, namely, the search for new perfections."365 It follows that discord and imperfection are not necessarily bad:
"[T]here are in fact higher and lower perfections, and an imperfection

particular outcomes).
363. Judge Posner has attempted to argue that no theory can accurately describe all of
law, but that theories that justify significant segments of law can nonetheless be useful.
POSNER, supra note 29, § 1.3. In a certain sense he is correct; no "endstate" theory can
accurately describe our experience, yet such a theory can suggest a range of possible
approaches and thus have predictive power. See MODES OF THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 9295, 135-36. But in a more important sense, Posner is wrong. Posner's view of "endstate"
theory seems to be equivalent to a Platonic form of knowledge that is independent of (indeed,
incapable of) the process of change. Once we understand that it is possible (indeed, essential)
to introduce the element of perpetual process into tort theory, Posner's claim that no theory
can describe torts is simply incorrect. In fact, the great danger of efforts such as Posner's,
which seek to describe large segments of torts in terms of incomplete endstate theories, is that
these theories systematically exclude a wide array of possibilities inconsistent with the abstract
theory on which a theorist has myopically focused. Cf. id. at 132 (calling belief that
individualities can be separated from process "falsehood[ ]").
364. This insight, which can be found throughout Whitehead's metaphysical work, is
applied to human history, institutions, and civilizations in Parts I and IV of Adventures of
Ideas. ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, supra note 15, at 1-127, 307-81.
365. Id. at 332.
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aiming at a higher type stands above lower perfections."366 Therefore,
legal fields whose forms contain the internal capacity to aim at higher
perfections have the best prognosis for long-term survival. 67
The fact that torts must either be open to change or else die has both
a descriptive and a normative dimension. Descriptively, of course, torts
has not yet died, despite the rise and fall of hundreds of civilizations and
cultures that employed tort responses to loss allocation. This reality
strongly suggests that torts has the internal capacity-indeed, even the
drive-constantly to seek out new solutions and new forms of perfection.
That fact in turn suggests that the core of torts must contain some
irresolvable tensions that constantly spur it to seek new forms of perfection.
Normatively, the fact that all states of perfection will perish suggests
that a tort system that wishes to survive must reject all conceptualist efforts
to hitch the system to a particular natural law, corrective justice, or
efficiency theory In saying this, I am not suggesting that conceptualist
thought, which aims for a particular type of perfection in legal rules, is inappropriate; nearly every civilization has aimed at, and many have
achieved, a particular type of perfection.3 68 The conceptualist's first
principles are useful to torts because they help us to see a range of
possibilities that can be actualized in a present outcome, as well as provide
us with a lens through which past experiences can be prehended.
Moreover, conceptualist thought-the aim at a particular perfection-is an
inherent part of tort law, and it cannot be wished away by the equally
inherent destabilizing influence of anti-conceptualism.3 69 Rather, my point
is this: If the concern is for the survival and evolution of a particulartort
system, the system cannot fall entirely under the influence of any conceptual approach. Just as past experiences can only partially determine present
outcomes, no first principle can forever demand tort law's (or humanity's)
obedience in this and all other experiences. A world of immutable first
principles gives us no freedom of choice-at least after the principles are
known. Eventually (and probably sooner rather than later), such a tort
366.
367

Id. at 330.
At a certain point, however, even these fields will die. The fields' forms will cease

to speak to human experience, and the fields will fail to replace them with new forms. At that
point, the fields will cease to live.

368. See ADVENTURES

OF IDEAS,

supra note 15, at 127, 331-32.

369. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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system will die.
These descriptive and prescriptive points confirm the appropriateness
of a process theory that describes torts as the confederation of causal and
community models. With differing methods of prehending past experience, each model provides a different lens through which to view problems
of loss allocation. With their inconsistences and their potential breadth of
scope, the models leave room for a range of possibilities and for the free
selection of novel, self-creative expressions. Torts can be both respectful
of past experience and open to new influences; its causal and community
models, respectively, put one foot of torts in a world largely determined
by past events and one foot in a world that is unapologetically self-creative
and free. Talng its meaning from the journey rather than the destination,
torts denies the mirage of an idyllic end state by establishing structures (the
causal and community models) that ensure conflict and thus provide room
for perpetual regeneration.
Of course, the confederation's consistency with perpetual process does
not necessarily demonstrate its correctness. Numerous theoretical models
could guarantee that torts remained in perpetual conflict; as I have said, it
is impossible to know whether any description is correct without the type
of empirical work that formed the heart of this Article.370 The limited
confirmation of my descriptive theory of torts is important nonetheless.
What tort law is is also what it should be-at least if we assume that torts
should accurately mirror our experiences in life and in law generally That
assumption seems particularly appropriate as applied to torts. Although a
field of law (like torts) does not need to serve as a microcosm of life and
law, it is desirable. Torts is a window on a universal dimension of the
human condition: the experience of loss created by others' present
occasions of choice. Therefore, its resonance with our more general
understanding of law and life as perpetual process is particularly satisfying.
If all of this sounds like a defense of chaos over order, to some extent
it is. I cannot ascribe to torts a future filled with unambiguous theories,
unassailable doctrines, right practices, and certain answers. Nonetheless,
at least two influences moderate the potential for chaos.37' First, no culture
370. See supra notes 24-47, 83, 351 and accompanying text.

371. There is a third influence as well-optimism in the triumphant power of humanity
to achieve its greater perfection. This influence suggests that torts need not be haphazard and
disorganized, but rather can develop progressively within a society centered on the betterment

of the human condition. Nonetheless, this influence is more a matter of faith than reality, for
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can keep more than a limited range of possibilities active at one time.
Some of the limitations on actualized possibilities are procedural; a culture
is unlikely to regard favorably a possibility that was soundly rejected by the
relevant supreme court in an identical situation last year. Other limitations
inhere in the nature of intellectual thought. For a time at least, most
cultures have dominant (one might say "faddish") methods of approaching
problems. In our legal culture generally and m torts specifically, we have
seen in the past century the parade of formalism, realism, doctrinalism,
corrective justice, law and economics, critical studies, and pragmatism,
with each enjoying its time in the sun.3' These and other personal
preferences tend to filter out most of the past experiences and novel present
possibilities, leaving (at most) three or four choices to consider in detail.
A second tempering influence is the form of torts itself. Although
torts is a process in perpetual conflict, the form of torts presently requires
that the conflict occur within the boundaries established by the causal and
community models. Those models reduce the range of possibilities that are
likely to be actualized in a present decision. Admittedly, the greatest
number of those restrictions derives from the models' optimal conditions
rather than from the absolute limits of the models' boundaries, but these
conditions nonetheless provide an important filter. Although a situation
that the models' preferences do not clearly justify will occasionally appear
and test the absolute limits of the models' forms,373 generally the optimal
preferences screen out unappealing possibilities from our conscious
consideration.
Of course, if torts truly is in a process of perpetual conflict, the
question remains whether torts can bring itself into conflict even with its
boundaries of causation, community values, adjudicatory process, and loss.
Previously, I have suggested that it can do so. 4 If this is true, however,
then the utility of conceptualizing torts in terms of its causal and community forms becomes open to question.
the freedom to choose always carries with it the potential to abandon the gains achieved
before. Hence, I do not mention it in the text.
372. For a short history of the influences of the first five schools of thought on torts, see
WHrrE, supranote 1. For the influence of the latter two schools, see, e.g., Abel, supra note
9; Bender, Primer,supra note 9; Smith, supra note 8; Wells, supra note 8.
373. This is how I understand the Sindell case, which can be brought within the strict
terms of the causal model, see supra notes 176, 348 and accompanying text, but which
certainly violates the causal model's preferences for strong causal proof by plaintiffs.
374. See supra text following note 348.
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Nonetheless, the vision of humanity, law, and torts in perpetual
process does not negate the existence or utility of forms. It is always
possible to impose a certain abstract order on the range of possibilities with
which a particular present decision confronts us. Thus, we can say that
some series of choices are "good" choices, and others are "bad" choices;
that some are "just" or "efficient" choices, and others "unjust" or
"inefficient" choices. The possibilities can be divided, considered, and
reconstituted in any of a number of ways. As abstractions from the
possibilities themselves, these orders (or forms) are in a very real sense
less important than the possibilities and their process of realization in a
present outcome. But abstract forms serve the indispensible function of
helping us to catalogue and retrieve the full range of possibilities conveniently and cogently 17 Take, for instance, the Hymowitz problem of
women suffering cervical cancer. We must make some choice to deal with
the experience of loss. Forced to reinvent the range of possible choices for
each present occasion, we would likely prehend possibilities (whether past
or new) in a haphazard way that reduces opportunities for equal treatment
of like persons. By abstracting choices into various categories-tort,
contract, insurance, regulation, government relief, private assistance, and
so on-we better assure that the full range of possibilities lies before us"'
and, consequently, better assure the quality of the future choices that
375. Whitehead perceived that the existence of process is inextricably tied to the existence

of forms (or eternal objects), which are necessary to help us understand and actualize a
possibility in a present occasion of experience. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN, AN
INTERPRETATION OF WHITEHEAD'S METAPHYsics 215-20, 252-56 (1959); Ivor Leclerc, Form
andActuality, in THE RELEVANCE OF WHITEHEAD 169 (Ivor Leclerc ed., 1961); ADVENTURES
OF IDEAS, supra note 15, at 107-39; Emmett, supra note 15, at 292-93. At the same time,
Whitehead realized that these forms were indeterminate and could achieve concreteness only
through their individual actualization in occasions of experience. Actual experiences,
however, would never exhaust the form, which was broad enough to contain a wealth of
unrealized possibilities. See CHRISTIAN, supra, at 206-14. Whitehead's understanding of
forms provides the deeper normative justification for my earlier claim that torts must have
some form apart from its extant historical and cultural manifestations, but that the form is
indeterminate with respect to specific doctrines or outcomes. See supra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
376. Of course, even forms do not eliminate the problem of incomplete prehension of
possibilities. It is quite likely that one person will perceive the Hymowitz problem only
through the forms of regulation or legislation, another only through the forms of tort and
regulation, and a third only through the form of private assistance. Nonetheless, by being able
to "cubbyhole" a range of possibilities within one form, we reduce the initial burden of
memorizing the large numbers of possibilities presented within each form.
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depend on our present outcomes. Hence, forms are confining only insofar
as a person becomes so captived by a form that he or she fails to recognize
the reason for the form's existence-the unleashing of the full range of
possibilities for a present experience.
In a certain sense, therefore, our focus on the existence or precise
content of any form is not especially important. Calling Hymowitz a torts
case rather than a welfare redistribution or cost internalization case will not
cause the republic to fall or somehow reduce the range of actualized
possibilities confronting DES plaintiffs. Indeed, an occasional misbranding
as a tort case can serve to remind those of us stuck m the "torts rit" of the
full range of nontort possibilities inherent in present experiences.
On balance, however, the wholesale infusion of nontort possibilities into
tort law (i.e., the destruction of tort law's form) is a losing proposition. The
overexpansion of any form ultimately risks the reduction rather than the
expansion of actualized possibilities. Suppose, for instance, that the form of
"torts" could grow to include all of the common and statutory law The
enormity of the form would make it impossible to bring to mind the full
range of possibilities for present experience-except in the haphazard way
that forms are designed to prevent. 3" Inevitably, we would find that the
form of "torts" was no longer useful and would begin anew the process of
subdividing "torts" into new forms that were.
The secondary nature of forms may make the entire enterprise of this
Article seem insignificant: If the form of torts can exclude little in the way
of theory, doctrine, or practice and if we now discover that the little which
is excluded can nonetheless be seen as a legitimate external (i.e., nontort)
solution to loss, what good is it to know that torts is comprised of a causal
and a community model? If you expect specific "right" solutions to loss
allocation problems, I must concede that the answer is "very little." But if
the focus is on the critical unit of torts-the present case whose outcome
must be decided-the form gains an immediate relevance. For the plaintiff
prosecuting, the defendant defending, and the adjudicator deciding the case,
the elemental requirements of loss, adjudicatory process, causation, and
community values, as well as the optimal conditions associated with each
model, provide a quick check of the possibilities of a tort response and a
reminder to check other adjudicatory responses (contracts, antitrust, and so
on) as well.37
377 See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
378. If we shift focus to the role of law in society, the form of torts is also quite
significant. It might well be (although I am unable presently to prove it) that there are
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Therefore, the form of torts can be justified, at least in part, m
normative terms. The most satisfying dimension of the normative defense
is its ability to unite the discordant sounds of so many theories and trends
that fall into and out of fashion. We cannot deny the unbridgeable chasms
between efficiency and justice, morality and pragmatism, formalism and
critical scholarship; nor can we reconcile the conflicting individual results
and reasoning of cases adhering to each of these theories. A processoriented theory of torts steps away from the contradictions and hostilities and
embraces all. "We have an outcome to determine," the process theory says,
"and we welcome all of your perspectives. They give us choices, and to
choose is to be alive. We especially want your fresh ideas. Law and
economics was exciting m its time, but has since lost its novelty It has
become a part of our prehension, a part of our routine analysis that
originates from our past experiences. We want new choices as well-choices
never yet imagined. They too will excite us in their youth, become a more
comfortable part of our experience in their maturity, and recede from
memory in an obsolescent old age. And then we shall want still newer
theories. Now, let us begin by asking what choices are conceivably
available to us, and why might we choose them?"
Thus, in a way not quite pragmatic, 79 process theory finds wisdom and
freedom in the irreconcilable. All of the grand normative theories, as well
dimensions of human experience into which law cannot extend. Because the scope of law
cannot be greater than the sum of its component parts, the knowledge of the reach of each of
those component parts is a necessary step in the development of a jurisprudence of law in
process.

379. I take pragmatism to be a philosophical method that seeks to find the solution in the
"here and now" that best advances the interests of humanity, without worrying about the
intellectual claims of some primordial scientific, cultural, or deontological principle that it
should never be violated. See Ruth A. Putnam, Pragmatism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS

1002 (Lawrence C. Becker ed., 1992); Smith, supra note 38, at 422; Symposium, supra note
22.

So understood, a pragmatic theory and a process theory of torts vary in important

regards. Process theory permits a decision maker to follow a primordial principle and to
exclaim in good deontological fashion: "Damn the consequences!

Full speed ahead."

Similarly, process theory allows choices for the worse; pragmatism insists that its choices be
made with an eye to the betterment of humanity. Third, process theory suffers a culture to

remain static, whereas pragmatism requires (in a way offensive to many European and Asian
cultures) continued experimentation m the name of progress. See NORTHROP, supra note 19,
at 47 There are other differences as well, although they lie beyond the scope of this article.
See John Dewey, The Philosophy of Whitehead, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALFRED NORTH
WHITEHEAD 641-61 (Paul A. Schilpp ed., 1941) (discussing points of agreement and
disagreement between Dewey's pragmatism and Whitehead's metaphysics); Tidmarsh, supra

note 84 (same).
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as approaches that deny grand theories, have equal and respected life. Each
position stakes out a range of acceptable (and unacceptable) possibilities.
One position's counsel may be refused today, but the position's survival m
the present lets it carry the fight for its possibilities until tomorrow, whose
choice can only be partially determined by the choice today Conflicting
outcomes, rules, and theories are the norm, and no individual choice can
hope to be consistent with each of a myriad number of distinct and often
opposing choices. But it does not need to be. In a system of perpetual
evolution (and devolution), consistency is not an issue.
This reconciliation of competing positions through a vision of change
comes at too high a price for those who have staked everything upon a
particular theory or critique of torts. From their perspective, the opportunity
for a pet theory of efficiency or fairness to compete with pragmatic good
sense or the disestablishment of entrenched hegemomes for the soul of each
tort outcome gives inadequate shrift to the one true principle of torts. For
two reasons, however, the criticism is unavailing. First, the need to anoint
a particular theory or critique leaves either incurable ambiguities or
insufficient room for improvement. For instance, to proclaim corrective
justice as the "one true principle" fails to define whose version of corrective
justice is the correct one,3"' and to choose Jules Coleman's 1983 version of
corrective justice leaves no room for later improvements on or refinements
of that theory 381 Second, suppose that we could draw Rawls's "veil of
ignorance" around torts. Essentially, we have two techniques to address the
tensions among the various visions of torts: We could either pick one theory
and discard all the rest forever, or we could give each theory the opportunity
to compete to influence each occasion of loss allocation. If no theory could
know whether it would be the one ultimately adopted or one of the many
forever rejected, I suspect that any reasonably strong vision of torts would
prefer the chance of influence (the second option) to the high risk of eternal
annihilation (the first option). A level playing field and confidence in its
validity should be enough for any conceptualist or anti-conceptualist view of
torts, and that is precisely what process theory guarantees.

380. There are a number of competing theories. Some leading descriptions include
COLEMAN, supra note 14; Epstein, supra note 24; Fletcher, supra note 28; Schroeder, supra
note 113; Wemrib, supra note 34; Wright, supra note 36.
381. For Coleman's 1983 views, see Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Thetr
Scope and Limits: PartII, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983). Coleman himself has attempted to
improve upon his earlier ideas. See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 318-28.
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Those who stake out a theory of justice or morality, however, will raise
another flaw m process theory- Its inability to reject the unjust or the
immoral renders its relativism especially dangerous and despicable. The
reality that process theory generally, and the descriptive theory of torts
specifically, permits poor and even evil outcomes cannot be denied.
Causation is only a gentle brake on evil influences, and communities can
sometimes be hopelessly blinded by prejudice or evil intent. Nonetheless,
if our enterprise is to understand what tort law is, this moral critique offers
little of interest. Undeniably, torts has made many wrong turns in its
history 11 Even at its own normative level, however, a world of morality
or justice in which all answers are neatly worked out is not an especially
attractive one. Process theory invites those who wish a moral or just world
to work toward its attainment; it merely denies the possibility that we can
achieve a state of absolute justice or perfection.3 u In process theory, the
journey that we have undertaken rather than the destination that we will
never reach is our focus. 3" To denigrate the journey, as the moral critique
does, is to suggest that all those who die short of Shangri-La have lived less
perfect lives than those who reach the promised land. To the contrary,
process theory finds meaning in the journey, celebrates our present
existence, and makes us as fully participatory m humanity as those who
preceded and those who follow us. True progress toward a more moral or
just world can occur, but will occur only when there is the equal opportunity
to regress.
Conclusion
A process theory of torts may appear incapable of providing any lessons
about what torts "should" do today In general, I acknowledge the criticism.
We must find the "ought" of torts in personal credos of justice, efficiency,
pragmatism, or the like; we must be constantly willing to defend our views
against attack and to adjust them in light of new possibilities. Nonetheless,
I do believe that the process theory has at least one important implication for
382. For two cases which I believe to be missteps, see Tarleton v. M'Gawley, 170 Eng.
Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793) (allowing action of interference with slave trader's economic
advantage); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889) (countenancing
oligopolistic efforts at predatory pricing in colonial China), aff'd, 1892 App. Cas. 25.
383. See ADvENTURFs OF IDEAS, supra note 15, at 356 ("There is no totality which is
the harmony of all perfections. Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience
necessarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities.").
384. See MODES OF THOUGHT, supra note 15, at 131.
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the future of torts. As a complex and pluralistic society increasingly
margmalizes community values (and thus the community model), torts will
increasingly become a less important dimension of our response to occasions
of loss. Put somewhat differently, the future of torts depends upon the
existence of a vibrant core of community values.
The proof is simple. If we conceive of torts as the confederation of
causal and community models, it is evident that the causal model, with its
formal preferences, will spend its time logically spinning out the doctrinal
structures demanded by principles selected m a past moment of creativity 385
Its formal, backward-looking methodology aims at a perfection no longer
vibrant. Because it seeks answers through the prehension of existing data,
doctrines, and theories, the causal model does not seek out the new
possibility or the novel vision that challenges established structures. That
responsibility falls instead on the community model. Although conservative
in its own way,386 the community model is ultimately open to future
change-even to radical change when the community demands. Only the
community model, by disposition, is likely to actualize new possibilities and
new approaches to loss allocation. Indeed, thus effect will be felt beyond the
actual limits of the model itself.387
If we were to assume the absence of the community model and its
creative impulses, novel solutions to loss allocation would not disappear.
They would still exist and be available for actualization through other forms
of law such as contract, legislation, or welfare entitlements; or perhaps
through nonlegal forms as well. But these creative solutions-these ais at
new and higher perfections-would not be tort solutions. In this way, torts
would be margmalized as a living form of possibilities. Indeed, torts would
not be significantly distinct from other external, government-imposed
methods of loss allocation. Stuck in the mud of some previously declared
notion of appropriate behavior, torts will become far less interesting than the
novel possibilities of nontort solutions. Like a tort system hitched to a
particular conceptual solution, torts will wither and, perhaps, die.38
385. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
386. Before the community model can act, there must be widespread knowledge and
shared opinions about particular activities. Thus, even the community model is unlikely to
bring torts to the cutting edge of possibilities.
387 See supra notes 290, 348 and accompanying text.

388. See NORTHROP, supra note 19, at 93 (reporting findings of sociological jurisprudence that positive laws that are not "reinforced by the content of the norms embodied in
the culture
become ineffective"); id. at 102-04; supra note 362-68 and accompanying text.

A PROCESS THEORY OF TORTS

1427

Therefore, the future of torts as a viable form for loss allocation hinges
on the existence of a community model, which in turn depends on a vibrant
core of community values. In a technologically complex society, however,
the community increasingly lacks knowledge of the instrumentalities of
injury; in a pluralistic society, the community lacks a coherent opinion about
a defendant's proper methods of operating those instrumentalities. When
technology and pluralism combine, as they have in our society, the
community's sensibilities become relevant primarily for widely practiced and
noncontroversial activities such as car driving, entry on others' premises,
and land ownership,3"9 as well as a few oddball instances of failing to rescue,
remooring ships in a storm, and hunting accidents with equally negligent
shooters. In important and "hot" areas such as products liability, malpractice, privacy, and negligent economic harm, the community model is simply
not a player on the stage.
I do not know whether the remaining pockets of the community model
will sustain the far-flung empire of torts over the long haul. Recent events
certainly give rise to doubt that they can. The waves of tort reform show
how interest group solutions can supplant community norms when consensus
on tort solutions no longer exists. The much-debated recent withdrawal of
the common law from the precipice of experimentation 39 may reflect our
reluctance to push the causal model boldly toward new frontiers when the
community model has not caught up. On the other hand, in its literature,
cases, and practices, torts has already developed a vast array of roads not
taken, and the continuance of the community model in at least some areas
makes it possible that, like Sindell, some cases in the future will escape the
inherent conservatism of the causal model.
Although the fate of torts in a largely (but not entirely) complex and
pluralistic society is uncertain, the prognosis for torts improves dramatically
if we revisualize the nature of our communities. Although the community
389. Even here there are limits on consensus, as exemplified in the community's
disagreement about the duty of a social host toward those injured by a drunken guest. See,
e.g., Kelly v Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984); Sharon E. Conaway, Comment, The
Continuing Searchfor Solutions to the DrnkingDriver Tragedy and the Problem of Social
Host Liability, 82 Nw. U. L. RFV 403, 405 & n.21 (1988) (discussing cases imposing liability
on social guests and their legislative abrogation).
390. See.generally Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet
Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REV 731 (1992); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REv 479 (1990); David G. Owen, The FaultPit, 26 GA. L. REv 703
(1992); Schwartz, supra note 307
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influence remains the primary creative force for new possibilities in torts, the
time lag for the adoption of new values in a community means that by the
time of the adoption, these values have long lost the cutting edge that process
theory prefers. Moreover, traditional communities, which are often
paternalistic and prejudiced against the unknown, can suppress the
realization of new possibilities even more effectively than formalism, which
must at least pursue new possibilities when logic dictates."' 1 In these
communities, the true freedom that nourishes process theory is not possible.
At the same time, the rejection of any community in favor of personal
freedom cannot be the answer, for the escape from community leaves torts
trapped in the causal model. In a tort system without a vibrant sense of
community, we become isolated from each other and from the law, for
neither connects well to our personal mores and experiences.
The only way to solve this dilemma is to re-invent our sense of
community We must create "new communities that are not experienced as
restrictive of freedom." 3" The communities must be radically open to the
journey on a never-ending path toward new and higher perfections. They
must be committed to immediate and sustained dialogue about the new
possibilities suggested by unfamiliar conduct, so that the ignorance and
pluralism that stymie the community model are quickly overcome.
This antidote is radical, and we might not choose to take it. Perhaps
saving a central place for torts is simply not worth the price. Maybe it
would be easier to downsize the scope of the causal model by removing
nagging problems like products liability from tort law's consideration.
Perhaps torts should plug along and wait either for community consensus to
catch up or for torts to shrivel up.
Whatever the answer, process theory connects torts to the larger issues
of the society that we now have and the one that we may choose to have in
the future. If torts wishes to be an integral part of that future society,
community norms must bear upon the center of its work.

391. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 28, at 572 (recognizing that theory of reciprocity might
inadequately protect minorities who engage in activities that are not norm); Symposium, supra
note 22, at vii-viii (posing question of whether pragmatism can be reconciled with minority
voices).
392. COBB & GRIFFIN, supra note 16, at 113.

